Narrative:

On approach to runway 36R at clt the nosewheel steering light came on and went back out. Upon arrival at the gate, maintenance was briefed on the occurrence and asked if they wanted it written up. The reply was 'no,' but they would check the nosewheel area. I opened the gear doors utilizing the alternate release and extension doors after the maintenance man ensured the doors were clear. Normally, I immediately select the gear release door back to closed. (Note: with the release and extension doors open, hydraulic fluid bypasses the landing gear preventing gear retraction). After pulling the t-handle hidden by the alternate release door, I released it. Just then I was distracted by the captain and closed the alternate release door without ensuring the t- handle was properly seated. The door looked and felt closed, but was actually cracked open about 1/4 inch. It is company policy that, if the cockpit integrity is compromised by maintenance men or other personnel being in the cockpit, an acceptance check as well as before start checklist must be completed. The acceptance checklist was not completed nor called for by the captain. I did not question why we didn't do the acceptance because I moved the doors and thought I returned them to the original position and no one else had entered the cockpit. Company now says it does not matter whether someone else was on the flight deck, an acceptance checklist must be done even when the crew changes any switches even if returned to original position. Start, taxi, and takeoff were normal until the gear handle was selected up and the gear failed to retract. Clt tower informed us the gear was still down. We climbed to a safe altitude, reviewed the emergency checklist, notified the company for assistance, notified the flight attendant and 3 passenger, and told clt tower to standby while we handled the problem. A recurring problem in the mdt is the alternate release door open as little as 1/4 inch can cause the gear to fail to retract. We checked the alternate release door and it appeared closed. We advised company and they advised to return for landing. When taxiing into the gate we noticed the t-handle was twisted, preventing full closure of the alternate release door. The handle was straightened and the door was closed. The discrepancy was written up and signed off by maintenance. We departed to lwb with a normal gear retraction. Problems: distraction prevented normal visual verification of seating of the t-handle and alternate release door. Company manual leaves a 'gray' area as to when the acceptance checklist is required (alternate release door is on this checklist). Design of system allows the door to appear closed when not fully seated and no caution light to caution you. There is no emergency checklist for 'landing gear failed to retract.' if there is a mechanical gripe, it should be written up even if it 'corrects itself' and maintenance says it is not necessary.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT ON AN ACR MDT.

Narrative: ON APCH TO RWY 36R AT CLT THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING LIGHT CAME ON AND WENT BACK OUT. UPON ARR AT THE GATE, MAINT WAS BRIEFED ON THE OCCURRENCE AND ASKED IF THEY WANTED IT WRITTEN UP. THE REPLY WAS 'NO,' BUT THEY WOULD CHK THE NOSEWHEEL AREA. I OPENED THE GEAR DOORS UTILIZING THE ALTERNATE RELEASE AND EXTENSION DOORS AFTER THE MAINT MAN ENSURED THE DOORS WERE CLR. NORMALLY, I IMMEDIATELY SELECT THE GEAR RELEASE DOOR BACK TO CLOSED. (NOTE: WITH THE RELEASE AND EXTENSION DOORS OPEN, HYD FLUID BYPASSES THE LNDG GEAR PREVENTING GEAR RETRACTION). AFTER PULLING THE T-HANDLE HIDDEN BY THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR, I RELEASED IT. JUST THEN I WAS DISTRACTED BY THE CAPT AND CLOSED THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR WITHOUT ENSURING THE T- HANDLE WAS PROPERLY SEATED. THE DOOR LOOKED AND FELT CLOSED, BUT WAS ACTUALLY CRACKED OPEN ABOUT 1/4 INCH. IT IS COMPANY POLICY THAT, IF THE COCKPIT INTEGRITY IS COMPROMISED BY MAINT MEN OR OTHER PERSONNEL BEING IN THE COCKPIT, AN ACCEPTANCE CHK AS WELL AS BEFORE START CHKLIST MUST BE COMPLETED. THE ACCEPTANCE CHKLIST WAS NOT COMPLETED NOR CALLED FOR BY THE CAPT. I DID NOT QUESTION WHY WE DIDN'T DO THE ACCEPTANCE BECAUSE I MOVED THE DOORS AND THOUGHT I RETURNED THEM TO THE ORIGINAL POS AND NO ONE ELSE HAD ENTERED THE COCKPIT. COMPANY NOW SAYS IT DOES NOT MATTER WHETHER SOMEONE ELSE WAS ON THE FLT DECK, AN ACCEPTANCE CHKLIST MUST BE DONE EVEN WHEN THE CREW CHANGES ANY SWITCHES EVEN IF RETURNED TO ORIGINAL POS. START, TAXI, AND TKOF WERE NORMAL UNTIL THE GEAR HANDLE WAS SELECTED UP AND THE GEAR FAILED TO RETRACT. CLT TWR INFORMED US THE GEAR WAS STILL DOWN. WE CLBED TO A SAFE ALT, REVIEWED THE EMER CHKLIST, NOTIFIED THE COMPANY FOR ASSISTANCE, NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND 3 PAX, AND TOLD CLT TWR TO STANDBY WHILE WE HANDLED THE PROBLEM. A RECURRING PROBLEM IN THE MDT IS THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR OPEN AS LITTLE AS 1/4 INCH CAN CAUSE THE GEAR TO FAIL TO RETRACT. WE CHKED THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR AND IT APPEARED CLOSED. WE ADVISED COMPANY AND THEY ADVISED TO RETURN FOR LNDG. WHEN TAXIING INTO THE GATE WE NOTICED THE T-HANDLE WAS TWISTED, PREVENTING FULL CLOSURE OF THE ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR. THE HANDLE WAS STRAIGHTENED AND THE DOOR WAS CLOSED. THE DISCREPANCY WAS WRITTEN UP AND SIGNED OFF BY MAINT. WE DEPARTED TO LWB WITH A NORMAL GEAR RETRACTION. PROBLEMS: DISTR PREVENTED NORMAL VISUAL VERIFICATION OF SEATING OF THE T-HANDLE AND ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR. COMPANY MANUAL LEAVES A 'GRAY' AREA AS TO WHEN THE ACCEPTANCE CHKLIST IS REQUIRED (ALTERNATE RELEASE DOOR IS ON THIS CHKLIST). DESIGN OF SYS ALLOWS THE DOOR TO APPEAR CLOSED WHEN NOT FULLY SEATED AND NO CAUTION LIGHT TO CAUTION YOU. THERE IS NO EMER CHKLIST FOR 'LNDG GEAR FAILED TO RETRACT.' IF THERE IS A MECHANICAL GRIPE, IT SHOULD BE WRITTEN UP EVEN IF IT 'CORRECTS ITSELF' AND MAINT SAYS IT IS NOT NECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.