Narrative:

The situation actually began while we arrived in rochester, ny. The arrival ATIS accurately idented the low ceiling and visibility -- reduced by snow and blowing snow. I knew it had been snowing in rochester for several hours, so it struck me as strange that the ATIS gave the runway condition as 'patches of snow and ice, braking action good.' just prior to the OM we communicated with rochester tower. We were cleared to land and I had the first officer request the runway condition. Again, 'patches of snow and ice, braking action good.' the approach was normal. When I got a clear picture of the runway (at about 200-300 ft) it was apparent that it was completely snow covered! The touchdown was very soft, indicating a rather deep covering. Using mostly reverse thrust, I did not touch the brakes until approximately 80 KTS. The runway was at best fair braking and a report as 'fair to poor toward the end' was relayed to the tower controller. At the terminal gate the first officer and I began preparing for our departure to chicago in about 50 mins. The snow was still falling, and if anything, was increasing. A new ATIS indicated the runway condition as 1/4 inch of wet snow on patches of snow and ice, braking action fair. The first officer and I agreed this was a better assessment of what we had landed on and prepared our takeoff calculations accordingly using cluttered runway charts. The weight reductions required for cluttered runway conditions is where our problems started. Our calculated weight was lighter than our company dispatcher had anticipated. Even before we arrived in rochester the dispatcher had been in communication with rochester tower asking about field conditions so he could stay ahead of these calculations. He was given the 'patches of snow and ice' information and was told plowing was being done between arrs. He of course could not figure out why I had ordered a weight reduction for a clutter takeoff when the tower told him the runway had only patches of snow and ice. At this point I was summoned to a telephone to talk to our dispatcher. I explained what we saw during our landing, what the latest ATIS was giving as runway condition, and that ground control had informed us that plowing was the 'county's responsibility' and they had no control of it. This is, of course, a classic communication breakdown. The kind of breakdown that can, if left unchked, have catastrophic results. In this case my first officer and I would not leave without being assured our weight was reduced enough to ensure a safe takeoff. Decisions made in the cockpit using good clear concepts are only as good as the information we receive. Our dispatcher was thinking ahead for us, but the information he received could have put our takeoff in jeopardy. The communication breakdown began when the tower did not give updated runway information to inbound and outbound flts during a heavy snowfall. If the runway condition is the responsibility of the county or other party, then maybe they should be 'brought into the loop' so updated information can flow to the cockpit as well as to the dispatcher, who is jointly responsible for the flight. We have come a long way in recent yrs to ensure a high degree of safety in winter operations. This incident has indicated to me that possibly a further refinement in the way we give field condition reports is needed. We need to have all parties involved on the same page of the book. I do not believe this is rochester's problem in particular, but an area of concern at all airports where winter can rear its ugly head.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY CLUTTER NOT PROPERLY RPTED CREATING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OVERWT TKOF.

