Narrative:

Mishap occurred on a biennial flight check, instructor briefed me prior to our flight and covered changes in regulation's as well as other information he deemed necessary. During the briefing I told the CFI that I did not want to shut down engines as part of the check and that we would use '0' thrust settings to simulate engine failure and feather I stated that if he wanted to shut down engines we should rent a plane as I did not want my engines subjected to shock cooling, I further stated that the airline I had flown for in the past lost an aircraft and its crew during a training flight with 2 engines out on the same side and the rudder actuator broke and the plane rolled over just prior to landing; and I felt there is no need to put ourselves in the same situation. The CFI agreed with my feelings and stated he would honor my wishes. We took off did some airwork then proceeded to do a landing. After I landed I reset the trim and flaps and started to do a touch and go when he requested a full stop which I did. We taxied back to the runup area and briefed for an ILS approach at another airport. As we taxied out to takeoff the CFI asked me if I wanted to do an aborted takeoff prior to 55 KTS and I said yes. Instruction included pulling back power and braking and maintaining directional control of the aircraft. The field was in the middle of farm land with no facilities or even paved roads leading to it. The centerline was offset to the left on the field with a taxi line on the right side of the field. We started our takeoff roll when I was distracted by a red handkerchief which was being placed over my mixtures and his hand. With engines roaring and the aircraft accelerating down the runway, I said 'you're not going to shut down my engine are you?' he said 'yes' and a moment later he shut down my left engine. I could not believe his action and almost immediately I pulled back the power on both engines and tried to control and stop the aircraft on the runway. It became apparent that I would not succeed despite the use of full rudder and heavy braking I was not too concerned as I thought that we would simply run into the dirt momentarily and would get back onto the runway without any problem. I did ease off braking as we left the runway to save the nose gear. Unfortunately the farmers field had just been plowed and the aircraft simply came to an abrupt stop as the nose gear could not take the strain of the soft dirt and broke causing the propellers to hit the dirt and the nose cone to strike the ground in a cloud of dust. I shut off the battery gas and mags, asked the CFI if he was ok. We exited the aircraft and I asked the CFI what he thought he just had a blank stare. Next I asked what could be learned from this experience. He said, 'I thought with your experience you could handle the cut.' I then asked what was his intent if I couldn't -- no answer. The CFI offered no instruction or assistance during this run into the dirt and sat there with his rudder pedals still stowed in a useless position. When I told him that we had agreed on not shutting down engines he thought it only referred to in-flight situations. Result: no injuries, hurt pride, unnecessary damage to my beautiful small transport. The CFI did not apologize until the next day and then only slightly. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Callback made at reporter request and to suggest contacting FSDO. Reporter states he came across a 3 part series on multi engine training from a safety foundation. Read it, copied it, sent to CFI. Called CFI a few days later to discuss article. CFI said he didn't care what the article said he would do the same thing again. That did it! Reporter called FSDO, made report. Both parties were called to FAA office to discuss situation. Reporter excused shortly after and CFI was told he would have to go through remedial training to maintain certification. Reporter hopes this will not happen to anyone else.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING MULTI ENG BIENNIAL FLT REVIEW PRACTICE ABORTED TKOF, ACFT RUNS OFF RWY INTO SOFT DIRT.

