Narrative:

The incident occurred during the second landing of a biennial flight review which was a simulated soft field landing on runway 15 at saf, in an small aircraft. The pilot set up on 3/4 mi final with gear down and full flaps at 70 KIAS. The approach was stabilized well but seemed shallow and slightly short to me. I felt 70 was on the slow side. I asked, and the pilot indicated that his target was approximately 75. He also volunteered the he intended to carry some power through touchdown. I elected not to intervene since the pilot (commercial rated) had approximately 30 yrs experience in this airplane and seemed competent. (I had 1.3 hours in make and model accumulated 2 yrs ago during a biennial flight review for the same pilot.) at approximately 3/8 mi final, the pilot realized (I think) that we were low and subconsciously pulled back on the yoke. Airspeed dropped to 65 KIAS. I said 'you're getting too slow.' the pilot added some power (I think), but we continued to descend below the glide path and lose airspeed. At 1/8 mi final and approximately 50 ft AGL, airspeed dropped to approximately 60 KIAS, I noted a slight buffet and called for full power emphatically! The pilot responded with full power (I think it was full, propeller was at high RPM but I did not follow through to check that he pushed full throttle.) the application of power was too late and we 'mushed in' about 600 ft short of runway 15. Descent rate had been mostly arrested but the main gear contacted the side of an arroyo about 1 ft from the top and collapsed the main gear. I estimate vsi approximately minus 300 to minus 500 FPM. Had we cleared the edge of the arroyo, I do not think that the airplane would have sustained any damage. The airplane bounced, touched down approximately 10 ft before the runway. At this point, the pilot had flying speed and we were quickly airborne. The decision not to continue a go around was made jointly. The pilot reduced power and we skidded to stop approximately 1000 ft down the runway (nosewheel on the centerline). The pilot pulled the mixture and we quickly exited the airplane. Either just before or just after the first bounce, I did reach for the yoke, to make sure that we did not enter pilot induced oscillations. At the second bounce, I think I said 'I've got the airplane,' but I don't think the pilot heard me. At any rate, he did not relinquish control and was doing everything ok. I called for him to abort the go around and he agreed. I think my hand stayed on the yoke to make sure that the nose stayed up, but I don't believe that I ever overrode any of the pilot's control inputs. The green (down and locked)light as well as the amber (unsafe) light for the gear was inoperative. I did not discover this discover this discrepancy until after takeoff. No gear light was certainly a small distraction on short final requiring the mechanical check (not a lot, but little things build up). No stall warning almost certainly delayed my response. Had I heard a stall warning I would have acted more aggressively. Had he heard a stall warning, he would probably have corrected the problem himself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR GIVING BIENNIAL FLT REVIEW HAS ENCOUNTER WITH TERRAIN JUST PRIOR TO REACHING RWY.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING THE SECOND LNDG OF A BIENNIAL FLT REVIEW WHICH WAS A SIMULATED SOFT FIELD LNDG ON RWY 15 AT SAF, IN AN SMA. THE PLT SET UP ON 3/4 MI FINAL WITH GEAR DOWN AND FULL FLAPS AT 70 KIAS. THE APCH WAS STABILIZED WELL BUT SEEMED SHALLOW AND SLIGHTLY SHORT TO ME. I FELT 70 WAS ON THE SLOW SIDE. I ASKED, AND THE PLT INDICATED THAT HIS TARGET WAS APPROX 75. HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED THE HE INTENDED TO CARRY SOME PWR THROUGH TOUCHDOWN. I ELECTED NOT TO INTERVENE SINCE THE PLT (COMMERCIAL RATED) HAD APPROX 30 YRS EXPERIENCE IN THIS AIRPLANE AND SEEMED COMPETENT. (I HAD 1.3 HRS IN MAKE AND MODEL ACCUMULATED 2 YRS AGO DURING A BIENNIAL FLT REVIEW FOR THE SAME PLT.) AT APPROX 3/8 MI FINAL, THE PLT REALIZED (I THINK) THAT WE WERE LOW AND SUBCONSCIOUSLY PULLED BACK ON THE YOKE. AIRSPD DROPPED TO 65 KIAS. I SAID 'YOU'RE GETTING TOO SLOW.' THE PLT ADDED SOME PWR (I THINK), BUT WE CONTINUED TO DSND BELOW THE GLIDE PATH AND LOSE AIRSPD. AT 1/8 MI FINAL AND APPROX 50 FT AGL, AIRSPD DROPPED TO APPROX 60 KIAS, I NOTED A SLIGHT BUFFET AND CALLED FOR FULL PWR EMPHATICALLY! THE PLT RESPONDED WITH FULL PWR (I THINK IT WAS FULL, PROP WAS AT HIGH RPM BUT I DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH TO CHK THAT HE PUSHED FULL THROTTLE.) THE APPLICATION OF PWR WAS TOO LATE AND WE 'MUSHED IN' ABOUT 600 FT SHORT OF RWY 15. DSCNT RATE HAD BEEN MOSTLY ARRESTED BUT THE MAIN GEAR CONTACTED THE SIDE OF AN ARROYO ABOUT 1 FT FROM THE TOP AND COLLAPSED THE MAIN GEAR. I ESTIMATE VSI APPROX MINUS 300 TO MINUS 500 FPM. HAD WE CLRED THE EDGE OF THE ARROYO, I DO NOT THINK THAT THE AIRPLANE WOULD HAVE SUSTAINED ANY DAMAGE. THE AIRPLANE BOUNCED, TOUCHED DOWN APPROX 10 FT BEFORE THE RWY. AT THIS POINT, THE PLT HAD FLYING SPD AND WE WERE QUICKLY AIRBORNE. THE DECISION NOT TO CONTINUE A GAR WAS MADE JOINTLY. THE PLT REDUCED PWR AND WE SKIDDED TO STOP APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY (NOSEWHEEL ON THE CTRLINE). THE PLT PULLED THE MIXTURE AND WE QUICKLY EXITED THE AIRPLANE. EITHER JUST BEFORE OR JUST AFTER THE FIRST BOUNCE, I DID REACH FOR THE YOKE, TO MAKE SURE THAT WE DID NOT ENTER PLT INDUCED OSCILLATIONS. AT THE SECOND BOUNCE, I THINK I SAID 'I'VE GOT THE AIRPLANE,' BUT I DON'T THINK THE PLT HEARD ME. AT ANY RATE, HE DID NOT RELINQUISH CTL AND WAS DOING EVERYTHING OK. I CALLED FOR HIM TO ABORT THE GAR AND HE AGREED. I THINK MY HAND STAYED ON THE YOKE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE NOSE STAYED UP, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I EVER OVERRODE ANY OF THE PLT'S CTL INPUTS. THE GREEN (DOWN AND LOCKED)LIGHT AS WELL AS THE AMBER (UNSAFE) LIGHT FOR THE GEAR WAS INOP. I DID NOT DISCOVER THIS DISCOVER THIS DISCREPANCY UNTIL AFTER TKOF. NO GEAR LIGHT WAS CERTAINLY A SMALL DISTR ON SHORT FINAL REQUIRING THE MECHANICAL CHK (NOT A LOT, BUT LITTLE THINGS BUILD UP). NO STALL WARNING ALMOST CERTAINLY DELAYED MY RESPONSE. HAD I HEARD A STALL WARNING I WOULD HAVE ACTED MORE AGGRESSIVELY. HAD HE HEARD A STALL WARNING, HE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE CORRECTED THE PROB HIMSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.