Narrative:

Airline flight of may/xx/92 was scheduled from chicago to toronto. Normal fuel checks were made comparing flight plan release figures with those on takeoff performance documents. Checks of reserve, alternate, and holding figures were also made. Overlooked, however, was a xchk I normally make to compare flight time with scheduled burn. I also did not note that the total fuel figure was low for a flight of this nature. After departure, I was busy with a communication and did not send for the ACARS flight plan, which gives target times and fuel over flight plan points, until well past keeler. Soon after, the flight was cleared direct to salem, then given a heading for london, on. Just past salem, a fuel check was made and the first officer and I determined that we were approximately 3000 pounds of fuel short of what would have been necessary to continue to toronto. A quick check of the fuel gauges was made to determine that we were probably not losing fuel. We checked the flight plan release and discovered that the burn off the 1 hour segment which should have been roughly 7000 pounds, had been planned at 2683 pounds. 90 mi east of london, I coordination with dispatch and ATC for a detroit landing. The aircraft landed with 3900 pounds of fuel on board. I called dispatch from dtw. He had discovered that the burn rates for our particular aircraft were being adjusted, which had somehow contributed to the computer flight plan error. It is an understatement to say that this occurrence has served to re-emphasize the necessity of careful checking of flight plan fuel. Supplemental information from acn 210937: after leveling off at our cruising altitude I noticed that the fuel burn was 3000 pounds more than flight plan burn. I informed the captain immediately. After closer examination of the computerized flight plan, it became obvious that the computerized flight plan was in error. Dispatch, the first officer, and captain should have noticed the mistake on the flight plan. Having never experienced a problem with a flight plan, complacency was a factor even though on paper nothing was wrong. Common sense should have prevailed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR CARRIER MLG EXECUTES A DIVERSION TO ALT ARPT AFTER DISCOVERING THAT FUEL REMAINING WAS INADEQUATE FOR REMAINDER OF TRIP.

Narrative: AIRLINE FLT OF MAY/XX/92 WAS SCHEDULED FROM CHICAGO TO TORONTO. NORMAL FUEL CHKS WERE MADE COMPARING FLT PLAN RELEASE FIGURES WITH THOSE ON TKOF PERFORMANCE DOCUMENTS. CHKS OF RESERVE, ALTERNATE, AND HOLDING FIGURES WERE ALSO MADE. OVERLOOKED, HOWEVER, WAS A XCHK I NORMALLY MAKE TO COMPARE FLT TIME WITH SCHEDULED BURN. I ALSO DID NOT NOTE THAT THE TOTAL FUEL FIGURE WAS LOW FOR A FLT OF THIS NATURE. AFTER DEP, I WAS BUSY WITH A COM AND DID NOT SEND FOR THE ACARS FLT PLAN, WHICH GIVES TARGET TIMES AND FUEL OVER FLT PLAN POINTS, UNTIL WELL PAST KEELER. SOON AFTER, THE FLT WAS CLRED DIRECT TO SALEM, THEN GIVEN A HDG FOR LONDON, ON. JUST PAST SALEM, A FUEL CHK WAS MADE AND THE FO AND I DETERMINED THAT WE WERE APPROX 3000 POUNDS OF FUEL SHORT OF WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO TORONTO. A QUICK CHK OF THE FUEL GAUGES WAS MADE TO DETERMINE THAT WE WERE PROBABLY NOT LOSING FUEL. WE CHKED THE FLT PLAN RELEASE AND DISCOVERED THAT THE BURN OFF THE 1 HR SEGMENT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN ROUGHLY 7000 POUNDS, HAD BEEN PLANNED AT 2683 POUNDS. 90 MI E OF LONDON, I COORD WITH DISPATCH AND ATC FOR A DETROIT LNDG. THE ACFT LANDED WITH 3900 POUNDS OF FUEL ON BOARD. I CALLED DISPATCH FROM DTW. HE HAD DISCOVERED THAT THE BURN RATES FOR OUR PARTICULAR ACFT WERE BEING ADJUSTED, WHICH HAD SOMEHOW CONTRIBUTED TO THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN ERROR. IT IS AN UNDERSTATEMENT TO SAY THAT THIS OCCURRENCE HAS SERVED TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY OF CAREFUL CHKING OF FLT PLAN FUEL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 210937: AFTER LEVELING OFF AT OUR CRUISING ALT I NOTICED THAT THE FUEL BURN WAS 3000 POUNDS MORE THAN FLT PLAN BURN. I INFORMED THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY. AFTER CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN, IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN WAS IN ERROR. DISPATCH, THE FO, AND CAPT SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THE MISTAKE ON THE FLT PLAN. HAVING NEVER EXPERIENCED A PROBLEM WITH A FLT PLAN, COMPLACENCY WAS A FACTOR EVEN THOUGH ON PAPER NOTHING WAS WRONG. COMMON SENSE SHOULD HAVE PREVAILED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.