Narrative:

In planning a flight from allegheny county, PA, to central new jersey, I received WX information from an air carrier WX service at agc. My primary concern was icing conditions, which were forecast as moderate to occasionally severe along the first portion of my route. Various reports of icing from trace to moderate (as I recall) appeared in PIREPS. I should have gone to a hotel right then. Unfortunately, I had a bad case of get-home-itis and convinced myself that it would be reasonable to just 'check things out' and return to agc if I encountered any icing. (Agc had been MVFR earlier that day, but had just gone IFR with an 800 ft ceiling). Bolstering this foolish thought was a report from a pilot who had recently arrived from that direction and said that he had been on top at 6000 and encountered no icing. In addition, there were alternates closely spaced along the early portion of the route that were VFR or nearly so. I pulled out the approach plates for the alternates and studied them, once again convincing myself, stupidly, that it was ok to set out since I had 'plenty' of options in case any ice was encountered. I filed IFR at 7000. I preflted the aircraft carefully. I also verified that my gear was locked down correctly, since on the previous leg of my flight, I had had a problem with the gear motor and had extended it manually. The mechanism was locked over-center as it should be. (It was a holiday wkend, and no mechanics were available at agc that day to reset it). I again reviewed the approach plate for agc and the approachs for latrobe and johnstown, in case I hit ice and had to return or divert. I turned on the heat and defrost full blast, and verified their operation. Once again, this 'thinking ahead' added to the illusion of appropriately-managed risk. On the runup pad, I told the local controller that I was just going to 'take a look' and would return to agc if I had any problems. He said he would pass that information along to the approach controller. My initial clearance was to 3000, with expectation of 7000 in 10 mins, according to the SID. I was concerned about this, so I asked if he could check with approach on the possibility of getting an immediate climb to my final altitude. He checked, and the answer was that I could expect a climb without delay. Here again, both of these things added to the feeling that I was thinking ahead, preparing rational alternatives in case of an icing encounter. It's surprising how you can fool yourself sometimes. I departed and was cleared immediately to 7000 as promised. Approach said that another aircraft was on top at 5800. I reached 6000, and was not on top yet, but had encountered no ice. However, I was climbing more slowly than usual, because of my extended landing gear, and a short time later, at around 6500 ft, I started to get a trace of ice on the windshield. I asked the controller if 6000 was ok for a while, and he cleared me back down to 6000. No more ice accumulated; however, with no guarantee that 6000 would stay ice-free and with known ice above, I told approach that I'd like to divert to either johnstown or latrobe, both of which were close by. He suggested latrobe, and vectored me onto the localizer, cleared me for the approach, and I landed without incident. During the descent, ice began to accumulate rapidly. By the time I landed, I had about a 6 inch ice free spot in the windshield to look through and the airplane had about 1/2 inch of ice on all the leading surfaces. If I had had to go around for one reason or another or had to spend much more time in those descent conditions, I might not have made it. When I got back to my hotel room I just couldn't believe that I had, in a very real sense, risked my life just to get home a day earlier. Contributing human factors: strong desire to get somewhere, overconfidence due to presence of options and willingness to divert, insufficient knowledge of and experience with icing phenomena, poor judgement.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROBLEM EXACERBATES ENRTE WX AND ICING ENCOUNTER.

