Narrative:

ATIS broadcast indicated ILS approachs were being conducted to runways 18L and 18R. Air carrier X was inbound from the ese, we briefed and set up for an ILS to 18L. Upon handoff to approach control we were given 'expect 18R ILS' so we then re-briefed and changed everything in the cockpit which was necessary to execute the 18R ILS approach in cvg. Following several positioning turns and a frequency change to another approach controller north, northeast of the airport, we were given a turn to 210 degree, told to maintain altitude until established, and cleared for the ILS 18L approach, all within a very short period of time. As this was the first and only mention of 18L since contacting approach, I asked for a verification of the runway clearance. 18L was confirmed, followed by 'I thought you had been told.' by the time frequency and altitude bugs were changed for this 'new' runway we were above the GS, although we had managed to get on the localizer. Using higher than normal descent rates to et down and capture the glideslope decreased spacing on traffic ahead, which caused the tower to rescind landing clearance after initially giving it to us. After it was clear that the aircraft ahead would be off the runway in time, we were again cleared to land. On the phone after shutting down at the gate, a supervisor apologized for the handling, admitting that they were having problems with parallel approachs in cvg, that the controllers forgot to reclr us to 18L once the snow-removal operations were completed on that runway. It seems to me that cvg approach causes or suffers from an unusually high number of abnormal situations in the course of directing arrival traffic to the runway environment, both in VMC and IMC. After having once been given a 60 degree intercept to the localizer just inside the final approach fix to this same runway on another occasion, I am very vigilant when going into this airport. I know that the addition of runway 18L/36R in just the past couple of yrs has caused many new procedure dealing with parallel approachs, etc., but I fear that if a review of current practices and procedure in cvg is not done with an eye toward 'tightening things up considerably' then there may be a very serious incident (south) in that location in the near future. I have tried to make my fears known to supervisory personnel each time that I felt ATC handling practices were unusually abnormal or unsafe. The gentleman I spoke to after this latest incident commented that they have now gotten some experienced controllers up from atl to help them out, so perhaps this situation will be corrected in the near future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X GIVEN LATE RWY CHANGE FOR MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWYS APCHS.

Narrative: ATIS BROADCAST INDICATED ILS APCHS WERE BEING CONDUCTED TO RWYS 18L AND 18R. ACR X WAS INBOUND FROM THE ESE, WE BRIEFED AND SET UP FOR AN ILS TO 18L. UPON HDOF TO APCH CTL WE WERE GIVEN 'EXPECT 18R ILS' SO WE THEN RE-BRIEFED AND CHANGED EVERYTHING IN THE COCKPIT WHICH WAS NECESSARY TO EXECUTE THE 18R ILS APCH IN CVG. FOLLOWING SEVERAL POSITIONING TURNS AND A FREQ CHANGE TO ANOTHER APCH CTLR N, NE OF THE ARPT, WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO 210 DEG, TOLD TO MAINTAIN ALT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, AND CLRED FOR THE ILS 18L APCH, ALL WITHIN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. AS THIS WAS THE FIRST AND ONLY MENTION OF 18L SINCE CONTACTING APCH, I ASKED FOR A VERIFICATION OF THE RWY CLRNC. 18L WAS CONFIRMED, FOLLOWED BY 'I THOUGHT YOU HAD BEEN TOLD.' BY THE TIME FREQ AND ALT BUGS WERE CHANGED FOR THIS 'NEW' RWY WE WERE ABOVE THE GS, ALTHOUGH WE HAD MANAGED TO GET ON THE LOC. USING HIGHER THAN NORMAL DSCNT RATES TO ET DOWN AND CAPTURE THE GLIDESLOPE DECREASED SPACING ON TFC AHEAD, WHICH CAUSED THE TWR TO RESCIND LNDG CLRNC AFTER INITIALLY GIVING IT TO US. AFTER IT WAS CLR THAT THE ACFT AHEAD WOULD BE OFF THE RWY IN TIME, WE WERE AGAIN CLRED TO LAND. ON THE PHONE AFTER SHUTTING DOWN AT THE GATE, A SUPVR APOLOGIZED FOR THE HANDLING, ADMITTING THAT THEY WERE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH PARALLEL APCHS IN CVG, THAT THE CTLRS FORGOT TO RECLR US TO 18L ONCE THE SNOW-REMOVAL OPS WERE COMPLETED ON THAT RWY. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT CVG APCH CAUSES OR SUFFERS FROM AN UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF ABNORMAL SITUATIONS IN THE COURSE OF DIRECTING ARR TFC TO THE RWY ENVIRONMENT, BOTH IN VMC AND IMC. AFTER HAVING ONCE BEEN GIVEN A 60 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE LOC JUST INSIDE THE FINAL APCH FIX TO THIS SAME RWY ON ANOTHER OCCASION, I AM VERY VIGILANT WHEN GOING INTO THIS ARPT. I KNOW THAT THE ADDITION OF RWY 18L/36R IN JUST THE PAST COUPLE OF YRS HAS CAUSED MANY NEW PROC DEALING WITH PARALLEL APCHS, ETC., BUT I FEAR THAT IF A REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROC IN CVG IS NOT DONE WITH AN EYE TOWARD 'TIGHTENING THINGS UP CONSIDERABLY' THEN THERE MAY BE A VERY SERIOUS INCIDENT (S) IN THAT LOCATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I HAVE TRIED TO MAKE MY FEARS KNOWN TO SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL EACH TIME THAT I FELT ATC HANDLING PRACTICES WERE UNUSUALLY ABNORMAL OR UNSAFE. THE GENTLEMAN I SPOKE TO AFTER THIS LATEST INCIDENT COMMENTED THAT THEY HAVE NOW GOTTEN SOME EXPERIENCED CTLRS UP FROM ATL TO HELP THEM OUT, SO PERHAPS THIS SITUATION WILL BE CORRECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.