Narrative:

Air carrier X was conducting a scheduled air carrier flight from richmond, va (ric) to washington dulles (iad). A front was passing through the area, causing numerous rain storms and small thunderstorms. We were proceeding north from ric to the brooke VOR, which is the south arrival fix to iad. A thunderstorm developed directly over brooke, which caused all the inbound aircraft to deviate from the normal arrival corridor. The controller issued numerous vectors, many of which were refused by the aircraft receiving them, due to the many small thunderstorms in the area. The frequency was extremely busy. It was often literally impossible to get a word in. Air carrier X was told to descend to 3000 ft MSL and began deviating around thunderstorms just south of the brooke VOR. We were then given a heading of 270 degrees by iad approach. We proceeded on this heading at a speed of 250 KTS for about 10 mins. Iad approach was still extremely busy with other aircraft. The captain began to express concern about the height of the terrain we were approaching. (We were IMC at the time.) we attempted to contact iad approach, but could not get through the other traffic on the radio. By this time, I fixed our position as 40 mi from the montebello VOR on the 60 degree radial. The MEA on the airway at this point is 6000 ft. We were at 3000. The captain slowed the aircraft to 200 KTS, while I again attempted to contact iad approach. The radio altimeter began to indicate that the terrain was rising, and we could see the hills through the fog ahead. I finally got through to iad approach. They advised that they had lost radar contact with us and asked our position. I gave it as 40 mi east of montebello. They then asked us to confirm we were at 7000 ft. When told that no, we were at 3000 ft, they issued instructions for an immediate right turn to 030 degrees and a climb to 5000 ft. As we started the turn, we could see terrain out the captain's left window that was above the level of the aircraft. That terrain was directly on our previous course. ATC asked us to switch to another transponder and soon reacquired radar contact. A normal approach and landing were then made at iad. Significant factors were: 1) the total saturation of the ATC system caused by the thunderstorms. The controller clearly 'lost it' when the storm moved over his initial fix, thus destroying his plans. As aircraft deviated, they wandered into other sectors and our controller had to coordinate with these controllers. It was beyond his ability, and he completely forgot about our flight as a result. 2) the total lack of terrain information in our cockpit. Once we got off the airways, we had to depend on the ATC system for terrain clearance. We had no other information, except to note the MEA's of airways in our approximately area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X CFTT BELOW MVA. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: ACR X WAS CONDUCTING A SCHEDULED ACR FLT FROM RICHMOND, VA (RIC) TO WASHINGTON DULLES (IAD). A FRONT WAS PASSING THROUGH THE AREA, CAUSING NUMEROUS RAIN STORMS AND SMALL TSTMS. WE WERE PROCEEDING N FROM RIC TO THE BROOKE VOR, WHICH IS THE S ARR FIX TO IAD. A TSTM DEVELOPED DIRECTLY OVER BROOKE, WHICH CAUSED ALL THE INBOUND ACFT TO DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL ARR CORRIDOR. THE CTLR ISSUED NUMEROUS VECTORS, MANY OF WHICH WERE REFUSED BY THE ACFT RECEIVING THEM, DUE TO THE MANY SMALL TSTMS IN THE AREA. THE FREQ WAS EXTREMELY BUSY. IT WAS OFTEN LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET A WORD IN. ACR X WAS TOLD TO DSND TO 3000 FT MSL AND BEGAN DEVIATING AROUND TSTMS JUST S OF THE BROOKE VOR. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A HDG OF 270 DEGS BY IAD APCH. WE PROCEEDED ON THIS HDG AT A SPD OF 250 KTS FOR ABOUT 10 MINS. IAD APCH WAS STILL EXTREMELY BUSY WITH OTHER ACFT. THE CAPT BEGAN TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE HEIGHT OF THE TERRAIN WE WERE APCHING. (WE WERE IMC AT THE TIME.) WE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT IAD APCH, BUT COULD NOT GET THROUGH THE OTHER TFC ON THE RADIO. BY THIS TIME, I FIXED OUR POS AS 40 MI FROM THE MONTEBELLO VOR ON THE 60 DEG RADIAL. THE MEA ON THE AIRWAY AT THIS POINT IS 6000 FT. WE WERE AT 3000. THE CAPT SLOWED THE ACFT TO 200 KTS, WHILE I AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT IAD APCH. THE RADIO ALTIMETER BEGAN TO INDICATE THAT THE TERRAIN WAS RISING, AND WE COULD SEE THE HILLS THROUGH THE FOG AHEAD. I FINALLY GOT THROUGH TO IAD APCH. THEY ADVISED THAT THEY HAD LOST RADAR CONTACT WITH US AND ASKED OUR POS. I GAVE IT AS 40 MI E OF MONTEBELLO. THEY THEN ASKED US TO CONFIRM WE WERE AT 7000 FT. WHEN TOLD THAT NO, WE WERE AT 3000 FT, THEY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO 030 DEGS AND A CLB TO 5000 FT. AS WE STARTED THE TURN, WE COULD SEE TERRAIN OUT THE CAPT'S L WINDOW THAT WAS ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE ACFT. THAT TERRAIN WAS DIRECTLY ON OUR PREVIOUS COURSE. ATC ASKED US TO SWITCH TO ANOTHER TRANSPONDER AND SOON REACQUIRED RADAR CONTACT. A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WERE THEN MADE AT IAD. SIGNIFICANT FACTORS WERE: 1) THE TOTAL SATURATION OF THE ATC SYS CAUSED BY THE TSTMS. THE CTLR CLRLY 'LOST IT' WHEN THE STORM MOVED OVER HIS INITIAL FIX, THUS DESTROYING HIS PLANS. AS ACFT DEVIATED, THEY WANDERED INTO OTHER SECTORS AND OUR CTLR HAD TO COORDINATE WITH THESE CTLRS. IT WAS BEYOND HIS ABILITY, AND HE COMPLETELY FORGOT ABOUT OUR FLT AS A RESULT. 2) THE TOTAL LACK OF TERRAIN INFO IN OUR COCKPIT. ONCE WE GOT OFF THE AIRWAYS, WE HAD TO DEPEND ON THE ATC SYS FOR TERRAIN CLRNC. WE HAD NO OTHER INFO, EXCEPT TO NOTE THE MEA'S OF AIRWAYS IN OUR APPROX AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.