Narrative: THE SIT ACTUALLY BEGAN WHILE WE ARRIVED IN ROCHESTER, NY. THE ARR ATIS ACCURATELY IDENTED THE LOW CEILING AND VISIBILITY -- REDUCED BY SNOW AND BLOWING SNOW. I KNEW IT HAD BEEN SNOWING IN ROCHESTER FOR SEVERAL HRS, SO IT STRUCK ME AS STRANGE THAT THE ATIS GAVE THE RWY CONDITION AS 'PATCHES OF SNOW AND ICE, BRAKING ACTION GOOD.' JUST PRIOR TO THE OM WE COMMUNICATED WITH ROCHESTER TWR. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND I HAD THE FO REQUEST THE RWY CONDITION. AGAIN, 'PATCHES OF SNOW AND ICE, BRAKING ACTION GOOD.' THE APCH WAS NORMAL. WHEN I GOT A CLR PICTURE OF THE RWY (AT ABOUT 200-300 FT) IT WAS APPARENT THAT IT WAS COMPLETELY SNOW COVERED! THE TOUCHDOWN WAS VERY SOFT, INDICATING A RATHER DEEP COVERING. USING MOSTLY REVERSE THRUST, I DID NOT TOUCH THE BRAKES UNTIL APPROX 80 KTS. THE RWY WAS AT BEST FAIR BRAKING AND A RPT AS 'FAIR TO POOR TOWARD THE END' WAS RELAYED TO THE TWR CTLR. AT THE TERMINAL GATE THE FO AND I BEGAN PREPARING FOR OUR DEP TO CHICAGO IN ABOUT 50 MINS. THE SNOW WAS STILL FALLING, AND IF ANYTHING, WAS INCREASING. A NEW ATIS INDICATED THE RWY CONDITION AS 1/4 INCH OF WET SNOW ON PATCHES OF SNOW AND ICE, BRAKING ACTION FAIR. THE FO AND I AGREED THIS WAS A BETTER ASSESSMENT OF WHAT WE HAD LANDED ON AND PREPARED OUR TKOF CALCULATIONS ACCORDINGLY USING CLUTTERED RWY CHARTS. THE WT REDUCTIONS REQUIRED FOR CLUTTERED RWY CONDITIONS IS WHERE OUR PROBS STARTED. OUR CALCULATED WT WAS LIGHTER THAN OUR COMPANY DISPATCHER HAD ANTICIPATED. EVEN BEFORE WE ARRIVED IN ROCHESTER THE DISPATCHER HAD BEEN IN COM WITH ROCHESTER TWR ASKING ABOUT FIELD CONDITIONS SO HE COULD STAY AHEAD OF THESE CALCULATIONS. HE WAS GIVEN THE 'PATCHES OF SNOW AND ICE' INFO AND WAS TOLD PLOWING WAS BEING DONE BTWN ARRS. HE OF COURSE COULD NOT FIGURE OUT WHY I HAD ORDERED A WT REDUCTION FOR A CLUTTER TKOF WHEN THE TWR TOLD HIM THE RWY HAD ONLY PATCHES OF SNOW AND ICE. AT THIS POINT I WAS SUMMONED TO A TELEPHONE TO TALK TO OUR DISPATCHER. I EXPLAINED WHAT WE SAW DURING OUR LNDG, WHAT THE LATEST ATIS WAS GIVING AS RWY CONDITION, AND THAT GND CTL HAD INFORMED US THAT PLOWING WAS THE 'COUNTY'S RESPONSIBILITY' AND THEY HAD NO CTL OF IT. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A CLASSIC COM BREAKDOWN. THE KIND OF BREAKDOWN THAT CAN, IF LEFT UNCHKED, HAVE CATASTROPHIC RESULTS. IN THIS CASE MY FO AND I WOULD NOT LEAVE WITHOUT BEING ASSURED OUR WT WAS REDUCED ENOUGH TO ENSURE A SAFE TKOF. DECISIONS MADE IN THE COCKPIT USING GOOD CLR CONCEPTS ARE ONLY AS GOOD AS THE INFO WE RECEIVE. OUR DISPATCHER WAS THINKING AHEAD FOR US, BUT THE INFO HE RECEIVED COULD HAVE PUT OUR TKOF IN JEOPARDY. THE COM BREAKDOWN BEGAN WHEN THE TWR DID NOT GIVE UPDATED RWY INFO TO INBOUND AND OUTBOUND FLTS DURING A HVY SNOWFALL. IF THE RWY CONDITION IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COUNTY OR OTHER PARTY, THEN MAYBE THEY SHOULD BE 'BROUGHT INTO THE LOOP' SO UPDATED INFO CAN FLOW TO THE COCKPIT AS WELL AS TO THE DISPATCHER, WHO IS JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FLT. WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY IN RECENT YRS TO ENSURE A HIGH DEG OF SAFETY IN WINTER OPS. THIS INCIDENT HAS INDICATED TO ME THAT POSSIBLY A FURTHER REFINEMENT IN THE WAY WE GIVE FIELD CONDITION RPTS IS NEEDED. WE NEED TO HAVE ALL PARTIES INVOLVED ON THE SAME PAGE OF THE BOOK. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS ROCHESTER'S PROB IN PARTICULAR, BUT AN AREA OF CONCERN AT ALL ARPTS WHERE WINTER CAN REAR ITS UGLY HEAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.