Narrative:

#1 for departure jfk. Told to contact clearance for change in routing. Given unfamiliar routing. I was PF, captain was to navigation. Previous handoffs after departure had been stressful. Controllers didn't know our first assigned fix (greki: cmk 057 degrees, 17 DME). Captain attempted to locate greki on charts (he looked for approximately 4 mins). He became frustrated and incapable or unwilling to search further. During this time, I told captain I would handle communication while he searched for greki. Each controller had asked what was our routing or asked if greki was our first fix. During this trip, the captain seemed so confused or 'overloaded' that he didn't know where he was and he also couldn't respond to controllers properly. Shortly after handoff to this controller (unsure, but probably ZBW), we were level at 8000. TCASII was MEL'd inoperative. Controller called traffic at our 10 O'clock, changing altitude to level at 7000. I had the traffic in sight (a competitor's light transport). The controller reported the traffic as going opposite its actual route of flight. When I first saw traffic, they were level or leveling off at our altitude. We were on autoplt (altitude hold, heading mode, half bank). Captain later said he was confused because the traffic he saw was going opposite direction from controller's callout. The traffic was converging on us with no corrective action. I told captain this. Aircraft began to turn to the right. He was slewing heading bug. He never informed me he was taking the controls best evasive action called for altitude. Captain was turning to parallel the traffic (now non-visual) captain panicked (he didn't look to see never realized we were in half bank mode), disengaged autoplt causing abrupt bank change. He then declared he would hand fly it. Prior to a disconnect, he cried out my name in what seemed a panicked order for me to avoid the traffic even though he had silently taken the controls. He never changed altitude. I contemplated relieving the captain (mutiny?). Prior to taking controls back, I located greki intersection and attempted in vain to make out aware of our position. I regarded captain as subtly incapacitated for the rest of the day. Watching him closely, controller never admitted mistake nor apologized 'other aircraft reported us in sight but never changed heading more altitude. A first officer should never take anything for granted and should always be prepared to take proper action in spite of captain. This event should be required simulator training for all first officer's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 ACR LTTS HAD AN NMAC. THE RPTING ACFT MADE EVASIVE ACTION. BUT DIFFERENT FROM ATC COMMANDS.

Narrative: #1 FOR DEP JFK. TOLD TO CONTACT CLRNC FOR CHANGE IN ROUTING. GIVEN UNFAMILIAR ROUTING. I WAS PF, CAPT WAS TO NAV. PREVIOUS HDOFS AFTER DEP HAD BEEN STRESSFUL. CTLRS DIDN'T KNOW OUR FIRST ASSIGNED FIX (GREKI: CMK 057 DEGS, 17 DME). CAPT ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE GREKI ON CHARTS (HE LOOKED FOR APPROX 4 MINS). HE BECAME FRUSTRATED AND INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO SEARCH FURTHER. DURING THIS TIME, I TOLD CAPT I WOULD HANDLE COM WHILE HE SEARCHED FOR GREKI. EACH CTLR HAD ASKED WHAT WAS OUR ROUTING OR ASKED IF GREKI WAS OUR FIRST FIX. DURING THIS TRIP, THE CAPT SEEMED SO CONFUSED OR 'OVERLOADED' THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHERE HE WAS AND HE ALSO COULDN'T RESPOND TO CTLRS PROPERLY. SHORTLY AFTER HDOF TO THIS CTLR (UNSURE, BUT PROBABLY ZBW), WE WERE LEVEL AT 8000. TCASII WAS MEL'D INOP. CTLR CALLED TFC AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK, CHANGING ALT TO LEVEL AT 7000. I HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT (A COMPETITOR'S LTT). THE CTLR RPTED THE TFC AS GOING OPPOSITE ITS ACTUAL RTE OF FLT. WHEN I FIRST SAW TFC, THEY WERE LEVEL OR LEVELING OFF AT OUR ALT. WE WERE ON AUTOPLT (ALT HOLD, HDG MODE, HALF BANK). CAPT LATER SAID HE WAS CONFUSED BECAUSE THE TFC HE SAW WAS GOING OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM CTLR'S CALLOUT. THE TFC WAS CONVERGING ON US WITH NO CORRECTIVE ACTION. I TOLD CAPT THIS. ACFT BEGAN TO TURN TO THE R. HE WAS SLEWING HDG BUG. HE NEVER INFORMED ME HE WAS TAKING THE CTLS BEST EVASIVE ACTION CALLED FOR ALT. CAPT WAS TURNING TO PARALLEL THE TFC (NOW NON-VISUAL) CAPT PANICKED (HE DIDN'T LOOK TO SEE NEVER REALIZED WE WERE IN HALF BANK MODE), DISENGAGED AUTOPLT CAUSING ABRUPT BANK CHANGE. HE THEN DECLARED HE WOULD HAND FLY IT. PRIOR TO A DISCONNECT, HE CRIED OUT MY NAME IN WHAT SEEMED A PANICKED ORDER FOR ME TO AVOID THE TFC EVEN THOUGH HE HAD SILENTLY TAKEN THE CTLS. HE NEVER CHANGED ALT. I CONTEMPLATED RELIEVING THE CAPT (MUTINY?). PRIOR TO TAKING CTLS BACK, I LOCATED GREKI INTXN AND ATTEMPTED IN VAIN TO MAKE OUT AWARE OF OUR POS. I REGARDED CAPT AS SUBTLY INCAPACITATED FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. WATCHING HIM CLOSELY, CTLR NEVER ADMITTED MISTAKE NOR APOLOGIZED 'OTHER ACFT RPTED US IN SIGHT BUT NEVER CHANGED HEADING MORE ALT. A FO SHOULD NEVER TAKE ANYTHING FOR GRANTED AND SHOULD ALWAYS BE PREPARED TO TAKE PROPER ACTION IN SPITE OF CAPT. THIS EVENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED SIMULATOR TRAINING FOR ALL FO'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.