Postflt inspection reveals missing hydraulic bay service door.

Attributes
ACN	206686
Time
Date	199203
Day	Tue
Local Time Of Day	0001 To 0600
Place
Locale Reference	airport : day
State Reference	OH
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 9000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Navigation In Use	Other
Flight Phase	climbout : takeoff cruise other ground : preflight
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 75 flight time total : 5800 flight time type : 350
ASRS Report	206686
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 85 flight time total : 1523 flight time type : 240
ASRS Report	206685
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Aircraft
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

While operating an light transport on a scheduled passenger carrying flight, a servicing door for a hydraulic bay underneath the left nacelle was blown off. A thorough preflight was done and no discrepancies were noted. On arrival we left the aircraft and did a walk around post-flight inspection. During this inspection, we failed to notice that the door was missing. There were several factors that contributed. First, the nature of the post-flight inspection is that it is not as detail- oriented as a preflight inspection allowing us to overlook the missing door. Second, the inspection was done before sunrise. I believe the location of the panel and the darkness at the time caused us to overlook it. Also, this flight was the last leg of a 15 hour continuous duty trip with a 5 hour rest at the hotel. I believe that fatigue was also a contributory factor. Supplemental information from acn 206685: a more thorough preflight inspection first officer the service door cover/covers fasteners and hinge could possibly expose worn or loose fasteners, or unsecure panel.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALS MISSING HYD BAY SVC DOOR.

Narrative: WHILE OPERATING AN LTT ON A SCHEDULED PAX CARRYING FLT, A SVCING DOOR FOR A HYD BAY UNDERNEATH THE L NACELLE WAS BLOWN OFF. A THOROUGH PREFLT WAS DONE AND NO DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED. ON ARR WE LEFT THE ACFT AND DID A WALK AROUND POST-FLT INSPECTION. DURING THIS INSPECTION, WE FAILED TO NOTICE THAT THE DOOR WAS MISSING. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED. FIRST, THE NATURE OF THE POST-FLT INSPECTION IS THAT IT IS NOT AS DETAIL- ORIENTED AS A PREFLT INSPECTION ALLOWING US TO OVERLOOK THE MISSING DOOR. SECOND, THE INSPECTION WAS DONE BEFORE SUNRISE. I BELIEVE THE LOCATION OF THE PANEL AND THE DARKNESS AT THE TIME CAUSED US TO OVERLOOK IT. ALSO, THIS FLT WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 15 HR CONTINUOUS DUTY TRIP WITH A 5 HR REST AT THE HOTEL. I BELIEVE THAT FATIGUE WAS ALSO A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 206685: A MORE THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION FO THE SVC DOOR COVER/COVERS FASTENERS AND HINGE COULD POSSIBLY EXPOSE WORN OR LOOSE FASTENERS, OR UNSECURE PANEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.