Narrative:

Climbing through FL260, ZJX asked if we could cross 20 DME south of craig VOR at FL330. We were currently at 48 DME south with a rate of climb of 2000 FPM plus. Our weight was 154000 pounds and our ground speed was 360 KTS. Our IAS was 300 KTS. Computing this information, the first officer and I concurred that we should be able to reach FL330 within the 28 mi to go. As a backup, I could tradeoff some airspeed for an increased rate of climb. The first officer replied to center, 'I think we can.' center then cleared us to cross the 20 DME south of craig at FL330. I maintained a 2000 FPM rate of climb until out of FL300 at which time I noticed that the outside air temperature was increasing and our rate of climb started to decrease. I then began trading airspeed for an increased rate of climb. I also increased thrust to 'maximum allowable for a 2 min period' (aircraft engine limitation). However, the outside air temperature kept increasing and we were only able to maintain a 1000 FPM rate of climb out of FL320 at 23.5 DME. Approaching 20 DME, we were leaving FL32.5 and were leveling off at approximately 19 DME. During the last 1000 ft, the aircraft started drifting to the left of centerline. I elected to make no turn to correct in order to achieve maximum climb performance, and that we were still in protected airspace. (Inside the 4 mi each side of centerline airspace). About 10 seconds after level at FL330 (and regaining airspeed), center pointed out traffic at 11 O'clock and 8 mi at FL310. Our TCASII showed no traffic nor gave any aural alerts. We sighted the traffic (at FL310) and it appeared to be more than 5 mi (opposite direction). 2 sectors later, and prior to being turned over to ZDC, ZJX asked us to call quality assurance at ZJX over a possible incident south of craig. Our flight plan showed a normal temperature lapse rate at our altitudes and position. Had the inversion not been this extensive, we would have been level at 330 prior to the 20 DME. In accepting this crossing restriction, I was assuming normal flight conditions. I will no longer accept a clearance that requires optimum operating parameters such as a climb restriction. I do believe that center should assign evasive headings when a possibility of a conflict alert exists (none was assigned), or immediately assigned a lower altitude (if still below the crossing traffic altitude). Communication were also somewhat at fault. 'I think we can' was not a definite yes and also the crossing traffic's position was not stated until we were level at FL330. There is obviously a lot left to be learned in aviation safety. Your data banks are a big step in this direction. Supplemental information from acn 210906: at FL325, ATC replied 'say your DME.' I responded 'just about 20 south,' as the DME counter was reading 21 DME. ATC then replied 'say your altitude.' I responded 'FL325.' ATC then requested we call them reaching FL330. At FL327 I replied 'leveling at FL330.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV ALT UNDERSHOT ALT XING RESTRICTION NOT MET IN AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC SITUATION.

Narrative: CLBING THROUGH FL260, ZJX ASKED IF WE COULD CROSS 20 DME S OF CRAIG VOR AT FL330. WE WERE CURRENTLY AT 48 DME S WITH A RATE OF CLB OF 2000 FPM PLUS. OUR WT WAS 154000 POUNDS AND OUR GND SPD WAS 360 KTS. OUR IAS WAS 300 KTS. COMPUTING THIS INFO, THE FO AND I CONCURRED THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH FL330 WITHIN THE 28 MI TO GO. AS A BACKUP, I COULD TRADEOFF SOME AIRSPD FOR AN INCREASED RATE OF CLB. THE FO REPLIED TO CTR, 'I THINK WE CAN.' CTR THEN CLRED US TO CROSS THE 20 DME S OF CRAIG AT FL330. I MAINTAINED A 2000 FPM RATE OF CLB UNTIL OUT OF FL300 AT WHICH TIME I NOTICED THAT THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP WAS INCREASING AND OUR RATE OF CLB STARTED TO DECREASE. I THEN BEGAN TRADING AIRSPD FOR AN INCREASED RATE OF CLB. I ALSO INCREASED THRUST TO 'MAX ALLOWABLE FOR A 2 MIN PERIOD' (ACFT ENG LIMITATION). HOWEVER, THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP KEPT INCREASING AND WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO MAINTAIN A 1000 FPM RATE OF CLB OUT OF FL320 AT 23.5 DME. APCHING 20 DME, WE WERE LEAVING FL32.5 AND WERE LEVELING OFF AT APPROX 19 DME. DURING THE LAST 1000 FT, THE ACFT STARTED DRIFTING TO THE L OF CTRLINE. I ELECTED TO MAKE NO TURN TO CORRECT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE MAX CLB PERFORMANCE, AND THAT WE WERE STILL IN PROTECTED AIRSPACE. (INSIDE THE 4 MI EACH SIDE OF CTRLINE AIRSPACE). ABOUT 10 SECONDS AFTER LEVEL AT FL330 (AND REGAINING AIRSPD), CTR POINTED OUT TFC AT 11 O'CLOCK AND 8 MI AT FL310. OUR TCASII SHOWED NO TFC NOR GAVE ANY AURAL ALERTS. WE SIGHTED THE TFC (AT FL310) AND IT APPEARED TO BE MORE THAN 5 MI (OPPOSITE DIRECTION). 2 SECTORS LATER, AND PRIOR TO BEING TURNED OVER TO ZDC, ZJX ASKED US TO CALL QUALITY ASSURANCE AT ZJX OVER A POSSIBLE INCIDENT S OF CRAIG. OUR FLT PLAN SHOWED A NORMAL TEMP LAPSE RATE AT OUR ALTS AND POS. HAD THE INVERSION NOT BEEN THIS EXTENSIVE, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN LEVEL AT 330 PRIOR TO THE 20 DME. IN ACCEPTING THIS XING RESTRICTION, I WAS ASSUMING NORMAL FLT CONDITIONS. I WILL NO LONGER ACCEPT A CLRNC THAT REQUIRES OPTIMUM OPERATING PARAMETERS SUCH AS A CLB RESTRICTION. I DO BELIEVE THAT CTR SHOULD ASSIGN EVASIVE HDGS WHEN A POSSIBILITY OF A CONFLICT ALERT EXISTS (NONE WAS ASSIGNED), OR IMMEDIATELY ASSIGNED A LOWER ALT (IF STILL BELOW THE XING TFC ALT). COM WERE ALSO SOMEWHAT AT FAULT. 'I THINK WE CAN' WAS NOT A DEFINITE YES AND ALSO THE XING TFC'S POS WAS NOT STATED UNTIL WE WERE LEVEL AT FL330. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A LOT LEFT TO BE LEARNED IN AVIATION SAFETY. YOUR DATA BANKS ARE A BIG STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 210906: AT FL325, ATC REPLIED 'SAY YOUR DME.' I RESPONDED 'JUST ABOUT 20 S,' AS THE DME COUNTER WAS READING 21 DME. ATC THEN REPLIED 'SAY YOUR ALT.' I RESPONDED 'FL325.' ATC THEN REQUESTED WE CALL THEM REACHING FL330. AT FL327 I REPLIED 'LEVELING AT FL330.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.