Narrative:

Upon arrival at clt airport from the overnight, I (first officer) proceeded to the gate at which our aircraft had just arrived. After passenger had disembarked I went down the jetway, dropped off my bags and exited the jetway to conduct my preflight. Everything appeared normal except I noted that all of the spoilers were still up. Because I had a 30 in 7 problem, I did not go back up the jetway to the aircraft, but instead I went into the crew room to check on the computer that there was in fact a programmed first officer to relieve me in indianapolis. Having done that, I returned to the aircraft and settled in and accomplished my preflight items completely forgetting about the fact that I had noted the spoilers were up on my external preflight. When the captain arrived he settled in and accomplished his preflight checks. At approximately 10 mins prior to departure time (XA15 EST) we performed the receiving checklist followed by the before start checklist with no abnormal indications observed. (On the before start check we checked 'speed brake, down/detent' which it was down and in the detent.) neither of us visually checked outside to insure that the spoilers/speed brakes were in fact down (I will from this day on) and the item did not trigger my mind to question the position of them either. At departure time the doors were closed and we were cleared to push. The pushback was accomplished by a single tug driver (non maintenance type in accordance with the new maintenance contract) who pushed us straight back and cleared us to start. We started engine #2 only, as we planned a single engine taxi. Following engine start the captain cleared the pushback man off the intercom to disconnect the tug. That accomplished, he showed the captain the nose gear bypass pin pulled and saluted us out. He did not indicate anything abnormal about our aircraft confign. Prior to taxi the after start checklist was accomplished, again without any abnormal indications in the cockpit. When we were third or fourth in line for takeoff, engine #1 was started. After start and before takeoff checklists were accomplished. Again, no abnormal indications were noted in the cockpit. (The recall check does not check a disparity between the position of the speed brake handle and the actual speed brakes.) on advancement of the throttles, no warning horn was received because 1) the flaps were set for takeoff, 2) trim setting was in the green band, 3) speed brake handle was in the down detent (even though the spoilers were fully extended/up). When we were #1 for takeoff I made a PA that we were next for takeoff in about 1 min. While we were taking the runway (18L) the tower advised us that they were going to put an mdt in front of us for takeoff as we were on the same departure as the company aircraft who had just taken off. After sitting 'in position' on runway 18L for approximately 2 mins, we received a call from the 'C' flight attendant who relayed that a deadheading captain had just informed him that our spoilers were up. Upon receiving this information I immediately looked back at the wings and confirmed it. I called the tower prior to receiving takeoff clearance and requested clearance off the runway and to return to the gate. We were cleared off runway 18L and back to ramp control for a gate. Once back at the gate maintenance personnel checked the aircraft over and determined that the speed brake handle was no longer connected to the control cable. This incident which could have been fatal has reinforced in my mind that any time I see anything slightly out of the ordinary that I will take action immediately to resolve it one way or another rather than thinking that the previous crew had left the speed brake handle up and I will put it down when I get to the cockpit. Additionally, if I see an aircraft either holding short (there were several aircraft behind us) or taking the active runway in an unusual confign, I will say something. Supplemental information from acn 237339: upon landing all checklists were completed and the crew exited via the jetway. There was no post-flight check, therefore, I was not aware of a problem. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter said it was assumed that the cable came undone after the spoilers had been activated onthe previous landing and they never retracted when the speed brake handle was stowed. He said he doubted that, if the cable came undone in-flight, the spoilers would extend spontaneously. The flight spoilers (not the ground spoilers) extend with application of aileron. He added that 2 company mlgs were behind them waiting for takeoff and neither of them mentioned the extended spoilers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ALMOST BEGINS TKOF ROLL WITH ALL SPOILERS EXTENDED.

