37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 213960 |
Time | |
Date | 199206 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sea |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Route In Use | enroute other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other personnel other |
Qualification | other pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 0 flight time total : 175 |
ASRS Report | 213960 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
I dispatched a flight sea-anc, operated by a non-overwater equipped large transport on a routing which was overwater. Flight plan was filed for routing sea..tou.J501.2ES..katch.B453.mdo.yeska 1.anc. Crew caught the error and refiled themselves over a legal routing, and did not fly this routing. This problem arose due to a number of contributing factors -- 1) I am a reserve dispatcher, working both domestic and international rule flts, working particular sectors/rtes on an infrequent basis. Have rarely worked this desk, got 'behind the power curve' with my workload, and rushed myself into causing this error, and not correcting it -- only discovered it after the flight was on ground at anc. 2) workload on desks is being constantly and gradually increased -- which may be ok for someone working a desk every day, but working it infrequently and the resultant unfamiliarity with routings, etc. For a reserve dispatcher results in potential to 'get buried' and more liable to make mistakes such as this. 3) centralized weight and balance people did not furnish me with 0 fuel weight for this flight until 1 1/2 hours prior to departure -- should be 2 1/2 hours before -- so I began dealing with a couple of other very fuel critical flts while I waited for this zero fuel weight -- and so when the zero fuel weight. Arrived, it was a rush to get the dispatch release done. Had to work out routing, fuel burn, etc. Quickly. In today's environment of fuel economy, company has emphasis on most economical fuel burn for routing -- so it is possible to get into a mode of looking for quickest routing without checking enough for legality -- especially when rushed. 4) our company data base department has built in the computer a series of routings for all sectors, including sea-anc, routings which we adhere to. Many of these routings include restrictions, example, 1-WAY airways between certain times, and these restrictions are noted on these rtes by data base. For sea-anc, data base have labeled some rtes as overwater or requiring omega or other such restrictions. Routing picked did not have any notation stating it was overwater -- tendency for dispatchers is often to see what limitations data base includes for routing, and, if no limitations noted, assume route is ok -- this is especially so when rushed. 5) I obviously should have checked routing on chart -- would have immediately seen it was over 50 mi from land -- but, in rush, did not check chart -- was more focused on dealing with another very fuel critical flight routing that I was working on concurrently. (Due to having to wait for 2FW for this sea-anc flight). 6) charts are not posted on walls for quick reference -- have to either unfold chart in limited work area, or walk over to charts on a table away from desk. 7) in training/recurrent training, routings are rarely dealt with. 8) supervision of dispatchers is pretty much non-existent -- no mentorship/no time to discuss problems/issues with chief dispatchers, who are focused on other things than supervising the dispatchers -- they act as coordinators with cfcf for delays, etc. And spend too little time supervising/advising/monitoring us.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR DISPATCHER PLANS OVERWATER RTE FOR NON-OVERWATER EQUIPPED ACFT.
