Narrative:

The flight was routine until the incident occurred. We worked for approximately 40 mins on chandelles, then decided to return to hwo to execute touch and go lndgs. The callup 2 NM southwest was made with the aircraft at approximately 1000 ft MSL. Shortly after the tower callup, and with the aircraft descending to the hwo pattern altitude of 800 ft MSL, approximately 1 1/2 mi southwest of the airport, the engine began to lose power. I glanced at the tachometer and noted an engine RPM of approximately 1300. I immediately took control of the aircraft and attempted to restore power by pulling carburetor heat on, exercising the throttle, verifying that the fuel shutoff valve was in the on position, and began looking for a suitable place to land. By exercising the throttle I was able to obtain a brief increase in power, and then tried to crank the engine using the starter. After a few seconds it became obvious that the engine would not restart, so I turned the aircraft toward the landing site (the aircraft would obviously not make the airport) while the student called the tower to report our situation. The landing area was an open area of soft sand with sand and grass debris bulldozed into piles approximately 4 ft high. The aircraft impacted on top of 1 of these piles and nosed over backwards. Both occupants were unhurt and exited the aircraft without incident. Emergency personnel arrived on the scene within approximately 5 mins. The accident occurred because the aircraft ran out of fuel. The student (a rated private pilot) failed to correctly ascertain the amount of fuel remaining in the tanks prior to takeoff, compounded by my own lack of a second visual check. The written policy of the flight training center, as stated in its training regulations allows students to depart on local area flts with as little as 1/2 fuel aboard. While the student in this situation made a good faith effort to visually verify the amount of fuel on board the aircraft, he had no positive way to tell if the tanks were 1/2 full without using a sight gauge. The aircraft had been flown the previous evening (after business hours) for 2.8 hours. I feel strongly that the policy of allowing students to leave the ramp with anything less than full tanks (unless an over gross weight situation would occur) was a major contributing factor in this accident. Had a policy been in effect that no aircraft leaves the ramp without full fuel, the student would have had no choice but to have the aircraft fueled prior to the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL EXHAUSTION IN SMA.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS ROUTINE UNTIL THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. WE WORKED FOR APPROX 40 MINS ON CHANDELLES, THEN DECIDED TO RETURN TO HWO TO EXECUTE TOUCH AND GO LNDGS. THE CALLUP 2 NM SW WAS MADE WITH THE ACFT AT APPROX 1000 FT MSL. SHORTLY AFTER THE TWR CALLUP, AND WITH THE ACFT DSNDING TO THE HWO PATTERN ALT OF 800 FT MSL, APPROX 1 1/2 MI SW OF THE ARPT, THE ENG BEGAN TO LOSE PWR. I GLANCED AT THE TACHOMETER AND NOTED AN ENG RPM OF APPROX 1300. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE PWR BY PULLING CARB HEAT ON, EXERCISING THE THROTTLE, VERIFYING THAT THE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE WAS IN THE ON POS, AND BEGAN LOOKING FOR A SUITABLE PLACE TO LAND. BY EXERCISING THE THROTTLE I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN A BRIEF INCREASE IN PWR, AND THEN TRIED TO CRANK THE ENG USING THE STARTER. AFTER A FEW SECONDS IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE ENG WOULD NOT RESTART, SO I TURNED THE ACFT TOWARD THE LNDG SITE (THE ACFT WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT MAKE THE ARPT) WHILE THE STUDENT CALLED THE TWR TO RPT OUR SITUATION. THE LNDG AREA WAS AN OPEN AREA OF SOFT SAND WITH SAND AND GRASS DEBRIS BULLDOZED INTO PILES APPROX 4 FT HIGH. THE ACFT IMPACTED ON TOP OF 1 OF THESE PILES AND NOSED OVER BACKWARDS. BOTH OCCUPANTS WERE UNHURT AND EXITED THE ACFT WITHOUT INCIDENT. EMER PERSONNEL ARRIVED ON THE SCENE WITHIN APPROX 5 MINS. THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE THE ACFT RAN OUT OF FUEL. THE STUDENT (A RATED PRIVATE PLT) FAILED TO CORRECTLY ASCERTAIN THE AMOUNT OF FUEL REMAINING IN THE TANKS PRIOR TO TKOF, COMPOUNDED BY MY OWN LACK OF A SECOND VISUAL CHK. THE WRITTEN POLICY OF THE FLT TRAINING CTR, AS STATED IN ITS TRAINING REGS ALLOWS STUDENTS TO DEPART ON LCL AREA FLTS WITH AS LITTLE AS 1/2 FUEL ABOARD. WHILE THE STUDENT IN THIS SITUATION MADE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO VISUALLY VERIFY THE AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD THE ACFT, HE HAD NO POSITIVE WAY TO TELL IF THE TANKS WERE 1/2 FULL WITHOUT USING A SIGHT GAUGE. THE ACFT HAD BEEN FLOWN THE PREVIOUS EVENING (AFTER BUSINESS HRS) FOR 2.8 HRS. I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE POLICY OF ALLOWING STUDENTS TO LEAVE THE RAMP WITH ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL TANKS (UNLESS AN OVER GROSS WT SITUATION WOULD OCCUR) WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS ACCIDENT. HAD A POLICY BEEN IN EFFECT THAT NO ACFT LEAVES THE RAMP WITHOUT FULL FUEL, THE STUDENT WOULD HAVE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO HAVE THE ACFT FUELED PRIOR TO THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.