Narrative:

ZJX and orlando approach control were involved in a computer automation change, whereby ZJX became the host facility for orl ATCT. This change mainly involves computer processing and usually has little impact on operations involving air traffic controllers. However, due to the limitations of this computer processing, aircraft operating from the mlb/cof complex would now be worked by controllers at orl ATCT rather than controllers at ZMA. Consequently, revised procedures for the handling of these departures were incorporated in the ZJX/orl ATCT LOA. Orl ATCT is presently delegated airspace at and below 12000 ft, a portion of which underlies the ZJX st. Johns sector 57. New procedures contained in the ZJX/orl ATCT (copy attached) allows orl ATCT the authority to climb mlb/cof departures to 13000 ft into the vertical limits of the ZJX st. Johns sector, as per the ZJX/orl ATCT LOA. Arriving aircraft to the mlb/cof complex are handed off by ZJX to orl ATCT at 13000 ft in accordance with the ZJX/orl ATCT LOA. This same LOA defines separation responsibility between these arrs and departures. Specifically, orl ATCT is responsible for separation between a departure climbing to 13000 ft and an arrival at 13000 ft. Orl ATCT only assumes responsibility for this separation when they have accepted a radar handoff on the arrival, and the arrival is level at 13000 ft. The problem arises with the conditional circumstances under which orl ATCT provides separation. There are many scenarios in which potential traffic would not be provided separation, even if all controllers strictly adhered to these procedures. Air traffic controllers can only base separation on known traffic, not conditional circumstances. In addition, there are no safeguards in place to protect traffic if a ZJX controller unintentionally accepts an automated radar handoff. The simple attempt to move a data block by computer entry, if incorrectly done, could result in a controller accepting an automated handoff, in this case with disastrous results if there is potential traffic. The only safe procedure for these departures is for orl ATCT to climb to the top of their vertical airspace to 12000 ft and effect a radar handoff to ZJX. In addition, they must be reduced to 250 KIAS, as are all other orl ATCT departures by LOA.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATCT ARTCC JOINT LOA ALLOWS TRACON TO CLB ACFT IN CTR AIRSPACE WITHOUT ATCT ARTCC INTRAFAC COORD.

Narrative: ZJX AND ORLANDO APCH CTL WERE INVOLVED IN A COMPUTER AUTOMATION CHANGE, WHEREBY ZJX BECAME THE HOST FACILITY FOR ORL ATCT. THIS CHANGE MAINLY INVOLVES COMPUTER PROCESSING AND USUALLY HAS LITTLE IMPACT ON OPS INVOLVING AIR TFC CTLRS. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS COMPUTER PROCESSING, ACFT OPERATING FROM THE MLB/COF COMPLEX WOULD NOW BE WORKED BY CTLRS AT ORL ATCT RATHER THAN CTLRS AT ZMA. CONSEQUENTLY, REVISED PROCS FOR THE HANDLING OF THESE DEPS WERE INCORPORATED IN THE ZJX/ORL ATCT LOA. ORL ATCT IS PRESENTLY DELEGATED AIRSPACE AT AND BELOW 12000 FT, A PORTION OF WHICH UNDERLIES THE ZJX ST. JOHNS SECTOR 57. NEW PROCS CONTAINED IN THE ZJX/ORL ATCT (COPY ATTACHED) ALLOWS ORL ATCT THE AUTHORITY TO CLB MLB/COF DEPS TO 13000 FT INTO THE VERT LIMITS OF THE ZJX ST. JOHNS SECTOR, AS PER THE ZJX/ORL ATCT LOA. ARRIVING ACFT TO THE MLB/COF COMPLEX ARE HANDED OFF BY ZJX TO ORL ATCT AT 13000 FT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ZJX/ORL ATCT LOA. THIS SAME LOA DEFINES SEPARATION RESPONSIBILITY BTWN THESE ARRS AND DEPS. SPECIFICALLY, ORL ATCT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEPARATION BTWN A DEP CLBING TO 13000 FT AND AN ARR AT 13000 FT. ORL ATCT ONLY ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SEPARATION WHEN THEY HAVE ACCEPTED A RADAR HDOF ON THE ARR, AND THE ARR IS LEVEL AT 13000 FT. THE PROB ARISES WITH THE CONDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH ORL ATCT PROVIDES SEPARATION. THERE ARE MANY SCENARIOS IN WHICH POTENTIAL TFC WOULD NOT BE PROVIDED SEPARATION, EVEN IF ALL CTLRS STRICTLY ADHERED TO THESE PROCS. AIR TFC CTLRS CAN ONLY BASE SEPARATION ON KNOWN TFC, NOT CONDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NO SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE TO PROTECT TFC IF A ZJX CTLR UNINTENTIONALLY ACCEPTS AN AUTOMATED RADAR HDOF. THE SIMPLE ATTEMPT TO MOVE A DATA BLOCK BY COMPUTER ENTRY, IF INCORRECTLY DONE, COULD RESULT IN A CTLR ACCEPTING AN AUTOMATED HDOF, IN THIS CASE WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS IF THERE IS POTENTIAL TFC. THE ONLY SAFE PROC FOR THESE DEPS IS FOR ORL ATCT TO CLB TO THE TOP OF THEIR VERT AIRSPACE TO 12000 FT AND EFFECT A RADAR HDOF TO ZJX. IN ADDITION, THEY MUST BE REDUCED TO 250 KIAS, AS ARE ALL OTHER ORL ATCT DEPS BY LOA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.