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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 224190 |
Time | |
Date | 199210 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : 1q4 |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : atl |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng |
Flight Phase | other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | instruction : instructor |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 25 flight time total : 1260 flight time type : 11 |
ASRS Report | 224190 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other anomaly other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Purpose of flight to satisfy BFR requirement. Preflight briefing included discussion of resource management, ie, applicant for BFR would be PIC as he was still current with regards to recency of experience and applicant possessed a current medical certificate. The flight was to consist of a VFR departure from rhv, en route to 1q4 simulated instrument flight would consist of 'south' turns with confign changes. A visual approach to a short field landing at 1q4. A practice 'engine failure on takeoff.' a normal takeoff and departure VFR to sck for a practice ILS simulated one engine inoperative. Return VFR to rhv with in-flight discussion of in-flight emergency procedures. Prior to performing the 'engine failure on takeoff' the procedure was discussed. I explained that after the takeoff roll was initiated, at or before 50 KIAS, I would pull one engine mixture to idle cut-off. His action as pilot would be to close both throttles. The aircraft was aligned on the runway centerline and we began the takeoff roll. At 40 KIAS I pulled the left engine mixture control to an idle cut-off position. The airplane yawed left, I called for throttle closure, the pilot responded, however, the airplane was no longer aligned with the runway centerline. My estimate is that the airplane had turned 15 ft to the left by the time both throttles were closed. The airplane continued off the runway onto what appeared to be smooth and level soil. The airplane rolled for about 25 ft then the nose gear sank in the soil, and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane slid about another 15 ft. The left propeller had a minor bend to one blade and a major bend to the other blade, indicating that rotation had almost stopped when the nose gear failed. The magnetos and master switches were turned off by the pilot. I closed the fuel control valves and we exited the airplane using the door. There were no injuries to persons or other property. Damage to the airplane appears to be limited to the nose gear, gear doors and the propellers. Post incident discussion revealed that the pilot was expecting engine cut at 50 KIAS not at any speed below 50 KIAS. Further discussion indicated that the pilot elected to leave the runway as opposed to braking and steering as he felt he might have skidded the tires, and was unable to recognize the soil as being unable to support the airplanes weight. The airplane used for this flight did not have fully functioning dual controls. The airplane is owned by the pilot, who is a retired military instructor pilot and a retired airline first officer. Given these factors I was not ready for his hesitation, or lack of corrective action during the engine cut and due to the airplane confign, ie, lack of dual controls I was unable to take corrective actions myself. It is my opinion that once the throttles were closed, there was enough runway width available to maneuver the airplane to a stop on the runway.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ISTR WITH STUDENT PRACTICING ENG FAILURE AT TKOF RUNS OFF RWY COLLAPSING NOSE GEAR.
Narrative: PURPOSE OF FLT TO SATISFY BFR REQUIREMENT. PREFLT BRIEFING INCLUDED DISCUSSION OF RESOURCE MGMNT, IE, APPLICANT FOR BFR WOULD BE PIC AS HE WAS STILL CURRENT WITH REGARDS TO RECENCY OF EXPERIENCE AND APPLICANT POSSESSED A CURRENT MEDICAL CERTIFICATE. THE FLT WAS TO CONSIST OF A VFR DEP FROM RHV, ENRTE TO 1Q4 SIMULATED INST FLT WOULD CONSIST OF 'S' TURNS WITH CONFIGN CHANGES. A VISUAL APCH TO A SHORT FIELD LNDG AT 1Q4. A PRACTICE 'ENG FAILURE ON TKOF.' A NORMAL TKOF AND DEP VFR TO SCK FOR A PRACTICE ILS SIMULATED ONE ENG INOP. RETURN VFR TO RHV WITH INFLT DISCUSSION OF INFLT EMER PROCS. PRIOR TO PERFORMING THE 'ENG FAILURE ON TKOF' THE PROC WAS DISCUSSED. I EXPLAINED THAT AFTER THE TKOF ROLL WAS INITIATED, AT OR BEFORE 50 KIAS, I WOULD PULL ONE ENG MIXTURE TO IDLE CUT-OFF. HIS ACTION AS PLT WOULD BE TO CLOSE BOTH THROTTLES. THE ACFT WAS ALIGNED ON THE RWY CTRLINE AND WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. AT 40 KIAS I PULLED THE L ENG MIXTURE CTL TO AN IDLE CUT-OFF POS. THE AIRPLANE YAWED L, I CALLED FOR THROTTLE CLOSURE, THE PLT RESPONDED, HOWEVER, THE AIRPLANE WAS NO LONGER ALIGNED WITH THE RWY CTRLINE. MY ESTIMATE IS THAT THE AIRPLANE HAD TURNED 15 FT TO THE L BY THE TIME BOTH THROTTLES WERE CLOSED. THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED OFF THE RWY ONTO WHAT APPEARED TO BE SMOOTH AND LEVEL SOIL. THE AIRPLANE ROLLED FOR ABOUT 25 FT THEN THE NOSE GEAR SANK IN THE SOIL, AND THE NOSE GEAR COLLAPSED. THE AIRPLANE SLID ABOUT ANOTHER 15 FT. THE L PROP HAD A MINOR BEND TO ONE BLADE AND A MAJOR BEND TO THE OTHER BLADE, INDICATING THAT ROTATION HAD ALMOST STOPPED WHEN THE NOSE GEAR FAILED. THE MAGNETOS AND MASTER SWITCHES WERE TURNED OFF BY THE PLT. I CLOSED THE FUEL CTL VALVES AND WE EXITED THE AIRPLANE USING THE DOOR. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO PERSONS OR OTHER PROPERTY. DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE APPEARS TO BE LIMITED TO THE NOSE GEAR, GEAR DOORS AND THE PROPS. POST INCIDENT DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE PLT WAS EXPECTING ENG CUT AT 50 KIAS NOT AT ANY SPD BELOW 50 KIAS. FURTHER DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT THE PLT ELECTED TO LEAVE THE RWY AS OPPOSED TO BRAKING AND STEERING AS HE FELT HE MIGHT HAVE SKIDDED THE TIRES, AND WAS UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE SOIL AS BEING UNABLE TO SUPPORT THE AIRPLANES WT. THE AIRPLANE USED FOR THIS FLT DID NOT HAVE FULLY FUNCTIONING DUAL CTLS. THE AIRPLANE IS OWNED BY THE PLT, WHO IS A RETIRED MIL INSTRUCTOR PLT AND A RETIRED AIRLINE FO. GIVEN THESE FACTORS I WAS NOT READY FOR HIS HESITATION, OR LACK OF CORRECTIVE ACTION DURING THE ENG CUT AND DUE TO THE AIRPLANE CONFIGN, IE, LACK OF DUAL CTLS I WAS UNABLE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MYSELF. IT IS MY OPINION THAT ONCE THE THROTTLES WERE CLOSED, THERE WAS ENOUGH RWY WIDTH AVAILABLE TO MANEUVER THE AIRPLANE TO A STOP ON THE RWY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.