Narrative:

Approach control had vectored me to a right base entry to the approach course for runway 24L, and after clearing me for the visual approach, handed me over to tower about 4 mi out. After calling tower, the controller asked me if I would be able to land on 24L holding short of the intersection with runway 36 and stated that 3100 ft would be available. I had to wait to contact tower and thus knew that an small transport was being set up to land on runway 36. The wind was reported to be 310 degrees at 13 KTS. A properly executed maximum performance landing for my small transport X should use 2000 ft or less so I decided to oblige the controller and accept the clearance with the hold short restriction. As I was crossing the threshold with glide angle and airspeed satisfactory, and in final landing confign, the tower calls me with something like the following: 'it's important that you stop short of the intersection, the situation is now critical.' I'm sure that the small transport Y was about to touch down at the same time. I touched down probably short of the numbers and applied maximum braking. After being on the runway for 1000 ft or so, the plane began to pull to the left and although the speed had slowed, it was impossible to keep from leaving the runway. I informed the tower, and emergency equipment was dispatched as a normal procedure although I told them that there were no injuries and felt sure that there was no damage. As it turned out, the loss of control resulted from a blown left tire. My speculation is that the wheel had hopped during the deceleration and allowed the brake to lock. My feelings about the episode are as follows: first, I feel that lndgs restr to holding short of an intersection are inherently risky. There are enough variables in the landing process that inadvertent overruns can occur. There also is a subtle pressure on the pilot to accept such a clearance to expedite the flow of traffic. I can remember instances in the past where such clrncs at a strange airport at night produce the situation where the pilot is unsure where the intersection in question really is.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY EXCURSION.

Narrative: APCH CTL HAD VECTORED ME TO A R BASE ENTRY TO THE APCH COURSE FOR RWY 24L, AND AFTER CLRING ME FOR THE VISUAL APCH, HANDED ME OVER TO TWR ABOUT 4 MI OUT. AFTER CALLING TWR, THE CTLR ASKED ME IF I WOULD BE ABLE TO LAND ON 24L HOLDING SHORT OF THE INTXN WITH RWY 36 AND STATED THAT 3100 FT WOULD BE AVAILABLE. I HAD TO WAIT TO CONTACT TWR AND THUS KNEW THAT AN SMT WAS BEING SET UP TO LAND ON RWY 36. THE WIND WAS RPTED TO BE 310 DEGS AT 13 KTS. A PROPERLY EXECUTED MAX PERFORMANCE LNDG FOR MY SMT X SHOULD USE 2000 FT OR LESS SO I DECIDED TO OBLIGE THE CTLR AND ACCEPT THE CLRNC WITH THE HOLD SHORT RESTRICTION. AS I WAS XING THE THRESHOLD WITH GLIDE ANGLE AND AIRSPD SATISFACTORY, AND IN FINAL LNDG CONFIGN, THE TWR CALLS ME WITH SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: 'IT'S IMPORTANT THAT YOU STOP SHORT OF THE INTXN, THE SITUATION IS NOW CRITICAL.' I'M SURE THAT THE SMT Y WAS ABOUT TO TOUCH DOWN AT THE SAME TIME. I TOUCHED DOWN PROBABLY SHORT OF THE NUMBERS AND APPLIED MAX BRAKING. AFTER BEING ON THE RWY FOR 1000 FT OR SO, THE PLANE BEGAN TO PULL TO THE L AND ALTHOUGH THE SPD HAD SLOWED, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP FROM LEAVING THE RWY. I INFORMED THE TWR, AND EMER EQUIP WAS DISPATCHED AS A NORMAL PROC ALTHOUGH I TOLD THEM THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND FELT SURE THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE LOSS OF CTL RESULTED FROM A BLOWN L TIRE. MY SPECULATION IS THAT THE WHEEL HAD HOPPED DURING THE DECELERATION AND ALLOWED THE BRAKE TO LOCK. MY FEELINGS ABOUT THE EPISODE ARE AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, I FEEL THAT LNDGS RESTR TO HOLDING SHORT OF AN INTXN ARE INHERENTLY RISKY. THERE ARE ENOUGH VARIABLES IN THE LNDG PROCESS THAT INADVERTENT OVERRUNS CAN OCCUR. THERE ALSO IS A SUBTLE PRESSURE ON THE PLT TO ACCEPT SUCH A CLRNC TO EXPEDITE THE FLOW OF TFC. I CAN REMEMBER INSTANCES IN THE PAST WHERE SUCH CLRNCS AT A STRANGE ARPT AT NIGHT PRODUCE THE SITUATION WHERE THE PLT IS UNSURE WHERE THE INTXN IN QUESTION REALLY IS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.