Narrative: UPON ARR AT CLT ARPT FROM THE OVERNIGHT, I (FO) PROCEEDED TO THE GATE AT WHICH OUR ACFT HAD JUST ARRIVED. AFTER PAX HAD DISEMBARKED I WENT DOWN THE JETWAY, DROPPED OFF MY BAGS AND EXITED THE JETWAY TO CONDUCT MY PREFLT. EVERYTHING APPEARED NORMAL EXCEPT I NOTED THAT ALL OF THE SPOILERS WERE STILL UP. BECAUSE I HAD A 30 IN 7 PROB, I DID NOT GO BACK UP THE JETWAY TO THE ACFT, BUT INSTEAD I WENT INTO THE CREW ROOM TO CHK ON THE COMPUTER THAT THERE WAS IN FACT A PROGRAMMED FO TO RELIEVE ME IN INDIANAPOLIS. HAVING DONE THAT, I RETURNED TO THE ACFT AND SETTLED IN AND ACCOMPLISHED MY PREFLT ITEMS COMPLETELY FORGETTING ABOUT THE FACT THAT I HAD NOTED THE SPOILERS WERE UP ON MY EXTERNAL PREFLT. WHEN THE CAPT ARRIVED HE SETTLED IN AND ACCOMPLISHED HIS PREFLT CHKS. AT APPROX 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP TIME (XA15 EST) WE PERFORMED THE RECEIVING CHKLIST FOLLOWED BY THE BEFORE START CHKLIST WITH NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS OBSERVED. (ON THE BEFORE START CHK WE CHKED 'SPD BRAKE, DOWN/DETENT' WHICH IT WAS DOWN AND IN THE DETENT.) NEITHER OF US VISUALLY CHKED OUTSIDE TO INSURE THAT THE SPOILERS/SPD BRAKES WERE IN FACT DOWN (I WILL FROM THIS DAY ON) AND THE ITEM DID NOT TRIGGER MY MIND TO QUESTION THE POS OF THEM EITHER. AT DEP TIME THE DOORS WERE CLOSED AND WE WERE CLRED TO PUSH. THE PUSHBACK WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY A SINGLE TUG DRIVER (NON MAINT TYPE IAW THE NEW MAINT CONTRACT) WHO PUSHED US STRAIGHT BACK AND CLRED US TO START. WE STARTED ENG #2 ONLY, AS WE PLANNED A SINGLE ENG TAXI. FOLLOWING ENG START THE CAPT CLRED THE PUSHBACK MAN OFF THE INTERCOM TO DISCONNECT THE TUG. THAT ACCOMPLISHED, HE SHOWED THE CAPT THE NOSE GEAR BYPASS PIN PULLED AND SALUTED US OUT. HE DID NOT INDICATE ANYTHING ABNORMAL ABOUT OUR ACFT CONFIGN. PRIOR TO TAXI THE AFTER START CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED, AGAIN WITHOUT ANY ABNORMAL INDICATIONS IN THE COCKPIT. WHEN WE WERE THIRD OR FOURTH IN LINE FOR TKOF, ENG #1 WAS STARTED. AFTER START AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED. AGAIN, NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS WERE NOTED IN THE COCKPIT. (THE RECALL CHK DOES NOT CHK A DISPARITY BTWN THE POS OF THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE AND THE ACTUAL SPD BRAKES.) ON ADVANCEMENT OF THE THROTTLES, NO WARNING HORN WAS RECEIVED BECAUSE 1) THE FLAPS WERE SET FOR TKOF, 2) TRIM SETTING WAS IN THE GREEN BAND, 3) SPD BRAKE HANDLE WAS IN THE DOWN DETENT (EVEN THOUGH THE SPOILERS WERE FULLY EXTENDED/UP). WHEN WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF I MADE A PA THAT WE WERE NEXT FOR TKOF IN ABOUT 1 MIN. WHILE WE WERE TAKING THE RWY (18L) THE TWR ADVISED US THAT THEY WERE GOING TO PUT AN MDT IN FRONT OF US FOR TKOF AS WE WERE ON THE SAME DEP AS THE COMPANY ACFT WHO HAD JUST TAKEN OFF. AFTER SITTING 'IN POS' ON RWY 18L FOR APPROX 2 MINS, WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE 'C' FLT ATTENDANT WHO RELAYED THAT A DEADHEADING CAPT HAD JUST INFORMED HIM THAT OUR SPOILERS WERE UP. UPON RECEIVING THIS INFO I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED BACK AT THE WINGS AND CONFIRMED IT. I CALLED THE TWR PRIOR TO RECEIVING TKOF CLRNC AND REQUESTED CLRNC OFF THE RWY AND TO RETURN TO THE GATE. WE WERE CLRED OFF RWY 18L AND BACK TO RAMP CTL FOR A GATE. ONCE BACK AT THE GATE MAINT PERSONNEL CHKED THE ACFT OVER AND DETERMINED THAT THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE WAS NO LONGER CONNECTED TO THE CTL CABLE. THIS INCIDENT WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN FATAL HAS REINFORCED IN MY MIND THAT ANY TIME I SEE ANYTHING SLIGHTLY OUT OF THE ORDINARY THAT I WILL TAKE ACTION IMMEDIATELY TO RESOLVE IT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER RATHER THAN THINKING THAT THE PREVIOUS CREW HAD LEFT THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE UP AND I WILL PUT IT DOWN WHEN I GET TO THE COCKPIT. ADDITIONALLY, IF I SEE AN ACFT EITHER HOLDING SHORT (THERE WERE SEVERAL ACFT BEHIND US) OR TAKING THE ACTIVE RWY IN AN UNUSUAL CONFIGN, I WILL SAY SOMETHING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 237339: UPON LNDG ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND THE CREW EXITED VIA THE JETWAY. THERE WAS NO POST-FLT CHK, THEREFORE, I WAS NOT AWARE OF A PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAID IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE CABLE CAME UNDONE AFTER THE SPOILERS HAD BEEN ACTIVATED ONTHE PREVIOUS LNDG AND THEY NEVER RETRACTED WHEN THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE WAS STOWED. HE SAID HE DOUBTED THAT, IF THE CABLE CAME UNDONE INFLT, THE SPOILERS WOULD EXTEND SPONTANEOUSLY. THE FLT SPOILERS (NOT THE GND SPOILERS) EXTEND WITH APPLICATION OF AILERON. HE ADDED THAT 2 COMPANY MLGS WERE BEHIND THEM WAITING FOR TKOF AND NEITHER OF THEM MENTIONED THE EXTENDED SPOILERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.