Narrative:

This was a flight under 121 supplemental rules from bfl to rno. I had received a forecast for rno which indicated high ceilings and unlimited visibility at our ETA of XB00L and beyond, the night before. During the preflight duties I had this forecast in the back of my mind but overlooked getting current WX before takeoff. We departed for rno at XA00 and while en route I received an amended forecast and current WX which indicated low visibility with some improvement at our ETA. A little more into the flight I received a second amended forecast which now indicated the WX would probably be below landing minimums until XD00L. I had contingency fuel aboard that would have allowed me to return to bfl or go to smf, plus reserves. While over rno I relayed a message via a local FBO to the duty officer that I was diverting to smf. I believe these factors contributed to the problem: I was overloaded with duties. At this company there are no dispatchers and the PIC is responsible for gathering all WX and airport data. One is under constant pressure to keep frequently very tight schedules. You must always consider the cheapest fuel and are advised to buy minimum fuel. It is the norm to encounter operational problems at out stations because all support personnel are contracted out and sometimes poorly trained in our procedures. Management on paper stresses support for its crews but in practice attempts to have crews bend the rules especially on duty-time or marginal WX which results in fatigue and stress. Second- guessing of almost every decision made by the crew. I believe fatigue was a factor in not receiving current WX and I was lulled into a false sense of security because of the very optimistic forecast I had received the night before.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT DEPARTED WITHOUT OBTAINING CURRENT WX AND FORECAST FOR DEST. WX TURNED OUT TO BE BELOW MINIMUMS.

Narrative: THIS WAS A FLT UNDER 121 SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FROM BFL TO RNO. I HAD RECEIVED A FORECAST FOR RNO WHICH INDICATED HIGH CEILINGS AND UNLIMITED VISIBILITY AT OUR ETA OF XB00L AND BEYOND, THE NIGHT BEFORE. DURING THE PREFLT DUTIES I HAD THIS FORECAST IN THE BACK OF MY MIND BUT OVERLOOKED GETTING CURRENT WX BEFORE TKOF. WE DEPARTED FOR RNO AT XA00 AND WHILE ENRTE I RECEIVED AN AMENDED FORECAST AND CURRENT WX WHICH INDICATED LOW VISIBILITY WITH SOME IMPROVEMENT AT OUR ETA. A LITTLE MORE INTO THE FLT I RECEIVED A SECOND AMENDED FORECAST WHICH NOW INDICATED THE WX WOULD PROBABLY BE BELOW LNDG MINIMUMS UNTIL XD00L. I HAD CONTINGENCY FUEL ABOARD THAT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED ME TO RETURN TO BFL OR GO TO SMF, PLUS RESERVES. WHILE OVER RNO I RELAYED A MESSAGE VIA A LCL FBO TO THE DUTY OFFICER THAT I WAS DIVERTING TO SMF. I BELIEVE THESE FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB: I WAS OVERLOADED WITH DUTIES. AT THIS COMPANY THERE ARE NO DISPATCHERS AND THE PIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GATHERING ALL WX AND ARPT DATA. ONE IS UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE TO KEEP FREQUENTLY VERY TIGHT SCHEDULES. YOU MUST ALWAYS CONSIDER THE CHEAPEST FUEL AND ARE ADVISED TO BUY MINIMUM FUEL. IT IS THE NORM TO ENCOUNTER OPERATIONAL PROBS AT OUT STATIONS BECAUSE ALL SUPPORT PERSONNEL ARE CONTRACTED OUT AND SOMETIMES POORLY TRAINED IN OUR PROCS. MGMNT ON PAPER STRESSES SUPPORT FOR ITS CREWS BUT IN PRACTICE ATTEMPTS TO HAVE CREWS BEND THE RULES ESPECIALLY ON DUTY-TIME OR MARGINAL WX WHICH RESULTS IN FATIGUE AND STRESS. SECOND- GUESSING OF ALMOST EVERY DECISION MADE BY THE CREW. I BELIEVE FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR IN NOT RECEIVING CURRENT WX AND I WAS LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE VERY OPTIMISTIC FORECAST I HAD RECEIVED THE NIGHT BEFORE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.