Narrative: MISHAP OCCURRED ON A BIENNIAL FLT CHK, INSTRUCTOR BRIEFED ME PRIOR TO OUR FLT AND COVERED CHANGES IN REG'S AS WELL AS OTHER INFO HE DEEMED NECESSARY. DURING THE BRIEFING I TOLD THE CFI THAT I DID NOT WANT TO SHUT DOWN ENGS AS PART OF THE CHK AND THAT WE WOULD USE '0' THRUST SETTINGS TO SIMULATE ENG FAILURE AND FEATHER I STATED THAT IF HE WANTED TO SHUT DOWN ENGS WE SHOULD RENT A PLANE AS I DID NOT WANT MY ENGS SUBJECTED TO SHOCK COOLING, I FURTHER STATED THAT THE AIRLINE I HAD FLOWN FOR IN THE PAST LOST AN ACFT AND ITS CREW DURING A TRAINING FLT WITH 2 ENGS OUT ON THE SAME SIDE AND THE RUDDER ACTUATOR BROKE AND THE PLANE ROLLED OVER JUST PRIOR TO LNDG; AND I FELT THERE IS NO NEED TO PUT OURSELVES IN THE SAME SITUATION. THE CFI AGREED WITH MY FEELINGS AND STATED HE WOULD HONOR MY WISHES. WE TOOK OFF DID SOME AIRWORK THEN PROCEEDED TO DO A LNDG. AFTER I LANDED I RESET THE TRIM AND FLAPS AND STARTED TO DO A TOUCH AND GO WHEN HE REQUESTED A FULL STOP WHICH I DID. WE TAXIED BACK TO THE RUNUP AREA AND BRIEFED FOR AN ILS APCH AT ANOTHER ARPT. AS WE TAXIED OUT TO TKOF THE CFI ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO DO AN ABORTED TKOF PRIOR TO 55 KTS AND I SAID YES. INSTRUCTION INCLUDED PULLING BACK PWR AND BRAKING AND MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL OF THE ACFT. THE FIELD WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF FARM LAND WITH NO FACILITIES OR EVEN PAVED ROADS LEADING TO IT. THE CTRLINE WAS OFFSET TO THE L ON THE FIELD WITH A TAXI LINE ON THE R SIDE OF THE FIELD. WE STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL WHEN I WAS DISTRACTED BY A RED HANDKERCHIEF WHICH WAS BEING PLACED OVER MY MIXTURES AND HIS HAND. WITH ENGS ROARING AND THE ACFT ACCELERATING DOWN THE RWY, I SAID 'YOU'RE NOT GOING TO SHUT DOWN MY ENG ARE YOU?' HE SAID 'YES' AND A MOMENT LATER HE SHUT DOWN MY L ENG. I COULD NOT BELIEVE HIS ACTION AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY I PULLED BACK THE PWR ON BOTH ENGS AND TRIED TO CTL AND STOP THE ACFT ON THE RWY. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT I WOULD NOT SUCCEED DESPITE THE USE OF FULL RUDDER AND HVY BRAKING I WAS NOT TOO CONCERNED AS I THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD SIMPLY RUN INTO THE DIRT MOMENTARILY AND WOULD GET BACK ONTO THE RWY WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM. I DID EASE OFF BRAKING AS WE LEFT THE RWY TO SAVE THE NOSE GEAR. UNFORTUNATELY THE FARMERS FIELD HAD JUST BEEN PLOWED AND THE ACFT SIMPLY CAME TO AN ABRUPT STOP AS THE NOSE GEAR COULD NOT TAKE THE STRAIN OF THE SOFT DIRT AND BROKE CAUSING THE PROPS TO HIT THE DIRT AND THE NOSE CONE TO STRIKE THE GND IN A CLOUD OF DUST. I SHUT OFF THE BATTERY GAS AND MAGS, ASKED THE CFI IF HE WAS OK. WE EXITED THE ACFT AND I ASKED THE CFI WHAT HE THOUGHT HE JUST HAD A BLANK STARE. NEXT I ASKED WHAT COULD BE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. HE SAID, 'I THOUGHT WITH YOUR EXPERIENCE YOU COULD HANDLE THE CUT.' I THEN ASKED WHAT WAS HIS INTENT IF I COULDN'T -- NO ANSWER. THE CFI OFFERED NO INSTRUCTION OR ASSISTANCE DURING THIS RUN INTO THE DIRT AND SAT THERE WITH HIS RUDDER PEDALS STILL STOWED IN A USELESS POS. WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD AGREED ON NOT SHUTTING DOWN ENGS HE THOUGHT IT ONLY REFERRED TO INFLT SITUATIONS. RESULT: NO INJURIES, HURT PRIDE, UNNECESSARY DAMAGE TO MY BEAUTIFUL SMT. THE CFI DID NOT APOLOGIZE UNTIL THE NEXT DAY AND THEN ONLY SLIGHTLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. CALLBACK MADE AT RPTR REQUEST AND TO SUGGEST CONTACTING FSDO. RPTR STATES HE CAME ACROSS A 3 PART SERIES ON MULTI ENG TRAINING FROM A SAFETY FOUNDATION. READ IT, COPIED IT, SENT TO CFI. CALLED CFI A FEW DAYS LATER TO DISCUSS ARTICLE. CFI SAID HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT THE ARTICLE SAID HE WOULD DO THE SAME THING AGAIN. THAT DID IT! RPTR CALLED FSDO, MADE RPT. BOTH PARTIES WERE CALLED TO FAA OFFICE TO DISCUSS SITUATION. RPTR EXCUSED SHORTLY AFTER AND CFI WAS TOLD HE WOULD HAVE TO GO THROUGH REMEDIAL TRAINING TO MAINTAIN CERTIFICATION. RPTR HOPES THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN TO ANYONE ELSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.