Narrative:

I was the replacement captain to fly flight from fwa-ord in aircraft. Freezing rain was falling at the time of passenger boarding. Previous captain briefed me on icing, freezing level 3000 ft MSL, and minor engine indication with #2 engine torque meter. I had the aircraft deiced before gate departure including all winged surfaces, propellers, spinners, and nose section. Fuselage was not deiced. Taxied to runway 5, 8 mins from gate departure to takeoff roll. All engine anti-icing and deicing were on, including continuous ignition. Takeoff clearance was received, climb to 3000 ft runway heading. I initiated the takeoff keeping an eye on #2 engine torque, first officer called V1, vr, V2, I initiated pitch attitude to 6 degrees on ADI, aircraft felt slow and sluggish even though airspeed indicated V2 plus 10 and increasing. I remarked to first officer aircraft felt slow and I delayed flap retraction a few hundred ft (usually 400 ft). Tower turned us to 360 degrees and contact departure. During left turn it was very difficult to roll aircraft left, I immediately looked at scs (standby control system) for warning lights. Ailerons were very heavy to the left, normal to the right. I had first officer fly the aircraft to see if he could confirm my control feel, which he did. I took control back and rolled out of turn on 360 degree heading. (First officer was with previous captain and flew aircraft from ord-fwa.) aircraft had just completed major wing damage repair to right wing, previous day.) on rollout, fire warning system for left engine illuminated. Initiated memory checklist items, including power reduction on left engine. I hesitated initially on feathering engine because the icing conditions. I had first officer declare an emergency and received heading to downwind leg for runway 5. I elected to feather engine and fire both fire bottles, fire lights and warnings remained illuminated. I told flight attendants we were returning to fwa with an end fire warning, made short and brief speech to passenger, first officer completed checklists for landing. Aircraft was accumulating freezing rain ice at a very rapid rate. Control was heavy and sluggish during circuit. Went from maximum continuous power to maximum contingency on the base leg with gear up and flaps at approach. I made a slow turn to final, touchdown was normal, torque was near maximum at touchdown (approximately 99 percent). I let aircraft decelerate, without reverse and light braking (runway condition). Crash fire rescue equipment confirmed no fire. We taxied back to gate, and deplaned passenger. During post-flight, aircraft was 1 large ice cube, I have never had that much ice on an aircraft in all my flying career. Aircraft had 60 passenger, 4 crew, 5000 pounds of fuel, unknown bags, and this was near our maximum gross of 50550 pounds. The aircraft has history of false fire warnings, especially after deicing procedures. Mechanics found chaffed fire wires. This captain will no longer observe deicing from cockpit and will perform a full and observed control check of all controls. We speculate that 1 or both aileron spring tabs froze, deicing fluid may have been forced into pitot system or static system was frozen over. I didn't notice standby instrument readings at the time. Their static system is heated, once airborne, both air data computers for primary EFIS displays are not heated. In theory placement of static ports on fuselage prevents ice problems. I'm not sure if this is true during freezing rain. Deicing fluid may have placed a minor roll, fluid was not at normal temperature (160-170 degrees) for deicing. Freezing rain came early, operations was not ready. Moderate to severe ice was reported by several aircraft in area after our incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MDT DEICED PRIOR TO DEP HAS RAPID ICE BUILDUP, ENG FIRE WARNINGS, POOR CTL. RETURN LAND.

