Cabin attendant distraction smoke in galley.

Attributes
ACN	204576
Time
Date	199203
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : iah
State Reference	TX
Altitude	msl bound lower : 3000 msl bound upper : 3000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : iah
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : straight in
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 170 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 500
ASRS Report	204576
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other other : unspecified
Resolutory Action	flight crew : overcame equipment problem other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Aircraft
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

We were on the ILS to 12R at hou when a flight attendant called on the interphone and said there was smoke in the back of the airplane. I directed the first officer to ask her for a more specific location (lavatory, galley, etc.) and to stay on the interphone. We were told by the flight attendant that it was coming from the galley area, and it was white smoke by the ovens. She was directed to turn off ovens, coffee maker switches, etc. The first officer started the smoke and fire procedures. I turned off the galley power and continued to fly the aircraft with the first officer handling the emergency procedures. I was about to declare an emergency when the flight attendant said the smoke had stopped. Smoke and fire procedures were complete and the runway in sight. We completed checklists and landed normally. The aft galley was not emitting smoke at this point, and so we proceeded to the gate where we asked for maintenance to meet the aircraft at the aft galley with a fire extinguisher just in case. After all passenger had deplaned, maintenance removed the oven and we found evidence of an overheated oven cavity that had overheated the galley walls immediately around the aft right hand oven. The fan inside the oven wouldn't turn, and the thermostat apparently didn't control the oven temperature and it got really hot in the immediate area of that oven. The electrical wiring to that oven was left disconnected. Circuit breaker clamped and the unit on mco. The entire galley area was inspected for hot spots. There was no electrical damage found outside the oven itself. No circuit breakers had popped throughout the ordeal. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback to reporter revealed that the medium large transport aircraft in this event has carried this type oven for many yrs. The oven went to the air carrier's repair shop and the reporter is still awaiting information re the failure on the oven. From initial information, reporter learned that this type oven does not have an overheat protective device and implied that this type of safety design could be placed within the oven at a fairly low cost. Reporter stated he would forward any new information on an additional report if and when the information is available.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CABIN ATTENDANT DISTR SMOKE IN GALLEY.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE ILS TO 12R AT HOU WHEN A FLT ATTENDANT CALLED ON THE INTERPHONE AND SAID THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE. I DIRECTED THE FO TO ASK HER FOR A MORE SPECIFIC LOCATION (LAVATORY, GALLEY, ETC.) AND TO STAY ON THE INTERPHONE. WE WERE TOLD BY THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT IT WAS COMING FROM THE GALLEY AREA, AND IT WAS WHITE SMOKE BY THE OVENS. SHE WAS DIRECTED TO TURN OFF OVENS, COFFEE MAKER SWITCHES, ETC. THE FO STARTED THE SMOKE AND FIRE PROCS. I TURNED OFF THE GALLEY PWR AND CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT WITH THE FO HANDLING THE EMER PROCS. I WAS ABOUT TO DECLARE AN EMER WHEN THE FLT ATTENDANT SAID THE SMOKE HAD STOPPED. SMOKE AND FIRE PROCS WERE COMPLETE AND THE RWY IN SIGHT. WE COMPLETED CHKLISTS AND LANDED NORMALLY. THE AFT GALLEY WAS NOT EMITTING SMOKE AT THIS POINT, AND SO WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE WHERE WE ASKED FOR MAINT TO MEET THE ACFT AT THE AFT GALLEY WITH A FIRE EXTINGUISHER JUST IN CASE. AFTER ALL PAX HAD DEPLANED, MAINT REMOVED THE OVEN AND WE FOUND EVIDENCE OF AN OVERHEATED OVEN CAVITY THAT HAD OVERHEATED THE GALLEY WALLS IMMEDIATELY AROUND THE AFT R HAND OVEN. THE FAN INSIDE THE OVEN WOULDN'T TURN, AND THE THERMOSTAT APPARENTLY DIDN'T CTL THE OVEN TEMP AND IT GOT REALLY HOT IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THAT OVEN. THE ELECTRICAL WIRING TO THAT OVEN WAS LEFT DISCONNECTED. CIRCUIT BREAKER CLAMPED AND THE UNIT ON MCO. THE ENTIRE GALLEY AREA WAS INSPECTED FOR HOT SPOTS. THERE WAS NO ELECTRICAL DAMAGE FOUND OUTSIDE THE OVEN ITSELF. NO CIRCUIT BREAKERS HAD POPPED THROUGHOUT THE ORDEAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK TO RPTR REVEALED THAT THE MLG ACFT IN THIS EVENT HAS CARRIED THIS TYPE OVEN FOR MANY YRS. THE OVEN WENT TO THE ACR'S REPAIR SHOP AND THE RPTR IS STILL AWAITING INFO RE THE FAILURE ON THE OVEN. FROM INITIAL INFO, RPTR LEARNED THAT THIS TYPE OVEN DOES NOT HAVE AN OVERHEAT PROTECTIVE DEVICE AND IMPLIED THAT THIS TYPE OF SAFETY DESIGN COULD BE PLACED WITHIN THE OVEN AT A FAIRLY LOW COST. RPTR STATED HE WOULD FORWARD ANY NEW INFO ON AN ADDITIONAL RPT IF AND WHEN THE INFO IS AVAILABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.