Narrative:

While I was in the office of FBO on sat afternoon, I overheard, on their scanner, one pilot repeatedly calling the local controller, requesting clearance for takeoff. One of the line personnel casually remarked that this aircraft must be in the 'dead spot.' upon further questioning, this 'dead spot' of which they spoke, is apparently right near the hold lines at the approach end of runway 23R. Shortly thereafter, I got out my hand held transceiver and began to casually monitor 120.05. It wasn't more than a few mins later that the 'dead spot' became rather apparent. While listening I heard the local controller issue a clearance for takeoff to small aircraft. I did not listen closely to the clearance, but I distinctly heard the pilot of small aircraft read back 'cleared to takeoff runway 23L.' the next transmission I heard was shortly after small aircraft was airborne, in which the local controller, in no uncertain terms, berated the pilot because he took off on runway 23L instead of 23R. Later in the day, upon questioning other pilots who had flown that afternoon, I heard similar stories of poor communications after taxiing to the runway's edge. Upon questioning the pilot from whom I heard the repeated calls go unanswered (the incident that originally piqued my interest), I found that another pilot had to act as a relay. After doing so, the local controller switched to a 'backup radio.' communication was then re-established. As an ATC specialist (atcs) at cleveland center, I am very much aware of the importance of catching an incorrect readback on a clearance. In fact, it seems that fully 25 percent of our operrors can be attributed to controllers not listening closely enough. At cleveland center I teach developmental trainees that no matter what clearance they issue, the clearance a pilot has is the clearance that the pilot reads back to them, which is why listening is so utterly important. But I know that no matter how closely a controller listens, if the radio equipment fails to receive the transmission from the aircraft, it is obvious that the controller will never hear the readback. I'm afraid that your local controller may not have heard the readback from small aircraft simply because of this apparent 'dead spot.' please understand that the purpose of this letter is not to lay fault or blame. The purpose is to be certain that you are aware of this potentially deadly problem in the ATC communications near the hold lines of runway 23R and taxiway golf. I am certain that you will wish to investigate this problem further, and do what is necessary to remedy this potentially dangerous situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter states he was paying fuel bill and it was his wife who was pilot trying to call tower. That is why it got his attention so quickly. Seems there is no structural blockage from runway to tower as he recalls. It is a big airport and end of runway a long distance from tower. Reporter has received no response from anyone else. Information update: reporter advised ASRS that the problem has been rectified. Antennas were repositioned within the last several months and no complaints have been received. Facility feels that the blind spot area no longer exists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT AT APCH END OF RWY 23R ARE IN 'DEAD SPOT' AND HAVE NO COM WITH TWR.

Narrative: WHILE I WAS IN THE OFFICE OF FBO ON SAT AFTERNOON, I OVERHEARD, ON THEIR SCANNER, ONE PLT REPEATEDLY CALLING THE LCL CTLR, REQUESTING CLRNC FOR TKOF. ONE OF THE LINE PERSONNEL CASUALLY REMARKED THAT THIS ACFT MUST BE IN THE 'DEAD SPOT.' UPON FURTHER QUESTIONING, THIS 'DEAD SPOT' OF WHICH THEY SPOKE, IS APPARENTLY RIGHT NEAR THE HOLD LINES AT THE APCH END OF RWY 23R. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I GOT OUT MY HAND HELD TRANSCEIVER AND BEGAN TO CASUALLY MONITOR 120.05. IT WASN'T MORE THAN A FEW MINS LATER THAT THE 'DEAD SPOT' BECAME RATHER APPARENT. WHILE LISTENING I HEARD THE LCL CTLR ISSUE A CLRNC FOR TKOF TO SMA. I DID NOT LISTEN CLOSELY TO THE CLRNC, BUT I DISTINCTLY HEARD THE PLT OF SMA READ BACK 'CLRED TO TKOF RWY 23L.' THE NEXT XMISSION I HEARD WAS SHORTLY AFTER SMA WAS AIRBORNE, IN WHICH THE LCL CTLR, IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS, BERATED THE PLT BECAUSE HE TOOK OFF ON RWY 23L INSTEAD OF 23R. LATER IN THE DAY, UPON QUESTIONING OTHER PLTS WHO HAD FLOWN THAT AFTERNOON, I HEARD SIMILAR STORIES OF POOR COMS AFTER TAXIING TO THE RWY'S EDGE. UPON QUESTIONING THE PLT FROM WHOM I HEARD THE REPEATED CALLS GO UNANSWERED (THE INCIDENT THAT ORIGINALLY PIQUED MY INTEREST), I FOUND THAT ANOTHER PLT HAD TO ACT AS A RELAY. AFTER DOING SO, THE LCL CTLR SWITCHED TO A 'BACKUP RADIO.' COM WAS THEN RE-ESTABLISHED. AS AN ATC SPECIALIST (ATCS) AT CLEVELAND CTR, I AM VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CATCHING AN INCORRECT READBACK ON A CLRNC. IN FACT, IT SEEMS THAT FULLY 25 PERCENT OF OUR OPERRORS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO CTLRS NOT LISTENING CLOSELY ENOUGH. AT CLEVELAND CTR I TEACH DEVELOPMENTAL TRAINEES THAT NO MATTER WHAT CLRNC THEY ISSUE, THE CLRNC A PLT HAS IS THE CLRNC THAT THE PLT READS BACK TO THEM, WHICH IS WHY LISTENING IS SO UTTERLY IMPORTANT. BUT I KNOW THAT NO MATTER HOW CLOSELY A CTLR LISTENS, IF THE RADIO EQUIP FAILS TO RECEIVE THE XMISSION FROM THE ACFT, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CTLR WILL NEVER HEAR THE READBACK. I'M AFRAID THAT YOUR LCL CTLR MAY NOT HAVE HEARD THE READBACK FROM SMA SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THIS APPARENT 'DEAD SPOT.' PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS NOT TO LAY FAULT OR BLAME. THE PURPOSE IS TO BE CERTAIN THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF THIS POTENTIALLY DEADLY PROBLEM IN THE ATC COMS NEAR THE HOLD LINES OF RWY 23R AND TAXIWAY GOLF. I AM CERTAIN THAT YOU WILL WISH TO INVESTIGATE THIS PROBLEM FURTHER, AND DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO REMEDY THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR STATES HE WAS PAYING FUEL BILL AND IT WAS HIS WIFE WHO WAS PLT TRYING TO CALL TWR. THAT IS WHY IT GOT HIS ATTN SO QUICKLY. SEEMS THERE IS NO STRUCTURAL BLOCKAGE FROM RWY TO TWR AS HE RECALLS. IT IS A BIG ARPT AND END OF RWY A LONG DISTANCE FROM TWR. RPTR HAS RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM ANYONE ELSE. INFO UPDATE: RPTR ADVISED ASRS THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN RECTIFIED. ANTENNAS WERE REPOSITIONED WITHIN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND NO COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. FACILITY FEELS THAT THE BLIND SPOT AREA NO LONGER EXISTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.