Narrative: I WAS THE REPLACEMENT CAPT TO FLY FLT FROM FWA-ORD IN ACFT. FREEZING RAIN WAS FALLING AT THE TIME OF PAX BOARDING. PREVIOUS CAPT BRIEFED ME ON ICING, FREEZING LEVEL 3000 FT MSL, AND MINOR ENG INDICATION WITH #2 ENG TORQUE METER. I HAD THE ACFT DEICED BEFORE GATE DEP INCLUDING ALL WINGED SURFACES, PROPS, SPINNERS, AND NOSE SECTION. FUSELAGE WAS NOT DEICED. TAXIED TO RWY 5, 8 MINS FROM GATE DEP TO TKOF ROLL. ALL ENG ANTI-ICING AND DEICING WERE ON, INCLUDING CONTINUOUS IGNITION. TKOF CLRNC WAS RECEIVED, CLB TO 3000 FT RWY HDG. I INITIATED THE TKOF KEEPING AN EYE ON #2 ENG TORQUE, FO CALLED V1, VR, V2, I INITIATED PITCH ATTITUDE TO 6 DEGS ON ADI, ACFT FELT SLOW AND SLUGGISH EVEN THOUGH AIRSPD INDICATED V2 PLUS 10 AND INCREASING. I REMARKED TO FO ACFT FELT SLOW AND I DELAYED FLAP RETRACTION A FEW HUNDRED FT (USUALLY 400 FT). TWR TURNED US TO 360 DEGS AND CONTACT DEP. DURING L TURN IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO ROLL ACFT L, I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED AT SCS (STANDBY CTL SYS) FOR WARNING LIGHTS. AILERONS WERE VERY HVY TO THE L, NORMAL TO THE R. I HAD FO FLY THE ACFT TO SEE IF HE COULD CONFIRM MY CTL FEEL, WHICH HE DID. I TOOK CTL BACK AND ROLLED OUT OF TURN ON 360 DEG HDG. (FO WAS WITH PREVIOUS CAPT AND FLEW ACFT FROM ORD-FWA.) ACFT HAD JUST COMPLETED MAJOR WING DAMAGE REPAIR TO R WING, PREVIOUS DAY.) ON ROLLOUT, FIRE WARNING SYS FOR L ENG ILLUMINATED. INITIATED MEMORY CHKLIST ITEMS, INCLUDING PWR REDUCTION ON L ENG. I HESITATED INITIALLY ON FEATHERING ENG BECAUSE THE ICING CONDITIONS. I HAD FO DECLARE AN EMER AND RECEIVED HDG TO DOWNWIND LEG FOR RWY 5. I ELECTED TO FEATHER ENG AND FIRE BOTH FIRE BOTTLES, FIRE LIGHTS AND WARNINGS REMAINED ILLUMINATED. I TOLD FLT ATTENDANTS WE WERE RETURNING TO FWA WITH AN END FIRE WARNING, MADE SHORT AND BRIEF SPEECH TO PAX, FO COMPLETED CHKLISTS FOR LNDG. ACFT WAS ACCUMULATING FREEZING RAIN ICE AT A VERY RAPID RATE. CTL WAS HVY AND SLUGGISH DURING CIRCUIT. WENT FROM MAX CONTINUOUS PWR TO MAX CONTINGENCY ON THE BASE LEG WITH GEAR UP AND FLAPS AT APCH. I MADE A SLOW TURN TO FINAL, TOUCHDOWN WAS NORMAL, TORQUE WAS NEAR MAX AT TOUCHDOWN (APPROX 99 PERCENT). I LET ACFT DECELERATE, WITHOUT REVERSE AND LIGHT BRAKING (RWY CONDITION). CFR CONFIRMED NO FIRE. WE TAXIED BACK TO GATE, AND DEPLANED PAX. DURING POST-FLT, ACFT WAS 1 LARGE ICE CUBE, I HAVE NEVER HAD THAT MUCH ICE ON AN ACFT IN ALL MY FLYING CAREER. ACFT HAD 60 PAX, 4 CREW, 5000 POUNDS OF FUEL, UNKNOWN BAGS, AND THIS WAS NEAR OUR MAX GROSS OF 50550 POUNDS. THE ACFT HAS HISTORY OF FALSE FIRE WARNINGS, ESPECIALLY AFTER DEICING PROCS. MECHS FOUND CHAFFED FIRE WIRES. THIS CAPT WILL NO LONGER OBSERVE DEICING FROM COCKPIT AND WILL PERFORM A FULL AND OBSERVED CTL CHK OF ALL CTLS. WE SPECULATE THAT 1 OR BOTH AILERON SPRING TABS FROZE, DEICING FLUID MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO PITOT SYS OR STATIC SYS WAS FROZEN OVER. I DIDN'T NOTICE STANDBY INST READINGS AT THE TIME. THEIR STATIC SYS IS HEATED, ONCE AIRBORNE, BOTH AIR DATA COMPUTERS FOR PRIMARY EFIS DISPLAYS ARE NOT HEATED. IN THEORY PLACEMENT OF STATIC PORTS ON FUSELAGE PREVENTS ICE PROBLEMS. I'M NOT SURE IF THIS IS TRUE DURING FREEZING RAIN. DEICING FLUID MAY HAVE PLACED A MINOR ROLL, FLUID WAS NOT AT NORMAL TEMP (160-170 DEGS) FOR DEICING. FREEZING RAIN CAME EARLY, OPS WAS NOT READY. MODERATE TO SEVERE ICE WAS RPTED BY SEVERAL ACFT IN AREA AFTER OUR INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.