Narrative:

While en route from sgf to jln, in process of a descent from 5000 MSL to 3000 MSL (to ultimate land at jln runway 31), my aircraft (light transport) suffered a complete power loss, resulting in a forced landing. The WX was VMC at both sgf and jln, and en route. The IFR flight plan was cancelled approximately 1/2 way (roughly 25 NM from jln.) the fuel required for the leg from sgf to jln was 25 us gallons or 150 pounds. The fuel onboard at departure from sgf was estimated to be 240 pounds with gauges indicating 280 pounds but a conservative planned estimate of 200 pounds at takeoff. There are four fuel tanks and each gauge indication showed an even distribution of 70 pounds per tank on start up at sgf. The aircraft was operated using the mains (aka tips or tiptanks) until power failure became imminent. Fuel flow indicated approximately 95 pounds per hour average per engine. Air time was expected to be a maximum of 20 mins. Fuel consumed for the trip was expected to be 60 pounds, with 30 pounds consumed from each main tank. According to my conservative estimates, I expected to land at jln with at least 20 pounds of fuel in each main tank. At the time of the power loss the main tanks indicated 40 pounds of fuel each. Needless to say, the power loss was certainly unexpected. According to my past experience of about 450 hours on this same plane, the fuel contained in my main tanks according to my estimates and according to the gauges was enough to fly to jln. It was enough to leave sgf and cruise for 33 mins or more. I noticed a slight change in the sound of the engines. I reached down to the fuel selector switches. I noticed a slight fluctuation of the right engine fuel flow. I switched the right selector to right auxiliary (auxiliary tank) and at the same time quickly flipped on the auxiliary boost pumps with my left hand. I noticed another change in the engines 'sound' and then switched the left fuel selector to left auxiliary. By this time another glance at the engine instruments indicated both left and right fuel flow was zero. I quickly looked for suitable landing sites. I chose to glide the plane towards what appeared to be a large pasture area and attempted to restate both engines by simultaneously jockeying throttles, mixtures and propellers. I tried priming with both the auxiliary pumps in both 'on' and 'high' positions with tanks selected on auxiliary and on mains and then again to auxiliary. The primer switch was activated as well. All of my efforts failed to produce any change in the fuel flow indicators or in the power of the engine. I concentrated now on trying to make the best landing I could and contacted jln tower to let them know that I was landing in a field with a complete power loss. Using a nose high pitch on landing and full aft elevator control I attempted to stop the plane in as short a distance as possible but still ended up going through a fence. I proceeded to secure the aircraft and cargo and began making what arrangements I could in order to facilitate rescue. The plane was secured and watched over by local law enforcement personnel while others arrived on the scene. Later in the afternoon, the aircraft owners were able to start both engines and operate them on all 4 fuel tanks and even moved the aircraft to another part of the field under its own power. I did suspect unporting of the main tanks and also that a vapor lock might have occurred. Fuel that was required was on board for all legs. For the flight from sgf to jln I was anticipating cancellation of IFR when about 20-25 NM from sgf. I had anticipated a total of 1.5 hours of fuel remaining (start up to shutdown) on board make a missed approach at jln and then return to sgf if necessary plus 45 mins reserve in past incident discussions and interviews, I had heard comments that I should have flown the aircraft with auxiliary fuel once in cruise and then switched over to main tanks for landing and takeoff. This action is not specifically required in the aircraft manual nor has anyone ever specifically told or informed me that was the way I should have operated the aircraft. Why experience after-the-fact leads me to believe there is some knowledge about my aircraft and its operation that was not provided until after the incident. Furthermore, this information seems to be based on experience and an intimate mechanical knowledge of the aircraft make and model. One FAA inspector commented that what I needed to know was known by 'experienced light transport pilots. Now, you're an experienced light transport pilot.' I would like to see the light transport operated such that future pilots be made aware of the possibility that auxiliary fuel may not be available for engine operation under certain conditions. Why operation of the auxiliary tanks was within the guidelines of my training and supervision, and within the bounds of my experience with the aircraft and the information available regarding the operation of the aircraft not indicate any mistakes on my part.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR TAXI HAS FUEL PROBLEM. FUEL ON BOARD OK BUT ENGS FAIL. FORCED LNDG.