Narrative:

During a busy departure from nashville airport (bna), runway 2L, our medium large transport-a was assigned a heading of 015 degrees and 5000 ft. After takeoff, we changed our radio over to departure control. We noticed that we were overtaking an large transport which had departed just prior to us. The departure controller asked if we had the large transport in visual contact, we said yes. He was level and in our 1 O'clock position. We were told to maintain visual separation from that aircraft. There were numerous radio xmissions to various aircraft, and shortly we were told to turn to a heading of 290 degrees (85 degrees to our left). The large transport still seemed to be ahead and to our right front. We proceeded to turn left to that heading. Shortly, we noticed that the large transport was in a left turn. I asked the controller 'what heading is the (name of airline) turning to?' as I could see a problem developing if the large transport continued his turn. The controller did not respond and cleared the large transport to 13000 ft. I again asked the controller 'what heading is the (airline) turning to.' momentarily, the large transport queried the controller as to what altitude he was cleared to. The controller responded 13000 ft. About this time our TCASII was sounding a 'traffic, traffic' warning as the large transport kept turning towards us. The large transport rogered the altitude and said he had 'traffic' in sight. However we were still on what looked like a collision course at probably 400 KTS! The medium large transport captain decided to descend to avoid further conflict, but just then the medium large transport TCASII began an RA of 'climb, climb.' since the large transport had been cleared to a higher altitude, the medium large transport continued its descent. Just as the large transport passed behind and above it, the medium large transport TCASII was calling 'increase climb, increase climb.' I believe that this close call occurred because the departure controller and the large transport crew did not understand each other. The controller assumed that the medium large transport would turn behind the large transport to the westerly heading. However, the medium large transport crew was not aware of the heading change given to the large transport (which basically was a course reversal heading for the large transport), and the medium large transport turned to the 290 degree heading when instructed to. The new heading given to the medium large transport should have been given after the large transport had passed to the southwest of the medium large transport. 4 problems were apparent: 1) visual separation instructions were given to an 'expanding' departure situation (how long do you keep watching the other aircraft to 'keep visual separation?' what do you do when, on an IFR clearance, you are given a heading that puts you converging with another aircraft on an IFR clearance that you were told to keep separation from)? 2) all players not listening to the 'necessary' or pertinent radio calls. 3) TCASII not knowing what ATC had instructed the converging aircraft to do. 4) ATC not knowing what TCASII was instructing the converging aircraft to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN 2 DEPARTING ACR ACFT CLBING TO ALT.

Narrative: DURING A BUSY DEP FROM NASHVILLE ARPT (BNA), RWY 2L, OUR MLG-A WAS ASSIGNED A HDG OF 015 DEGS AND 5000 FT. AFTER TKOF, WE CHANGED OUR RADIO OVER TO DEP CTL. WE NOTICED THAT WE WERE OVERTAKING AN LGT WHICH HAD DEPARTED JUST PRIOR TO US. THE DEP CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD THE LGT IN VISUAL CONTACT, WE SAID YES. HE WAS LEVEL AND IN OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS. WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THAT ACFT. THERE WERE NUMEROUS RADIO XMISSIONS TO VARIOUS ACFT, AND SHORTLY WE WERE TOLD TO TURN TO A HDG OF 290 DEGS (85 DEGS TO OUR L). THE LGT STILL SEEMED TO BE AHEAD AND TO OUR R FRONT. WE PROCEEDED TO TURN L TO THAT HDG. SHORTLY, WE NOTICED THAT THE LGT WAS IN A L TURN. I ASKED THE CTLR 'WHAT HDG IS THE (NAME OF AIRLINE) TURNING TO?' AS I COULD SEE A PROB DEVELOPING IF THE LGT CONTINUED HIS TURN. THE CTLR DID NOT RESPOND AND CLRED THE LGT TO 13000 FT. I AGAIN ASKED THE CTLR 'WHAT HDG IS THE (AIRLINE) TURNING TO.' MOMENTARILY, THE LGT QUERIED THE CTLR AS TO WHAT ALT HE WAS CLRED TO. THE CTLR RESPONDED 13000 FT. ABOUT THIS TIME OUR TCASII WAS SOUNDING A 'TFC, TFC' WARNING AS THE LGT KEPT TURNING TOWARDS US. THE LGT ROGERED THE ALT AND SAID HE HAD 'TFC' IN SIGHT. HOWEVER WE WERE STILL ON WHAT LOOKED LIKE A COLLISION COURSE AT PROBABLY 400 KTS! THE MLG CAPT DECIDED TO DSND TO AVOID FURTHER CONFLICT, BUT JUST THEN THE MLG TCASII BEGAN AN RA OF 'CLB, CLB.' SINCE THE LGT HAD BEEN CLRED TO A HIGHER ALT, THE MLG CONTINUED ITS DSCNT. JUST AS THE LGT PASSED BEHIND AND ABOVE IT, THE MLG TCASII WAS CALLING 'INCREASE CLB, INCREASE CLB.' I BELIEVE THAT THIS CLOSE CALL OCCURRED BECAUSE THE DEP CTLR AND THE LGT CREW DID NOT UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. THE CTLR ASSUMED THAT THE MLG WOULD TURN BEHIND THE LGT TO THE WESTERLY HDG. HOWEVER, THE MLG CREW WAS NOT AWARE OF THE HDG CHANGE GIVEN TO THE LGT (WHICH BASICALLY WAS A COURSE REVERSAL HDG FOR THE LGT), AND THE MLG TURNED TO THE 290 DEG HDG WHEN INSTRUCTED TO. THE NEW HDG GIVEN TO THE MLG SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN AFTER THE LGT HAD PASSED TO THE SW OF THE MLG. 4 PROBS WERE APPARENT: 1) VISUAL SEPARATION INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO AN 'EXPANDING' DEP SIT (HOW LONG DO YOU KEEP WATCHING THE OTHER ACFT TO 'KEEP VISUAL SEPARATION?' WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN, ON AN IFR CLRNC, YOU ARE GIVEN A HDG THAT PUTS YOU CONVERGING WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON AN IFR CLRNC THAT YOU WERE TOLD TO KEEP SEPARATION FROM)? 2) ALL PLAYERS NOT LISTENING TO THE 'NECESSARY' OR PERTINENT RADIO CALLS. 3) TCASII NOT KNOWING WHAT ATC HAD INSTRUCTED THE CONVERGING ACFT TO DO. 4) ATC NOT KNOWING WHAT TCASII WAS INSTRUCTING THE CONVERGING ACFT TO DO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.