Narrative:

On sep/wed, I was first officer on flight from santo domingo, dr (sdq) to borinquen, pr (bqn). After takeoff, we climbed to 13000 ft. Captain had the radar on, and we observed a large build-up that ran from north to south. When both voice and radar contact was established with mjzs captain had me request deviation to the north of course. We were cleared to deviation as necessary, direct to bqn when able. We were approximately 40 DME from bqn. I requested and received a lower altitude of 3600 ft. After several mins of deviating to the north, the radar showed what seemed an opening toward bqn. At that time we were established in a normal power off descent and turned toward bqn. Several mins later we encountered turbulence and very heavy precipitation with lightning. By 9000 ft we were out of the major WX. During that brief time, however, we lost #1 engine, and it was feathered. Many circuit breakers were popped. Several failure lights, including the surface lock light came on at that time. At approximately 8000 ft, the gear horn sounded as normal, and we were 21 DME from bqn. We were still in a normal descent when the flaps suddenly went to their full position without being selected. I tried to use the emergency retract switch and the normal mode, to no avail. The aircraft lost airspeed rapidly, and captain was forced to descend to an altitude of 1000 ft above the water. We had alerted san juan center of our emergency situation, but at 1000 ft with full power, we were able to maintain 120-110 KTS. We flew this confign the last 10 mi to the airport. On short final, the gear handle was selected down. However, it did not work. We were unable to unload the hydraulic system. But we elected to use the blow down bottle in hopes the gear would come down. The procedure worked, the nose and the right main showed safe. The left however, showed unsafe. Upon landing, we were relieved to find the gear down. We rolled to the end of the runway and shut down the remaining engines. A later inspection revealed that #3 engine had lost a propeller control unit, and we were not getting full use from that engine. There was an electrical strike which caused the many electrical problems, including the inoperative #1 feather pump. Captain flew the aircraft. The flight engineer and I tried repeatedly to start #1 engine, but it would not unfeather. The emergencys were dealt with as they arose. Supplemental information from acn 221364: prior to entering the clouds, the anti-ice system was activated. Ordered continuous ignition activated to prevent or recover from possible flame out. Alternating current bus a had 'locked out,' not allowing the operating generators to power it. When power was applied to engines 2, 3, and 4, it was noted that #3 was not giving normal power. I selected the landing gear down with the gear lever but got no response, even though we had hydraulic pressure. I then immediately used the emergency system to blow the gear down knowing that we could not go around on partial power and full flaps. The corrective action would be to reemphasize the use of radar to avoid WX and not to use it to differentiate between heavy and lighter WX.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LGT FREIGHTER RAN INTO SOME VERY HVY WX THAT CAUSED MULTIPLE ACFT SYS PROBLEMS. THERE WAS A LIGHTNING STRIKE, 'HVY, HVY' RAIN, AND TURB.

Narrative: ON SEP/WED, I WAS FO ON FLT FROM SANTO DOMINGO, DR (SDQ) TO BORINQUEN, PR (BQN). AFTER TKOF, WE CLBED TO 13000 FT. CAPT HAD THE RADAR ON, AND WE OBSERVED A LARGE BUILD-UP THAT RAN FROM N TO S. WHEN BOTH VOICE AND RADAR CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH MJZS CAPT HAD ME REQUEST DEV TO THE N OF COURSE. WE WERE CLRED TO DEV AS NECESSARY, DIRECT TO BQN WHEN ABLE. WE WERE APPROX 40 DME FROM BQN. I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A LOWER ALT OF 3600 FT. AFTER SEVERAL MINS OF DEVIATING TO THE N, THE RADAR SHOWED WHAT SEEMED AN OPENING TOWARD BQN. AT THAT TIME WE WERE ESTABLISHED IN A NORMAL PWR OFF DSCNT AND TURNED TOWARD BQN. SEVERAL MINS LATER WE ENCOUNTERED TURB AND VERY HVY PRECIPITATION WITH LIGHTNING. BY 9000 FT WE WERE OUT OF THE MAJOR WX. DURING THAT BRIEF TIME, HOWEVER, WE LOST #1 ENG, AND IT WAS FEATHERED. MANY CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE POPPED. SEVERAL FAILURE LIGHTS, INCLUDING THE SURFACE LOCK LIGHT CAME ON AT THAT TIME. AT APPROX 8000 FT, THE GEAR HORN SOUNDED AS NORMAL, AND WE WERE 21 DME FROM BQN. WE WERE STILL IN A NORMAL DSCNT WHEN THE FLAPS SUDDENLY WENT TO THEIR FULL POS WITHOUT BEING SELECTED. I TRIED TO USE THE EMER RETRACT SWITCH AND THE NORMAL MODE, TO NO AVAIL. THE ACFT LOST AIRSPD RAPIDLY, AND CAPT WAS FORCED TO DSND TO AN ALT OF 1000 FT ABOVE THE WATER. WE HAD ALERTED SAN JUAN CTR OF OUR EMER SITUATION, BUT AT 1000 FT WITH FULL PWR, WE WERE ABLE TO MAINTAIN 120-110 KTS. WE FLEW THIS CONFIGN THE LAST 10 MI TO THE ARPT. ON SHORT FINAL, THE GEAR HANDLE WAS SELECTED DOWN. HOWEVER, IT DID NOT WORK. WE WERE UNABLE TO UNLOAD THE HYD SYS. BUT WE ELECTED TO USE THE BLOW DOWN BOTTLE IN HOPES THE GEAR WOULD COME DOWN. THE PROC WORKED, THE NOSE AND THE R MAIN SHOWED SAFE. THE L HOWEVER, SHOWED UNSAFE. UPON LNDG, WE WERE RELIEVED TO FIND THE GEAR DOWN. WE ROLLED TO THE END OF THE RWY AND SHUT DOWN THE REMAINING ENGS. A LATER INSPECTION REVEALED THAT #3 ENG HAD LOST A PROP CTL UNIT, AND WE WERE NOT GETTING FULL USE FROM THAT ENG. THERE WAS AN ELECTRICAL STRIKE WHICH CAUSED THE MANY ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE INOP #1 FEATHER PUMP. CAPT FLEW THE ACFT. THE FE AND I TRIED REPEATEDLY TO START #1 ENG, BUT IT WOULD NOT UNFEATHER. THE EMERS WERE DEALT WITH AS THEY AROSE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 221364: PRIOR TO ENTERING THE CLOUDS, THE ANTI-ICE SYS WAS ACTIVATED. ORDERED CONTINUOUS IGNITION ACTIVATED TO PREVENT OR RECOVER FROM POSSIBLE FLAME OUT. ALTERNATING CURRENT BUS A HAD 'LOCKED OUT,' NOT ALLOWING THE OPERATING GENERATORS TO PWR IT. WHEN PWR WAS APPLIED TO ENGS 2, 3, AND 4, IT WAS NOTED THAT #3 WAS NOT GIVING NORMAL PWR. I SELECTED THE LNDG GEAR DOWN WITH THE GEAR LEVER BUT GOT NO RESPONSE, EVEN THOUGH WE HAD HYD PRESSURE. I THEN IMMEDIATELY USED THE EMER SYS TO BLOW THE GEAR DOWN KNOWING THAT WE COULD NOT GAR ON PARTIAL PWR AND FULL FLAPS. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD BE TO REEMPHASIZE THE USE OF RADAR TO AVOID WX AND NOT TO USE IT TO DIFFERENTIATE BTWN HVY AND LIGHTER WX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.