Narrative:

Clearance was to 3000 ft on climb out, slowing rate to stop at 3000 ft, departure control issued clearance to stop at 4000 ft. I continued climb to 4000 ft. Autothrottles seem to always give you more power than necessary; climbed from 3-4 at about 4000 FPM. At 4100, I realized I was going to pass 4000 ft, I nosed over, trying to override autothrottles and caught climb at about 4250 and descended back to 4000 ft. Controller called with comment 'air carrier X, that altitude was 4000 ft.' captain was reading after takeoff checklist when this occurred. I feel several factors may have contributed to the deviation. One is the accomplishment of the after takeoff checklist at 3000 ft. Although this one is a common practice, I feel it should be delayed until after 10000 ft or at least until the cockpit is less busy. Had the captain been more 'in the loop' it may never have occurred. Also, the first thing the captain told me upon taking our seats up front (our first leg together) was 'I really don't do things the way air carrier X wants us to do, I do things the right way.' this was apparent on his actions on setup and his checklist responses. This was not a big fan of air carrier X's SOP. (Another factor as an aside was that while not have 'met' him, I had seen him once before, he boarded the bus at ord and threw, I mean really threw, his bags on and started screaming and yelling at the bus driver in very foul language. I therefore knew the captain to have a very big temper. I was afraid of him. With his apparent distaste for sops and normal operating procedures, I was also very afraid of upsetting him. I was intimidated being so new on the aircraft). He did not use any of the 'glass' and apparently was displeased when I used it (LNAV, VNAV, even the flight director!) so I was not using any of the tools I had learned to use and had become comfortable with. He didn't use autothrottles and never used reduced takeoff power. (This is the reason I hadn't programmed the autothrottles for a reduced climb and therefore got such high rates of climb). I was a little preoccupied, and while there is no excuses for my lack of vigilance and altitude awareness, I feel several factors could have prevented my unintentional, yet big, screw-up. Follow SOP's even if you don't like them. They are there for a reason. No checklists below 10000 ft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV ALT OVERSHOT IN CLB. ACFT EQUIP OPERATING PROCS WITH CHKLIST USE PROCS.

Narrative: CLRNC WAS TO 3000 FT ON CLBOUT, SLOWING RATE TO STOP AT 3000 FT, DEP CTL ISSUED CLRNC TO STOP AT 4000 FT. I CONTINUED CLB TO 4000 FT. AUTOTHROTTLES SEEM TO ALWAYS GIVE YOU MORE PWR THAN NECESSARY; CLBED FROM 3-4 AT ABOUT 4000 FPM. AT 4100, I REALIZED I WAS GOING TO PASS 4000 FT, I NOSED OVER, TRYING TO OVERRIDE AUTOTHROTTLES AND CAUGHT CLB AT ABOUT 4250 AND DSNDED BACK TO 4000 FT. CTLR CALLED WITH COMMENT 'ACR X, THAT ALT WAS 4000 FT.' CAPT WAS READING AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WHEN THIS OCCURRED. I FEEL SEVERAL FACTORS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEV. ONE IS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AT 3000 FT. ALTHOUGH THIS ONE IS A COMMON PRACTICE, I FEEL IT SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER 10000 FT OR AT LEAST UNTIL THE COCKPIT IS LESS BUSY. HAD THE CAPT BEEN MORE 'IN THE LOOP' IT MAY NEVER HAVE OCCURRED. ALSO, THE FIRST THING THE CAPT TOLD ME UPON TAKING OUR SEATS UP FRONT (OUR FIRST LEG TOGETHER) WAS 'I REALLY DON'T DO THINGS THE WAY ACR X WANTS US TO DO, I DO THINGS THE RIGHT WAY.' THIS WAS APPARENT ON HIS ACTIONS ON SETUP AND HIS CHKLIST RESPONSES. THIS WAS NOT A BIG FAN OF ACR X'S SOP. (ANOTHER FACTOR AS AN ASIDE WAS THAT WHILE NOT HAVE 'MET' HIM, I HAD SEEN HIM ONCE BEFORE, HE BOARDED THE BUS AT ORD AND THREW, I MEAN REALLY THREW, HIS BAGS ON AND STARTED SCREAMING AND YELLING AT THE BUS DRIVER IN VERY FOUL LANGUAGE. I THEREFORE KNEW THE CAPT TO HAVE A VERY BIG TEMPER. I WAS AFRAID OF HIM. WITH HIS APPARENT DISTASTE FOR SOPS AND NORMAL OPERATING PROCS, I WAS ALSO VERY AFRAID OF UPSETTING HIM. I WAS INTIMIDATED BEING SO NEW ON THE ACFT). HE DID NOT USE ANY OF THE 'GLASS' AND APPARENTLY WAS DISPLEASED WHEN I USED IT (LNAV, VNAV, EVEN THE FLT DIRECTOR!) SO I WAS NOT USING ANY OF THE TOOLS I HAD LEARNED TO USE AND HAD BECOME COMFORTABLE WITH. HE DIDN'T USE AUTOTHROTTLES AND NEVER USED REDUCED TKOF PWR. (THIS IS THE REASON I HADN'T PROGRAMMED THE AUTOTHROTTLES FOR A REDUCED CLB AND THEREFORE GOT SUCH HIGH RATES OF CLB). I WAS A LITTLE PREOCCUPIED, AND WHILE THERE IS NO EXCUSES FOR MY LACK OF VIGILANCE AND ALT AWARENESS, I FEEL SEVERAL FACTORS COULD HAVE PREVENTED MY UNINTENTIONAL, YET BIG, SCREW-UP. FOLLOW SOP'S EVEN IF YOU DON'T LIKE THEM. THEY ARE THERE FOR A REASON. NO CHKLISTS BELOW 10000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.