Narrative:

Last fri, I reported for duty in silver city to work the afternoon shift. I was informed by the morning shift captain that the airplane nx had lost both communication and navigational abilities while in precipitation on approach to clovis municipal airport earlier in the day. Realizing that these were the symptoms of a chronic form of light transport malfunction that I had been made aware of just a few days prior, I chose to operate all segments of the day's schedule so long as official WX reports and forecasts indicated that these flts could remain clear of clouds. Upon reaching abq I received the current WX from duats and personally spoke with a WX specialist at the albuquerque FSS. Both of these sources indicated that WX in the denver area was forecast to be IMC. Navigation along the route of saf-den remaining clear of clouds would be difficult or impossible. Although nx had performed flawlessly during our first segment of the day, I felt it would be both unsafe and foolhardy to fly into these conditions knowing that all communications and navigational capabilities may be lost. I chose, therefore, to refuse the saf-den segment, but informed company flight flow that the abq-saf segment could be operated clear of clouds and I was willing to fly to saf. Per conference phone conversation with mr X mr a, mr B, and myself, I learned that aircraft ny was inbound to abq and I could 'swap' nx for ny. Mr a assured me that maintenance records indicated a clean bill of health for ny with no recent squawks pertaining to communication or navigation problems. Upon arrival, the captain of ny (mr C) informed me that he had earlier experienced both communication and navigational troubles with ny. I chose, therefore, to refuse operation of ny in addition to that of nx. Captain C refused nx. Flight to fmn could be made clear of clouds with some effort, so flight flow dispatched both nx and ny to that destination to receive a propeller grounding strap modification that was hoped would correct the malfunctions. Shortly after arriving in fmn with nx, I noticed nz taxiing in. I spoke with the captain (mr D) and learned he had had communication, navigation and additional trouble during the last 2 segments of his trip. Captain D was to hand nz over to a new crew in fmn. The outbound captain (mr east) refused nz for the aforementioned malfunctions. Nx received its 'propeller mod kit.' no one, not even the propeller manufacturer technical representative, could assure me that this modification would in fact correct the light transport model systems malfunctions described above. Flight flow dispatched us to repos the airplane from fmn to service for the morning shift in service. WX along the route was forecast to be IMC with thunderstorms. Approximately 1/3 of the flight was completed clear of clouds with no systems malfunctions. Shortly after entering IMC conditions my first officer and I realized that we were having difficulty receiving albuquerque center. Radio static made it hard to hear center's clrncs. About this time we noticed that we had lost LORAN navigational ability. Having switched to VOR navigation, although still outside service's reception range, and while discussing the situation, I noticed that my eyes and lungs were irritated by something. I asked my first officer if he smelled anything strange. He agreed that we had fumes in the cockpit. We donned oxygen masks and performed the appropriate emergency checklist. By this time our radio communication was essentially useless. Apparently we could transmit clearly, but reception was overpwred by loud, squealing static. Service's VOR had been intermittent. I had assumed, at first, the cause of this to be our distance from the station, but began to realize that this was not the case. Agreeing that we had lost LORAN navigation, VOR navigation, communication, and that we had fumes in the cockpit, we declared an emergency with abq center. I had been fortunate to be able to hear center long enough to receive a clearance for a heading and altitude toward abq prior to our declaring this emergency. We had seen abq before entering IMC. So, although there was still a lot of WX in the area, I was assured we would enter VMC and be able to fly a visual approach. I was troubled, however, that our radar now seemed inoperative also. About 25 mi from abq weencountered VMC. All navigation and communication was restored to normal and we landed without further incident. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. The 'propeller mod kit' mentioned is a piece of braid that bonds the propeller blades to the propeller hub electrically. This problem applies to only one model of the light transport. The FAA, the air carrier and the manufacturers are aware of and are working on the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CERTAIN MODEL LTT, WHEN FLOWN IN PRECIPITATION, EXPERIENCES STATIC WHICH RENDERS COM AND NAV RECEIVERS INOP.

