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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 203709 |
Time | |
Date | 199203 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lgb |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 185 flight time total : 5500 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 203709 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 25000 flight time type : 6000 |
ASRS Report | 203909 |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Starting a 3 day sequence, we got airplane 12 min prior to scheduled push, then had a flow time to meet. Habit pattern broken with takeoff and lndgs being conducted on runway 12 vice 30. Told to hold short of 16L by ground control. After acknowledgement, first officer was copying weight and balance while captain taxied along taxiway G. We both forgot 16L was right there. After copying numbers, I was waiting for my taxi chart when ground control called to tell us we had failed to stop, cleared us across and told us to hold short of runway 12. Moral for me: next time I'm not positive where a clearance (limit is, company business will wait while I check that first, no matter who is driving the plane. Hurry and confusion are individually dangerous, together potentially catastrophic. Fortunately there was no traffic on 16L at the time. Supplemental information from acn: 203909. The copilot and I were on our first trip together and not yet in sync. And I imagine there was an element of brain fade on my part. It was totally my error and my personal corrective action will be to be more cognizant during taxi operation especially when somewhat abnormal conditions exist. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states both crew members totally shocked that they allowed this to happen. Reporter had 'gut' instinct that should have gotten out airport diagram and asked company to wait. It is reporter habit to get out airport diagram at garte. But operations eager to give the weight and balance numbers. Believes captain feeling pressure of late push back and meeting flow time. Most unusual to use runway 12 (only third time in five years) and that is major factor along with runway being so close to ramp at push back position. They turned around and were right at the runway. Reporter feels small and poorly painted signs are also part of problem.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR CLRED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY. ENTERS RWY THEN CLRED TO CROSS.
Narrative: STARTING A 3 DAY SEQUENCE, WE GOT AIRPLANE 12 MIN PRIOR TO SCHEDULED PUSH, THEN HAD A FLOW TIME TO MEET. HABIT PATTERN BROKEN WITH TKOF AND LNDGS BEING CONDUCTED ON RWY 12 VICE 30. TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF 16L BY GND CTL. AFTER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, FO WAS COPYING WT AND BAL WHILE CAPT TAXIED ALONG TAXIWAY G. WE BOTH FORGOT 16L WAS RIGHT THERE. AFTER COPYING NUMBERS, I WAS WAITING FOR MY TAXI CHART WHEN GND CTL CALLED TO TELL US WE HAD FAILED TO STOP, CLRED US ACROSS AND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12. MORAL FOR ME: NEXT TIME I'M NOT POSITIVE WHERE A CLRNC (LIMIT IS, COMPANY BUSINESS WILL WAIT WHILE I CHK THAT FIRST, NO MATTER WHO IS DRIVING THE PLANE. HURRY AND CONFUSION ARE INDIVIDUALLY DANGEROUS, TOGETHER POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. FORTUNATELY THERE WAS NO TFC ON 16L AT THE TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN: 203909. THE COPLT AND I WERE ON OUR FIRST TRIP TOGETHER AND NOT YET IN SYNC. AND I IMAGINE THERE WAS AN ELEMENT OF BRAIN FADE ON MY PART. IT WAS TOTALLY MY ERROR AND MY PERSONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TO BE MORE COGNIZANT DURING TAXI OP ESPECIALLY WHEN SOMEWHAT ABNORMAL CONDITIONS EXIST. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES BOTH CREW MEMBERS TOTALLY SHOCKED THAT THEY ALLOWED THIS TO HAPPEN. RPTR HAD 'GUT' INSTINCT THAT SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN OUT ARPT DIAGRAM AND ASKED COMPANY TO WAIT. IT IS RPTR HABIT TO GET OUT ARPT DIAGRAM AT GARTE. BUT OPS EAGER TO GIVE THE WT AND BAL NUMBERS. BELIEVES CAPT FEELING PRESSURE OF LATE PUSH BACK AND MEETING FLOW TIME. MOST UNUSUAL TO USE RWY 12 (ONLY THIRD TIME IN FIVE YEARS) AND THAT IS MAJOR FACTOR ALONG WITH RWY BEING SO CLOSE TO RAMP AT PUSH BACK POS. THEY TURNED AROUND AND WERE RIGHT AT THE RWY. RPTR FEELS SMALL AND POORLY PAINTED SIGNS ARE ALSO PART OF PROBLEM.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.