Narrative: IN PLANNING A FLT FROM ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA, TO CENTRAL NEW JERSEY, I RECEIVED WX INFO FROM AN ACR WX SVC AT AGC. MY PRIMARY CONCERN WAS ICING CONDITIONS, WHICH WERE FORECAST AS MODERATE TO OCCASIONALLY SEVERE ALONG THE FIRST PORTION OF MY RTE. VARIOUS RPTS OF ICING FROM TRACE TO MODERATE (AS I RECALL) APPEARED IN PIREPS. I SHOULD HAVE GONE TO A HOTEL RIGHT THEN. UNFORTUNATELY, I HAD A BAD CASE OF GET-HOME-ITIS AND CONVINCED MYSELF THAT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO JUST 'CHK THINGS OUT' AND RETURN TO AGC IF I ENCOUNTERED ANY ICING. (AGC HAD BEEN MVFR EARLIER THAT DAY, BUT HAD JUST GONE IFR WITH AN 800 FT CEILING). BOLSTERING THIS FOOLISH THOUGHT WAS A RPT FROM A PLT WHO HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM THAT DIRECTION AND SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ON TOP AT 6000 AND ENCOUNTERED NO ICING. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE ALTERNATES CLOSELY SPACED ALONG THE EARLY PORTION OF THE RTE THAT WERE VFR OR NEARLY SO. I PULLED OUT THE APCH PLATES FOR THE ALTERNATES AND STUDIED THEM, ONCE AGAIN CONVINCING MYSELF, STUPIDLY, THAT IT WAS OK TO SET OUT SINCE I HAD 'PLENTY' OF OPTIONS IN CASE ANY ICE WAS ENCOUNTERED. I FILED IFR AT 7000. I PREFLTED THE ACFT CAREFULLY. I ALSO VERIFIED THAT MY GEAR WAS LOCKED DOWN CORRECTLY, SINCE ON THE PREVIOUS LEG OF MY FLT, I HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE GEAR MOTOR AND HAD EXTENDED IT MANUALLY. THE MECHANISM WAS LOCKED OVER-CTR AS IT SHOULD BE. (IT WAS A HOLIDAY WKEND, AND NO MECHS WERE AVAILABLE AT AGC THAT DAY TO RESET IT). I AGAIN REVIEWED THE APCH PLATE FOR AGC AND THE APCHS FOR LATROBE AND JOHNSTOWN, IN CASE I HIT ICE AND HAD TO RETURN OR DIVERT. I TURNED ON THE HEAT AND DEFROST FULL BLAST, AND VERIFIED THEIR OP. ONCE AGAIN, THIS 'THINKING AHEAD' ADDED TO THE ILLUSION OF APPROPRIATELY-MANAGED RISK. ON THE RUNUP PAD, I TOLD THE LCL CTLR THAT I WAS JUST GOING TO 'TAKE A LOOK' AND WOULD RETURN TO AGC IF I HAD ANY PROBLEMS. HE SAID HE WOULD PASS THAT INFO ALONG TO THE APCH CTLR. MY INITIAL CLRNC WAS TO 3000, WITH EXPECTATION OF 7000 IN 10 MINS, ACCORDING TO THE SID. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS, SO I ASKED IF HE COULD CHK WITH APCH ON THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO MY FINAL ALT. HE CHKED, AND THE ANSWER WAS THAT I COULD EXPECT A CLB WITHOUT DELAY. HERE AGAIN, BOTH OF THESE THINGS ADDED TO THE FEELING THAT I WAS THINKING AHEAD, PREPARING RATIONAL ALTERNATIVES IN CASE OF AN ICING ENCOUNTER. IT'S SURPRISING HOW YOU CAN FOOL YOURSELF SOMETIMES. I DEPARTED AND WAS CLRED IMMEDIATELY TO 7000 AS PROMISED. APCH SAID THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS ON TOP AT 5800. I REACHED 6000, AND WAS NOT ON TOP YET, BUT HAD ENCOUNTERED NO ICE. HOWEVER, I WAS CLBING MORE SLOWLY THAN USUAL, BECAUSE OF MY EXTENDED LNDG GEAR, AND A SHORT TIME LATER, AT AROUND 6500 FT, I STARTED TO GET A TRACE OF ICE ON THE WINDSHIELD. I ASKED THE CTLR IF 6000 WAS OK FOR A WHILE, AND HE CLRED ME BACK DOWN TO 6000. NO MORE ICE ACCUMULATED; HOWEVER, WITH NO GUARANTEE THAT 6000 WOULD STAY ICE-FREE AND WITH KNOWN ICE ABOVE, I TOLD APCH THAT I'D LIKE TO DIVERT TO EITHER JOHNSTOWN OR LATROBE, BOTH OF WHICH WERE CLOSE BY. HE SUGGESTED LATROBE, AND VECTORED ME ONTO THE LOC, CLRED ME FOR THE APCH, AND I LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. DURING THE DSCNT, ICE BEGAN TO ACCUMULATE RAPIDLY. BY THE TIME I LANDED, I HAD ABOUT A 6 INCH ICE FREE SPOT IN THE WINDSHIELD TO LOOK THROUGH AND THE AIRPLANE HAD ABOUT 1/2 INCH OF ICE ON ALL THE LEADING SURFACES. IF I HAD HAD TO GAR FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER OR HAD TO SPEND MUCH MORE TIME IN THOSE DSCNT CONDITIONS, I MIGHT NOT HAVE MADE IT. WHEN I GOT BACK TO MY HOTEL ROOM I JUST COULDN'T BELIEVE THAT I HAD, IN A VERY REAL SENSE, RISKED MY LIFE JUST TO GET HOME A DAY EARLIER. CONTRIBUTING HUMAN FACTORS: STRONG DESIRE TO GET SOMEWHERE, OVERCONFIDENCE DUE TO PRESENCE OF OPTIONS AND WILLINGNESS TO DIVERT, INSUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF AND EXPERIENCE WITH ICING PHENOMENA, POOR JUDGEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.