Narrative:

Upon returning to bay city an entry to crosswind runway 23 and #2 in the pattern was reported with #1 traffic in sight. #1 traffic thanked me. Flying downwind, then turning base after #1 traffic was past my abeam position on final, #3 traffic reported downwind runway 23 and verified #3. #1 traffic landed and a helicopter was observed taxiing to runway 23. I reported final runway 23 and then heard instructional conversation between the helicopter pilot and his student over the unicom frequency as if the transmit button were stuck. At this point I became concerned of the helicopter's awareness of my being on short final. At this time altitude was about 800 ft MSL and 1/4 mi to the 585 MSL airport. My concerns were founded as the helicopter taxied past the hold line onto active runway 23. My next decision was to execute the go around. Estimated miss was about 150 ft. While going around I heard the helicopter pilot tell his student not to freeze up on him and that the aircraft (me) did not say he was going to land. Although the helicopter pilot thought he was only on intercom he was also transmitting. Continuing the go around, leveling off, lowering the landing gear again, previous #1 traffic advised me to watch out my window. Next I heard the helicopter reporting downwind runway 23 which is a violation of far 91.127B, part 2, which states avoid flow of fixed wing aircraft while landing at an uncontrolled airport. After landing, waiting for the helicopter to land on runway 23, taxiing back, refueling, hangaring, I walked over to the FBO and saw previous #1 and #3 traffic pilots -- both flight instructors who advised me they were available as witnesses and of the far violation. Another pilot was not sure the helicopter pilot was an instructor. Not wanting to dismiss the incident I decided a visit to the now on the ground helicopter pilot was required. Upon my confronting the helicopter pilot of his unsafe act, he was resentful, arrogant and defiant, never acknowledging the need for safe operations. I advised the helicopter pilot his first priority while instructing was to see and avoid other aircraft. I further advised the helicopter pilot that other pilots had observed his abrupt maneuvers, and excessive speed taxiing on the airport. I advised the helicopter pilot I had his name and tail number for future unsafe acts. My last 2 words to him were to fly safely!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA ON APCH AT NON TWR ARPT IS FORCED TO GAR DUE HELI TAKING ACTIVE RWY.

Narrative: UPON RETURNING TO BAY CITY AN ENTRY TO XWIND RWY 23 AND #2 IN THE PATTERN WAS RPTED WITH #1 TFC IN SIGHT. #1 TFC THANKED ME. FLYING DOWNWIND, THEN TURNING BASE AFTER #1 TFC WAS PAST MY ABEAM POS ON FINAL, #3 TFC RPTED DOWNWIND RWY 23 AND VERIFIED #3. #1 TFC LANDED AND A HELI WAS OBSERVED TAXIING TO RWY 23. I RPTED FINAL RWY 23 AND THEN HEARD INSTRUCTIONAL CONVERSATION BTWN THE HELI PLT AND HIS STUDENT OVER THE UNICOM FREQ AS IF THE XMIT BUTTON WERE STUCK. AT THIS POINT I BECAME CONCERNED OF THE HELI'S AWARENESS OF MY BEING ON SHORT FINAL. AT THIS TIME ALT WAS ABOUT 800 FT MSL AND 1/4 MI TO THE 585 MSL ARPT. MY CONCERNS WERE FOUNDED AS THE HELI TAXIED PAST THE HOLD LINE ONTO ACTIVE RWY 23. MY NEXT DECISION WAS TO EXECUTE THE GAR. ESTIMATED MISS WAS ABOUT 150 FT. WHILE GOING AROUND I HEARD THE HELI PLT TELL HIS STUDENT NOT TO FREEZE UP ON HIM AND THAT THE ACFT (ME) DID NOT SAY HE WAS GOING TO LAND. ALTHOUGH THE HELI PLT THOUGHT HE WAS ONLY ON INTERCOM HE WAS ALSO XMITTING. CONTINUING THE GAR, LEVELING OFF, LOWERING THE LNDG GEAR AGAIN, PREVIOUS #1 TFC ADVISED ME TO WATCH OUT MY WINDOW. NEXT I HEARD THE HELI RPTING DOWNWIND RWY 23 WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF FAR 91.127B, PART 2, WHICH STATES AVOID FLOW OF FIXED WING ACFT WHILE LNDG AT AN UNCTLED ARPT. AFTER LNDG, WAITING FOR THE HELI TO LAND ON RWY 23, TAXIING BACK, REFUELING, HANGARING, I WALKED OVER TO THE FBO AND SAW PREVIOUS #1 AND #3 TFC PLTS -- BOTH FLT INSTRUCTORS WHO ADVISED ME THEY WERE AVAILABLE AS WITNESSES AND OF THE FAR VIOLATION. ANOTHER PLT WAS NOT SURE THE HELI PLT WAS AN INSTRUCTOR. NOT WANTING TO DISMISS THE INCIDENT I DECIDED A VISIT TO THE NOW ON THE GND HELI PLT WAS REQUIRED. UPON MY CONFRONTING THE HELI PLT OF HIS UNSAFE ACT, HE WAS RESENTFUL, ARROGANT AND DEFIANT, NEVER ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED FOR SAFE OPS. I ADVISED THE HELI PLT HIS FIRST PRIORITY WHILE INSTRUCTING WAS TO SEE AND AVOID OTHER ACFT. I FURTHER ADVISED THE HELI PLT THAT OTHER PLTS HAD OBSERVED HIS ABRUPT MANEUVERS, AND EXCESSIVE SPD TAXIING ON THE ARPT. I ADVISED THE HELI PLT I HAD HIS NAME AND TAIL NUMBER FOR FUTURE UNSAFE ACTS. MY LAST 2 WORDS TO HIM WERE TO FLY SAFELY!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.