Narrative:

The flight incurred a delay at the gate before pushback for the replacement of a battery charger. The flight proceeded without any further problems until the approach phase. We were instructed to 210 KTS, when slats were extended the right hydraulic quantity and pressure went to 0. We requested vectors off the localizer to give us time to run checklists and comply with afm procedures and prepare the cabin crew. We notified ATC of our condition and explained how after landing we would have to remain on the runway until maintenance could secure our gear doors and be tugged to the gate. The landing was uneventful and we stopped on the centerline. With the emergency equipment standing by and maintenance working on the gear doors, we started the APU to supplement cabin cooling. Once the APU air was selected on, the cabin began filling with smoke and fumes. We immediately secured the APU and ventilated the cabin with the left engine air conditioning unit. We were towed to the gate and passenger deplaned. 2 things I would have done differently: 1) deplaned all 141 passenger as plane was depwred for battery charger replacement. Even though emergency lighting was available and megaphones could have been used, it was uncomfortable for me to have everyone sitting on a dead airplane. I should have relied more on intuition to know it was going to take longer than maintenance said it would. 2) my gut feeling was not to start the APU, suspecting it may be soaked with hydraulic fluid, however, this was a line check by a check airman in the jump seat and my intuition was influenced by his suggestion to start the APU to save fuel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG HAD A SERIES OF MECHANICAL FAILURES THAT DID NOT SERIOUSLY ENDANGER THE FLT.

Narrative: THE FLT INCURRED A DELAY AT THE GATE BEFORE PUSHBACK FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF A BATTERY CHARGER. THE FLT PROCEEDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PROBS UNTIL THE APCH PHASE. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO 210 KTS, WHEN SLATS WERE EXTENDED THE R HYD QUANTITY AND PRESSURE WENT TO 0. WE REQUESTED VECTORS OFF THE LOC TO GIVE US TIME TO RUN CHKLISTS AND COMPLY WITH AFM PROCS AND PREPARE THE CABIN CREW. WE NOTIFIED ATC OF OUR CONDITION AND EXPLAINED HOW AFTER LNDG WE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN ON THE RWY UNTIL MAINT COULD SECURE OUR GEAR DOORS AND BE TUGGED TO THE GATE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE STOPPED ON THE CTRLINE. WITH THE EMER EQUIP STANDING BY AND MAINT WORKING ON THE GEAR DOORS, WE STARTED THE APU TO SUPPLEMENT CABIN COOLING. ONCE THE APU AIR WAS SELECTED ON, THE CABIN BEGAN FILLING WITH SMOKE AND FUMES. WE IMMEDIATELY SECURED THE APU AND VENTILATED THE CABIN WITH THE L ENG AIR CONDITIONING UNIT. WE WERE TOWED TO THE GATE AND PAX DEPLANED. 2 THINGS I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY: 1) DEPLANED ALL 141 PAX AS PLANE WAS DEPWRED FOR BATTERY CHARGER REPLACEMENT. EVEN THOUGH EMER LIGHTING WAS AVAILABLE AND MEGAPHONES COULD HAVE BEEN USED, IT WAS UNCOMFORTABLE FOR ME TO HAVE EVERYONE SITTING ON A DEAD AIRPLANE. I SHOULD HAVE RELIED MORE ON INTUITION TO KNOW IT WAS GOING TO TAKE LONGER THAN MAINT SAID IT WOULD. 2) MY GUT FEELING WAS NOT TO START THE APU, SUSPECTING IT MAY BE SOAKED WITH HYD FLUID, HOWEVER, THIS WAS A LINE CHK BY A CHK AIRMAN IN THE JUMP SEAT AND MY INTUITION WAS INFLUENCED BY HIS SUGGESTION TO START THE APU TO SAVE FUEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.