Narrative: LAST FRI, I RPTED FOR DUTY IN SILVER CITY TO WORK THE AFTERNOON SHIFT. I WAS INFORMED BY THE MORNING SHIFT CAPT THAT THE AIRPLANE NX HAD LOST BOTH COM AND NAVIGATIONAL ABILITIES WHILE IN PRECIPITATION ON APCH TO CLOVIS MUNICIPAL ARPT EARLIER IN THE DAY. REALIZING THAT THESE WERE THE SYMPTOMS OF A CHRONIC FORM OF LTT MALFUNCTION THAT I HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF JUST A FEW DAYS PRIOR, I CHOSE TO OPERATE ALL SEGMENTS OF THE DAY'S SCHEDULE SO LONG AS OFFICIAL WX RPTS AND FORECASTS INDICATED THAT THESE FLTS COULD REMAIN CLR OF CLOUDS. UPON REACHING ABQ I RECEIVED THE CURRENT WX FROM DUATS AND PERSONALLY SPOKE WITH A WX SPECIALIST AT THE ALBUQUERQUE FSS. BOTH OF THESE SOURCES INDICATED THAT WX IN THE DENVER AREA WAS FORECAST TO BE IMC. NAV ALONG THE RTE OF SAF-DEN REMAINING CLR OF CLOUDS WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH NX HAD PERFORMED FLAWLESSLY DURING OUR FIRST SEGMENT OF THE DAY, I FELT IT WOULD BE BOTH UNSAFE AND FOOLHARDY TO FLY INTO THESE CONDITIONS KNOWING THAT ALL COMS AND NAVIGATIONAL CAPABILITIES MAY BE LOST. I CHOSE, THEREFORE, TO REFUSE THE SAF-DEN SEGMENT, BUT INFORMED COMPANY FLT FLOW THAT THE ABQ-SAF SEGMENT COULD BE OPERATED CLR OF CLOUDS AND I WAS WILLING TO FLY TO SAF. PER CONFERENCE PHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR X MR A, MR B, AND MYSELF, I LEARNED THAT ACFT NY WAS INBOUND TO ABQ AND I COULD 'SWAP' NX FOR NY. MR A ASSURED ME THAT MAINT RECORDS INDICATED A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH FOR NY WITH NO RECENT SQUAWKS PERTAINING TO COM OR NAV PROBLEMS. UPON ARR, THE CAPT OF NY (MR C) INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD EARLIER EXPERIENCED BOTH COM AND NAVIGATIONAL TROUBLES WITH NY. I CHOSE, THEREFORE, TO REFUSE OP OF NY IN ADDITION TO THAT OF NX. CAPT C REFUSED NX. FLT TO FMN COULD BE MADE CLR OF CLOUDS WITH SOME EFFORT, SO FLT FLOW DISPATCHED BOTH NX AND NY TO THAT DEST TO RECEIVE A PROP GNDING STRAP MODIFICATION THAT WAS HOPED WOULD CORRECT THE MALFUNCTIONS. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING IN FMN WITH NX, I NOTICED NZ TAXIING IN. I SPOKE WITH THE CAPT (MR D) AND LEARNED HE HAD HAD COM, NAV AND ADDITIONAL TROUBLE DURING THE LAST 2 SEGMENTS OF HIS TRIP. CAPT D WAS TO HAND NZ OVER TO A NEW CREW IN FMN. THE OUTBOUND CAPT (MR E) REFUSED NZ FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED MALFUNCTIONS. NX RECEIVED ITS 'PROP MOD KIT.' NO ONE, NOT EVEN THE PROP MANUFACTURER TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE, COULD ASSURE ME THAT THIS MODIFICATION WOULD IN FACT CORRECT THE LTT MODEL SYSTEMS MALFUNCTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. FLT FLOW DISPATCHED US TO REPOS THE AIRPLANE FROM FMN TO SVC FOR THE MORNING SHIFT IN SVC. WX ALONG THE RTE WAS FORECAST TO BE IMC WITH TSTMS. APPROX 1/3 OF THE FLT WAS COMPLETED CLR OF CLOUDS WITH NO SYSTEMS MALFUNCTIONS. SHORTLY AFTER ENTERING IMC CONDITIONS MY FO AND I REALIZED THAT WE WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY RECEIVING ALBUQUERQUE CTR. RADIO STATIC MADE IT HARD TO HEAR CTR'S CLRNCS. ABOUT THIS TIME WE NOTICED THAT WE HAD LOST LORAN NAVIGATIONAL ABILITY. HAVING SWITCHED TO VOR NAV, ALTHOUGH STILL OUTSIDE SVC'S RECEPTION RANGE, AND WHILE DISCUSSING THE SITUATION, I NOTICED THAT MY EYES AND LUNGS WERE IRRITATED BY SOMETHING. I ASKED MY FO IF HE SMELLED ANYTHING STRANGE. HE AGREED THAT WE HAD FUMES IN THE COCKPIT. WE DONNED OXYGEN MASKS AND PERFORMED THE APPROPRIATE EMER CHKLIST. BY THIS TIME OUR RADIO COM WAS ESSENTIALLY USELESS. APPARENTLY WE COULD XMIT CLRLY, BUT RECEPTION WAS OVERPWRED BY LOUD, SQUEALING STATIC. SVC'S VOR HAD BEEN INTERMITTENT. I HAD ASSUMED, AT FIRST, THE CAUSE OF THIS TO BE OUR DISTANCE FROM THE STATION, BUT BEGAN TO REALIZE THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. AGREEING THAT WE HAD LOST LORAN NAV, VOR NAV, COM, AND THAT WE HAD FUMES IN THE COCKPIT, WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH ABQ CTR. I HAD BEEN FORTUNATE TO BE ABLE TO HEAR CTR LONG ENOUGH TO RECEIVE A CLRNC FOR A HDG AND ALT TOWARD ABQ PRIOR TO OUR DECLARING THIS EMER. WE HAD SEEN ABQ BEFORE ENTERING IMC. SO, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS STILL A LOT OF WX IN THE AREA, I WAS ASSURED WE WOULD ENTER VMC AND BE ABLE TO FLY A VISUAL APCH. I WAS TROUBLED, HOWEVER, THAT OUR RADAR NOW SEEMED INOP ALSO. ABOUT 25 MI FROM ABQ WEENCOUNTERED VMC. ALL NAV AND COM WAS RESTORED TO NORMAL AND WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. THE 'PROP MOD KIT' MENTIONED IS A PIECE OF BRAID THAT BONDS THE PROP BLADES TO THE PROP HUB ELECTRICALLY. THIS PROBLEM APPLIES TO ONLY ONE MODEL OF THE LTT. THE FAA, THE AIR CARRIER AND THE MANUFACTURERS ARE AWARE OF AND ARE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.