Narrative: I DISPATCHED A FLT SEA-ANC, OPERATED BY A NON-OVERWATER EQUIPPED LGT ON A ROUTING WHICH WAS OVERWATER. FLT PLAN WAS FILED FOR ROUTING SEA..TOU.J501.2ES..KATCH.B453.MDO.YESKA 1.ANC. CREW CAUGHT THE ERROR AND REFILED THEMSELVES OVER A LEGAL ROUTING, AND DID NOT FLY THIS ROUTING. THIS PROBLEM AROSE DUE TO A NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- 1) I AM A RESERVE DISPATCHER, WORKING BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTL RULE FLTS, WORKING PARTICULAR SECTORS/RTES ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. HAVE RARELY WORKED THIS DESK, GOT 'BEHIND THE PWR CURVE' WITH MY WORKLOAD, AND RUSHED MYSELF INTO CAUSING THIS ERROR, AND NOT CORRECTING IT -- ONLY DISCOVERED IT AFTER THE FLT WAS ON GND AT ANC. 2) WORKLOAD ON DESKS IS BEING CONSTANTLY AND GRADUALLY INCREASED -- WHICH MAY BE OK FOR SOMEONE WORKING A DESK EVERY DAY, BUT WORKING IT INFREQUENTLY AND THE RESULTANT UNFAMILIARITY WITH ROUTINGS, ETC. FOR A RESERVE DISPATCHER RESULTS IN POTENTIAL TO 'GET BURIED' AND MORE LIABLE TO MAKE MISTAKES SUCH AS THIS. 3) CENTRALIZED WT AND BAL PEOPLE DID NOT FURNISH ME WITH 0 FUEL WT FOR THIS FLT UNTIL 1 1/2 HRS PRIOR TO DEP -- SHOULD BE 2 1/2 HRS BEFORE -- SO I BEGAN DEALING WITH A COUPLE OF OTHER VERY FUEL CRITICAL FLTS WHILE I WAITED FOR THIS ZERO FUEL WT -- AND SO WHEN THE ZERO FUEL WT. ARRIVED, IT WAS A RUSH TO GET THE DISPATCH RELEASE DONE. HAD TO WORK OUT ROUTING, FUEL BURN, ETC. QUICKLY. IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT OF FUEL ECONOMY, COMPANY HAS EMPHASIS ON MOST ECONOMICAL FUEL BURN FOR ROUTING -- SO IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET INTO A MODE OF LOOKING FOR QUICKEST ROUTING WITHOUT CHKING ENOUGH FOR LEGALITY -- ESPECIALLY WHEN RUSHED. 4) OUR COMPANY DATA BASE DEPT HAS BUILT IN THE COMPUTER A SERIES OF ROUTINGS FOR ALL SECTORS, INCLUDING SEA-ANC, ROUTINGS WHICH WE ADHERE TO. MANY OF THESE ROUTINGS INCLUDE RESTRICTIONS, EXAMPLE, 1-WAY AIRWAYS BTWN CERTAIN TIMES, AND THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE NOTED ON THESE RTES BY DATA BASE. FOR SEA-ANC, DATA BASE HAVE LABELED SOME RTES AS OVERWATER OR REQUIRING OMEGA OR OTHER SUCH RESTRICTIONS. ROUTING PICKED DID NOT HAVE ANY NOTATION STATING IT WAS OVERWATER -- TENDENCY FOR DISPATCHERS IS OFTEN TO SEE WHAT LIMITATIONS DATA BASE INCLUDES FOR ROUTING, AND, IF NO LIMITATIONS NOTED, ASSUME RTE IS OK -- THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO WHEN RUSHED. 5) I OBVIOUSLY SHOULD HAVE CHKED ROUTING ON CHART -- WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY SEEN IT WAS OVER 50 MI FROM LAND -- BUT, IN RUSH, DID NOT CHK CHART -- WAS MORE FOCUSED ON DEALING WITH ANOTHER VERY FUEL CRITICAL FLT ROUTING THAT I WAS WORKING ON CONCURRENTLY. (DUE TO HAVING TO WAIT FOR 2FW FOR THIS SEA-ANC FLT). 6) CHARTS ARE NOT POSTED ON WALLS FOR QUICK REF -- HAVE TO EITHER UNFOLD CHART IN LIMITED WORK AREA, OR WALK OVER TO CHARTS ON A TABLE AWAY FROM DESK. 7) IN TRAINING/RECURRENT TRAINING, ROUTINGS ARE RARELY DEALT WITH. 8) SUPERVISION OF DISPATCHERS IS PRETTY MUCH NON-EXISTENT -- NO MENTORSHIP/NO TIME TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS/ISSUES WITH CHIEF DISPATCHERS, WHO ARE FOCUSED ON OTHER THINGS THAN SUPERVISING THE DISPATCHERS -- THEY ACT AS COORDINATORS WITH CFCF FOR DELAYS, ETC. AND SPEND TOO LITTLE TIME SUPERVISING/ADVISING/MONITORING US.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.