Narrative:

This event involves a feeling of complacency brought on by the latest generation of highly automated, glass- cockpit airplanes (in this case, an large transport). The capability to fully program complex procedures (sids, stars, transitions, approachs) can lead to a perception on the part of the flight crew that the flight management system, once programmed, will follow a particular procedure fully and completely. Our flight involved an arrival to memphis international. We were cleared for a 'middy 8' (arrival from over pxu). We had descended to 10000 ft at 'middy' intersection. The ATIS indicated approachs in progress to 36L, 36R, and 27. After some discussion with the controller, we were told to expect an ILS to 36R. Our particular problem arose in that as we approached 'clark' intersection (8 DME from mem) we were not aware of our need to turn to a 175 degree heading for landing to the north. One reason for this was that we were in the midst of a cockpit briefing and an approach checklist for an autoland to 36R. But the major reason for our lack of awareness was our presentation of the middy arrival on our display unit's (mcdu) flight plan page. The waypoints displayed were: miola, middy, H226 manual, ------ flight plan discontinuity. That is, after 'middy' intersection, our FMS had us flying a heading of 226 degree (indicated by 'H226 manual') with no mention being made of 'clark' intersection, or the required turn to 175 degree. Our sense of 'automated complacency' lead us to believe that a heading of 226 degree was correct as we busied ourselves with approach briefings and checklists. We thus flew past 'clark' intersection until roughly 6 DME from mem, when the controller realized we had not turned and told us we should be on a heading of 175 degree. We then turned, checked the chart, and realized we had, in fact, missed the turn point. We know that the chart is the gospel and that the FMS should always be verified against the charts, yet we allowed ourselves, during a busy work period, to fully trust the automated system, which we erroneously assumed was complete and correct. This brings up 2 points regarding highly-automated systems: why was 'clark' intersection not in the data base program? Because of capacity constraints? If so, why not increase capacity? It seems to create confusion when some, but not all, intxns are included in procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT CREW, WITH ALL OF THE MOST ADVANCED FLT GUIDANCE EQUIP, FAILED TO FLY A STAR AS PUBLISHED.

Narrative: THIS EVENT INVOLVES A FEELING OF COMPLACENCY BROUGHT ON BY THE LATEST GENERATION OF HIGHLY AUTOMATED, GLASS- COCKPIT AIRPLANES (IN THIS CASE, AN LGT). THE CAPABILITY TO FULLY PROGRAM COMPLEX PROCS (SIDS, STARS, TRANSITIONS, APCHS) CAN LEAD TO A PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF THE FLC THAT THE FLT MGMNT SYS, ONCE PROGRAMMED, WILL FOLLOW A PARTICULAR PROC FULLY AND COMPLETELY. OUR FLT INVOLVED AN ARR TO MEMPHIS INTL. WE WERE CLRED FOR A 'MIDDY 8' (ARR FROM OVER PXU). WE HAD DSNDED TO 10000 FT AT 'MIDDY' INTXN. THE ATIS INDICATED APCHS IN PROGRESS TO 36L, 36R, AND 27. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION WITH THE CTLR, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS TO 36R. OUR PARTICULAR PROBLEM AROSE IN THAT AS WE APCHED 'CLARK' INTXN (8 DME FROM MEM) WE WERE NOT AWARE OF OUR NEED TO TURN TO A 175 DEG HDG FOR LNDG TO THE N. ONE REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT WE WERE IN THE MIDST OF A COCKPIT BRIEFING AND AN APCH CHKLIST FOR AN AUTOLAND TO 36R. BUT THE MAJOR REASON FOR OUR LACK OF AWARENESS WAS OUR PRESENTATION OF THE MIDDY ARR ON OUR DISPLAY UNIT'S (MCDU) FLT PLAN PAGE. THE WAYPOINTS DISPLAYED WERE: MIOLA, MIDDY, H226 MANUAL, ------ FLT PLAN DISCONTINUITY. THAT IS, AFTER 'MIDDY' INTXN, OUR FMS HAD US FLYING A HDG OF 226 DEG (INDICATED BY 'H226 MANUAL') WITH NO MENTION BEING MADE OF 'CLARK' INTXN, OR THE REQUIRED TURN TO 175 DEG. OUR SENSE OF 'AUTOMATED COMPLACENCY' LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT A HDG OF 226 DEG WAS CORRECT AS WE BUSIED OURSELVES WITH APCH BRIEFINGS AND CHKLISTS. WE THUS FLEW PAST 'CLARK' INTXN UNTIL ROUGHLY 6 DME FROM MEM, WHEN THE CTLR REALIZED WE HAD NOT TURNED AND TOLD US WE SHOULD BE ON A HDG OF 175 DEG. WE THEN TURNED, CHKED THE CHART, AND REALIZED WE HAD, IN FACT, MISSED THE TURN POINT. WE KNOW THAT THE CHART IS THE GOSPEL AND THAT THE FMS SHOULD ALWAYS BE VERIFIED AGAINST THE CHARTS, YET WE ALLOWED OURSELVES, DURING A BUSY WORK PERIOD, TO FULLY TRUST THE AUTOMATED SYS, WHICH WE ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED WAS COMPLETE AND CORRECT. THIS BRINGS UP 2 POINTS REGARDING HIGHLY-AUTOMATED SYSTEMS: WHY WAS 'CLARK' INTXN NOT IN THE DATA BASE PROGRAM? BECAUSE OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS? IF SO, WHY NOT INCREASE CAPACITY? IT SEEMS TO CREATE CONFUSION WHEN SOME, BUT NOT ALL, INTXNS ARE INCLUDED IN PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.