Narrative:

On approach into pwm (WX 14 broken 7) at the end of a 13 hour crew duty day. Tower was closed (past midnight) so field was uncontrolled. We had intercepted the localizer to runway 11 and were established inbound. 4 radio frequencys were being used. Bos center, CTAF, bgr FSS, company ramp. Confusion started when I called ramp for a gate and current winds. (No ATIS) ramp gave winds of 200/17 which was 180 degree off from our previous reported. I relayed this to the captain and there was confusion as to which runway would be best. I called ramp again to verify the winds and was told they were 020/17. At this point we were inbound on localizer with DME at 4000 ft (center assigned altitude). The captain, upon receiving the new winds, decided to continue to runway 11. At this point things are very hectic with the captain making calls to bos center and CTAF almost simultaneously. The first officer flying the approach (in IMC conditions) and me running checklists and backing them up. We intercepted the GS and started our descent out of 4000 ft with the captain making calls on CTAF. Things were calming down a little with everything going smoothly. On GS, on localizer. At 2600 ft on our descent we received a call from center asking us if we had field in sight. We answered 'no' and we were told we were not cleared for the approach and were supposed to be at 4000 ft. The first officer then added power and rotated the nose back up to 4000 ft. At 3500 ft in the climb back up center told us 'radar contact lost.' at 4000 ft center cleared us direct the NDB for the procedural turn ILS approach. The first officer made a turn towards the needle and the captain stated 'don't follow that , it's unreliable. I never got an identify.' the captain is now task saturated trying to keep everyone informed of what we were doing. Somewhere in the confusion we lost contact with bos center and were unable to establish ourselves on the ILS without the NDB or radar. At this point confusion was prevalent, we were in the WX, we were all tired, and we were unsure of our exact position relevant to the terrain at our altitude. We all decided that the safe thing to do would be -- climb, get back with center and go to our alternate (bos) under positive radar control. Fuel was also a factor. We had only enough gas to shoot one more approach at pwn and make it to bos. So with safety being our #1 goal we continued onto bos for an uneventful landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF ACR LGT ACFT MADE AN APCH WHEN NOT CLRED BY ATC LATE AT NIGHT AT AN UNCTLED ARPT.

Narrative: ON APCH INTO PWM (WX 14 BROKEN 7) AT THE END OF A 13 HR CREW DUTY DAY. TWR WAS CLOSED (PAST MIDNIGHT) SO FIELD WAS UNCTLED. WE HAD INTERCEPTED THE LOC TO RWY 11 AND WERE ESTABLISHED INBOUND. 4 RADIO FREQS WERE BEING USED. BOS CTR, CTAF, BGR FSS, COMPANY RAMP. CONFUSION STARTED WHEN I CALLED RAMP FOR A GATE AND CURRENT WINDS. (NO ATIS) RAMP GAVE WINDS OF 200/17 WHICH WAS 180 DEG OFF FROM OUR PREVIOUS RPTED. I RELAYED THIS TO THE CAPT AND THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO WHICH RWY WOULD BE BEST. I CALLED RAMP AGAIN TO VERIFY THE WINDS AND WAS TOLD THEY WERE 020/17. AT THIS POINT WE WERE INBOUND ON LOC WITH DME AT 4000 FT (CTR ASSIGNED ALT). THE CAPT, UPON RECEIVING THE NEW WINDS, DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO RWY 11. AT THIS POINT THINGS ARE VERY HECTIC WITH THE CAPT MAKING CALLS TO BOS CTR AND CTAF ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE FO FLYING THE APCH (IN IMC CONDITIONS) AND ME RUNNING CHKLISTS AND BACKING THEM UP. WE INTERCEPTED THE GS AND STARTED OUR DSCNT OUT OF 4000 FT WITH THE CAPT MAKING CALLS ON CTAF. THINGS WERE CALMING DOWN A LITTLE WITH EVERYTHING GOING SMOOTHLY. ON GS, ON LOC. AT 2600 FT ON OUR DSCNT WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM CTR ASKING US IF WE HAD FIELD IN SIGHT. WE ANSWERED 'NO' AND WE WERE TOLD WE WERE NOT CLRED FOR THE APCH AND WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 4000 FT. THE FO THEN ADDED PWR AND ROTATED THE NOSE BACK UP TO 4000 FT. AT 3500 FT IN THE CLB BACK UP CTR TOLD US 'RADAR CONTACT LOST.' AT 4000 FT CTR CLRED US DIRECT THE NDB FOR THE PROCEDURAL TURN ILS APCH. THE FO MADE A TURN TOWARDS THE NEEDLE AND THE CAPT STATED 'DON'T FOLLOW THAT , IT'S UNRELIABLE. I NEVER GOT AN IDENT.' THE CAPT IS NOW TASK SATURATED TRYING TO KEEP EVERYONE INFORMED OF WHAT WE WERE DOING. SOMEWHERE IN THE CONFUSION WE LOST CONTACT WITH BOS CTR AND WERE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH OURSELVES ON THE ILS WITHOUT THE NDB OR RADAR. AT THIS POINT CONFUSION WAS PREVALENT, WE WERE IN THE WX, WE WERE ALL TIRED, AND WE WERE UNSURE OF OUR EXACT POS RELEVANT TO THE TERRAIN AT OUR ALT. WE ALL DECIDED THAT THE SAFE THING TO DO WOULD BE -- CLB, GET BACK WITH CTR AND GO TO OUR ALTERNATE (BOS) UNDER POSITIVE RADAR CTL. FUEL WAS ALSO A FACTOR. WE HAD ONLY ENOUGH GAS TO SHOOT ONE MORE APCH AT PWN AND MAKE IT TO BOS. SO WITH SAFETY BEING OUR #1 GOAL WE CONTINUED ONTO BOS FOR AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.