Narrative:

Upon reaching the DH on the ILS 31R approach at dfw, I decided to do a missed approach. During the go around, the first officer called for 'flap 15' and 'positive rate gear up.' upon placing the gear handle to up, the verbal landing gear warning sounded while the flaps were still in the landing range. This caused slight confusion. A call was then made to the tower that we were going around, but, due to frequency congestion the transmission was blocked, so, I tried again but no response. The aircraft was accelerating very rapidly toward 250 KTS, and the autothrottles were still in go around mode. I then ordered the first officer to go to 'speed select' while moving the speed select bug to clean min maneuvering speed. I reminded him to start a right turn direct to 'blue ridge' VOR. Then we received a 'TA' from the TCASII system followed immediately by a climb 'RA,' I commanded the first officer to follow the 'RA,' the entire time, 'climb, climb, climb,' aural warning sounding. During the later part of the 'RA,' the aircraft passed through the altitude set in the altitude alert window. The verbal altitude warning started sounding continuously, along with the tower issuing a heading of 280 degree for us to fly. I then read back heading 280 degree and the tower said negative, fly heading 360 degree. Noting the airspeed was decelerating rapidly (due to 'RA' climb commands), I told the first officer to reduce pitch attitude. After this point, we reestablished our heading and altitude as directed by the tower, and contacted departure control. I considered taking control of the aircraft away from the first officer, but opted not to do so because, I felt a change of control during this critical phase of flight might further compromise the safety of our flight. It is my opinion that during a critical phase of flight the verbal warnings hinder our ability to concentrate and miss their prime objective to correct the associated problem. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. The reporting captain states that he probably should have been making the approach, but the reported WX was 300 ft and 1/2 mi visibility. The aircraft was still in the clouds below 200 ft. The reporter did get a glimpse of the approach lights upon rotation. The TCASII was left in TA/RA when it should have been put in TA only. The aircraft diverted to love field where the crew went 'illegal'. The first officer apologized for his actions. The captain has not heard from the FAA or his company. To make matters complete, there were thunderstorms and windshear in the area. Dfw runway 31R is a CAT I approach with WX mins of 200/ 1/2.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG BADLY EXECUTED A GAR. THERE WAS AN ALTDEV, A HDG DEV, AND A TCASII ALERT.

Narrative: UPON REACHING THE DH ON THE ILS 31R APCH AT DFW, I DECIDED TO DO A MISSED APCH. DURING THE GAR, THE FO CALLED FOR 'FLAP 15' AND 'POSITIVE RATE GEAR UP.' UPON PLACING THE GEAR HANDLE TO UP, THE VERBAL LNDG GEAR WARNING SOUNDED WHILE THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN THE LNDG RANGE. THIS CAUSED SLIGHT CONFUSION. A CALL WAS THEN MADE TO THE TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND, BUT, DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION THE XMISSION WAS BLOCKED, SO, I TRIED AGAIN BUT NO RESPONSE. THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING VERY RAPIDLY TOWARD 250 KTS, AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE STILL IN GAR MODE. I THEN ORDERED THE FO TO GO TO 'SPD SELECT' WHILE MOVING THE SPD SELECT BUG TO CLEAN MIN MANEUVERING SPD. I REMINDED HIM TO START A R TURN DIRECT TO 'BLUE RIDGE' VOR. THEN WE RECEIVED A 'TA' FROM THE TCASII SYS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A CLB 'RA,' I COMMANDED THE FO TO FOLLOW THE 'RA,' THE ENTIRE TIME, 'CLB, CLB, CLB,' AURAL WARNING SOUNDING. DURING THE LATER PART OF THE 'RA,' THE ACFT PASSED THROUGH THE ALT SET IN THE ALT ALERT WINDOW. THE VERBAL ALT WARNING STARTED SOUNDING CONTINUOUSLY, ALONG WITH THE TWR ISSUING A HDG OF 280 DEG FOR US TO FLY. I THEN READ BACK HDG 280 DEG AND THE TWR SAID NEGATIVE, FLY HDG 360 DEG. NOTING THE AIRSPD WAS DECELERATING RAPIDLY (DUE TO 'RA' CLB COMMANDS), I TOLD THE FO TO REDUCE PITCH ATTITUDE. AFTER THIS POINT, WE REESTABLISHED OUR HDG AND ALT AS DIRECTED BY THE TWR, AND CONTACTED DEP CTL. I CONSIDERED TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE FO, BUT OPTED NOT TO DO SO BECAUSE, I FELT A CHANGE OF CTL DURING THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT MIGHT FURTHER COMPROMISE THE SAFETY OF OUR FLT. IT IS MY OPINION THAT DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT THE VERBAL WARNINGS HINDER OUR ABILITY TO CONCENTRATE AND MISS THEIR PRIME OBJECTIVE TO CORRECT THE ASSOCIATED PROBLEM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. THE RPTING CAPT STATES THAT HE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MAKING THE APCH, BUT THE RPTED WX WAS 300 FT AND 1/2 MI VISIBILITY. THE ACFT WAS STILL IN THE CLOUDS BELOW 200 FT. THE RPTR DID GET A GLIMPSE OF THE APCH LIGHTS UPON ROTATION. THE TCASII WAS LEFT IN TA/RA WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN TA ONLY. THE ACFT DIVERTED TO LOVE FIELD WHERE THE CREW WENT 'ILLEGAL'. THE FO APOLOGIZED FOR HIS ACTIONS. THE CAPT HAS NOT HEARD FROM THE FAA OR HIS COMPANY. TO MAKE MATTERS COMPLETE, THERE WERE TSTMS AND WINDSHEAR IN THE AREA. DFW RWY 31R IS A CAT I APCH WITH WX MINS OF 200/ 1/2.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.