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE FROM SGF TO JLN, IN PROCESS OF A DSCNT FROM 5000 MSL TO 3000 MSL (TO ULTIMATE LAND AT JLN RWY 31), MY ACFT (LTT) SUFFERED A COMPLETE PWR LOSS, RESULTING IN A FORCED LNDG. THE WX WAS VMC AT BOTH SGF AND JLN, AND ENRTE. THE IFR FLT PLAN WAS CANCELLED APPROX 1/2 WAY (ROUGHLY 25 NM FROM JLN.) THE FUEL REQUIRED FOR THE LEG FROM SGF TO JLN WAS 25 US GALLONS OR 150 POUNDS. THE FUEL ONBOARD AT DEP FROM SGF WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 240 POUNDS WITH GAUGES INDICATING 280 POUNDS BUT A CONSERVATIVE PLANNED ESTIMATE OF 200 POUNDS AT TKOF. THERE ARE FOUR FUEL TANKS AND EACH GAUGE INDICATION SHOWED AN EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF 70 POUNDS PER TANK ON START UP AT SGF. THE ACFT WAS OPERATED USING THE MAINS (AKA TIPS OR TIPTANKS) UNTIL PWR FAILURE BECAME IMMINENT. FUEL FLOW INDICATED APPROX 95 POUNDS PER HR AVERAGE PER ENG. AIR TIME WAS EXPECTED TO BE A MAX OF 20 MINS. FUEL CONSUMED FOR THE TRIP WAS EXPECTED TO BE 60 POUNDS, WITH 30 POUNDS CONSUMED FROM EACH MAIN TANK. ACCORDING TO MY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES, I EXPECTED TO LAND AT JLN WITH AT LEAST 20 POUNDS OF FUEL IN EACH MAIN TANK. AT THE TIME OF THE PWR LOSS THE MAIN TANKS INDICATED 40 POUNDS OF FUEL EACH. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE PWR LOSS WAS CERTAINLY UNEXPECTED. ACCORDING TO MY PAST EXPERIENCE OF ABOUT 450 HRS ON THIS SAME PLANE, THE FUEL CONTAINED IN MY MAIN TANKS ACCORDING TO MY ESTIMATES AND ACCORDING TO THE GAUGES WAS ENOUGH TO FLY TO JLN. IT WAS ENOUGH TO LEAVE SGF AND CRUISE FOR 33 MINS OR MORE. I NOTICED A SLIGHT CHANGE IN THE SOUND OF THE ENGS. I REACHED DOWN TO THE FUEL SELECTOR SWITCHES. I NOTICED A SLIGHT FLUCTUATION OF THE R ENG FUEL FLOW. I SWITCHED THE R SELECTOR TO R AUX (AUX TANK) AND AT THE SAME TIME QUICKLY FLIPPED ON THE AUX BOOST PUMPS WITH MY L HAND. I NOTICED ANOTHER CHANGE IN THE ENGS 'SOUND' AND THEN SWITCHED THE L FUEL SELECTOR TO L AUX. BY THIS TIME ANOTHER GLANCE AT THE ENG INSTS INDICATED BOTH L AND R FUEL FLOW WAS ZERO. I QUICKLY LOOKED FOR SUITABLE LNDG SITES. I CHOSE TO GLIDE THE PLANE TOWARDS WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LARGE PASTURE AREA AND ATTEMPTED TO RESTATE BOTH ENGS BY SIMULTANEOUSLY JOCKEYING THROTTLES, MIXTURES AND PROPS. I TRIED PRIMING WITH BOTH THE AUX PUMPS IN BOTH 'ON' AND 'HIGH' POSITIONS WITH TANKS SELECTED ON AUX AND ON MAINS AND THEN AGAIN TO AUX. THE PRIMER SWITCH WAS ACTIVATED AS WELL. ALL OF MY EFFORTS FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY CHANGE IN THE FUEL FLOW INDICATORS OR IN THE PWR OF THE ENG. I CONCENTRATED NOW ON TRYING TO MAKE THE BEST LNDG I COULD AND CONTACTED JLN TWR TO LET THEM KNOW THAT I WAS LNDG IN A FIELD WITH A COMPLETE PWR LOSS. USING A NOSE HIGH PITCH ON LNDG AND FULL AFT ELEVATOR CTL I ATTEMPTED TO STOP THE PLANE IN AS SHORT A DISTANCE AS POSSIBLE BUT STILL ENDED UP GOING THROUGH A FENCE. I PROCEEDED TO SECURE THE ACFT AND CARGO AND BEGAN MAKING WHAT ARRANGEMENTS I COULD IN ORDER TO FACILITATE RESCUE. THE PLANE WAS SECURED AND WATCHED OVER BY LCL LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL WHILE OTHERS ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. LATER IN THE AFTERNOON, THE ACFT OWNERS WERE ABLE TO START BOTH ENGS AND OPERATE THEM ON ALL 4 FUEL TANKS AND EVEN MOVED THE ACFT TO ANOTHER PART OF THE FIELD UNDER ITS OWN PWR. I DID SUSPECT UNPORTING OF THE MAIN TANKS AND ALSO THAT A VAPOR LOCK MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED. FUEL THAT WAS REQUIRED WAS ON BOARD FOR ALL LEGS. FOR THE FLT FROM SGF TO JLN I WAS ANTICIPATING CANCELLATION OF IFR WHEN ABOUT 20-25 NM FROM SGF. I HAD ANTICIPATED A TOTAL OF 1.5 HRS OF FUEL REMAINING (START UP TO SHUTDOWN) ON BOARD MAKE A MISSED APCH AT JLN AND THEN RETURN TO SGF IF NECESSARY PLUS 45 MINS RESERVE IN PAST INCIDENT DISCUSSIONS AND INTERVIEWS, I HAD HEARD COMMENTS THAT I SHOULD HAVE FLOWN THE ACFT WITH AUX FUEL ONCE IN CRUISE AND THEN SWITCHED OVER TO MAIN TANKS FOR LNDG AND TKOF. THIS ACTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED IN THE ACFT MANUAL NOR HAS ANYONE EVER SPECIFICALLY TOLD OR INFORMED ME THAT WAS THE WAY I SHOULD HAVE OPERATED THE ACFT. WHY EXPERIENCE AFTER-THE-FACT LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THERE IS SOME KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MY ACFT AND ITS OP THAT WAS NOT PROVIDED UNTIL AFTER THE INCIDENT. FURTHERMORE, THIS INFO SEEMS TO BE BASED ON EXPERIENCE AND AN INTIMATE MECHANICAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACFT MAKE AND MODEL. ONE FAA INSPECTOR COMMENTED THAT WHAT I NEEDED TO KNOW WAS KNOWN BY 'EXPERIENCED LTT PLTS. NOW, YOU'RE AN EXPERIENCED LTT PLT.' I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE LTT OPERATED SUCH THAT FUTURE PLTS BE MADE AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT AUX FUEL MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR ENG OP UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. WHY OP OF THE AUX TANKS WAS WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF MY TRAINING AND SUPERVISION, AND WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE ACFT AND THE INFO AVAILABLE REGARDING THE OP OF THE ACFT NOT INDICATE ANY MISTAKES ON MY PART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.