Narrative:

I firmly believe that the cause of the events listed separately was an unexpected, internal failure within the left engine. While en route from phillip, sd, to mandan, nd, in VFR conditions, with 2 other occupants onboard, the left engine failed approximately 30 mi south of the mandan, bismarck area. When the engine failure occurred I immediately began to execute the appropriate emergency procedures and began a turn sward towards an airport I remembered passing. While performing the above actions I noticed black smoke coming from the left engine and it began to shake and shudder. I believed that damage to the engine was extensive and could soon result in fire or an inability to feather the propeller. It was under this reasoning and at this point I feathered the left propeller and secured the left engine. After feathering the propeller and securing the engine and while operating the aircraft north the appropriate confign and airspeed, I realized the aircraft was descending at a rate too great to make it to my initial point of intended landing. Among many considerations I knew the lives of those onboard were of utmost importance. I promptly chose a landing area within reach of the aircraft's capabilities and away from other persons or property and committed myself to it. I used the power from the operating engine to maneuver the aircraft to my chosen point of landing and to slow the rate of descent just prior to touchdown. During this time, while preparing the aircraft for an off-airport landing and suspecting the presence of deep snow, I opted to leave the landing gear in the 'up' position to reduce the possibility of a nose over. I briefed the passenger of appropriate actions they should take during touchdown and after the aircraft ceased moving. I continued to maintain control of the aircraft to the best of my abilities until all movement ceased. While the passenger exited through the door I secured the aircraft then exited the aircraft myself. The only injuries involved in this off-airport landing were some shallow scratches on the hand of the rear seat passenger. After the occurrence of the above listed events, I took it upon myself to move the aircraft onto private property where I felt it would be safe. My only motivation for doing this was to reduce the possibility of vandalism, theft, or the chance that the falling snow would make it near impossible to move later. Also, after the fact, I found it difficult to find a phone number for which I could contact the NTSB. What I understood from my flight training was that I was to contact the NTSB, first, in the event of an aircraft incident. I turned to flight service and even though they couldn't give me a number with which I could contact the NTSB either, they gave me a phone number and instructions to contact the FSDO in fargo which I followed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN LEAVES 1 ENG RUNNING WHICH TAKES SMA TWIN TO THE SCENE OF THE OFF ARPT EMER FORCED LNDG.

Narrative: I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE CAUSE OF THE EVENTS LISTED SEPARATELY WAS AN UNEXPECTED, INTERNAL FAILURE WITHIN THE L ENG. WHILE ENRTE FROM PHILLIP, SD, TO MANDAN, ND, IN VFR CONDITIONS, WITH 2 OTHER OCCUPANTS ONBOARD, THE L ENG FAILED APPROX 30 MI S OF THE MANDAN, BISMARCK AREA. WHEN THE ENG FAILURE OCCURRED I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO EXECUTE THE APPROPRIATE EMER PROCS AND BEGAN A TURN SWARD TOWARDS AN ARPT I REMEMBERED PASSING. WHILE PERFORMING THE ABOVE ACTIONS I NOTICED BLACK SMOKE COMING FROM THE L ENG AND IT BEGAN TO SHAKE AND SHUDDER. I BELIEVED THAT DAMAGE TO THE ENG WAS EXTENSIVE AND COULD SOON RESULT IN FIRE OR AN INABILITY TO FEATHER THE PROP. IT WAS UNDER THIS REASONING AND AT THIS POINT I FEATHERED THE L PROP AND SECURED THE L ENG. AFTER FEATHERING THE PROP AND SECURING THE ENG AND WHILE OPERATING THE ACFT N THE APPROPRIATE CONFIGN AND AIRSPD, I REALIZED THE ACFT WAS DSNDING AT A RATE TOO GREAT TO MAKE IT TO MY INITIAL POINT OF INTENDED LNDG. AMONG MANY CONSIDERATIONS I KNEW THE LIVES OF THOSE ONBOARD WERE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE. I PROMPTLY CHOSE A LNDG AREA WITHIN REACH OF THE ACFT'S CAPABILITIES AND AWAY FROM OTHER PERSONS OR PROPERTY AND COMMITTED MYSELF TO IT. I USED THE PWR FROM THE OPERATING ENG TO MANEUVER THE ACFT TO MY CHOSEN POINT OF LNDG AND TO SLOW THE RATE OF DSCNT JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. DURING THIS TIME, WHILE PREPARING THE ACFT FOR AN OFF-ARPT LNDG AND SUSPECTING THE PRESENCE OF DEEP SNOW, I OPTED TO LEAVE THE LNDG GEAR IN THE 'UP' POS TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NOSE OVER. I BRIEFED THE PAX OF APPROPRIATE ACTIONS THEY SHOULD TAKE DURING TOUCHDOWN AND AFTER THE ACFT CEASED MOVING. I CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES UNTIL ALL MOVEMENT CEASED. WHILE THE PAX EXITED THROUGH THE DOOR I SECURED THE ACFT THEN EXITED THE ACFT MYSELF. THE ONLY INJURIES INVOLVED IN THIS OFF-ARPT LNDG WERE SOME SHALLOW SCRATCHES ON THE HAND OF THE REAR SEAT PAX. AFTER THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ABOVE LISTED EVENTS, I TOOK IT UPON MYSELF TO MOVE THE ACFT ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY WHERE I FELT IT WOULD BE SAFE. MY ONLY MOTIVATION FOR DOING THIS WAS TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF VANDALISM, THEFT, OR THE CHANCE THAT THE FALLING SNOW WOULD MAKE IT NEAR IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE LATER. ALSO, AFTER THE FACT, I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO FIND A PHONE NUMBER FOR WHICH I COULD CONTACT THE NTSB. WHAT I UNDERSTOOD FROM MY FLT TRAINING WAS THAT I WAS TO CONTACT THE NTSB, FIRST, IN THE EVENT OF AN ACFT INCIDENT. I TURNED TO FLT SVC AND EVEN THOUGH THEY COULDN'T GIVE ME A NUMBER WITH WHICH I COULD CONTACT THE NTSB EITHER, THEY GAVE ME A PHONE NUMBER AND INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT THE FSDO IN FARGO WHICH I FOLLOWED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.