Narrative:

On takeoff from sjt, #2 engine overtemped. The takeoff procedure at this airport is power set at brake release. Aborted takeoff sequence and rechked data and cycled ice protection and bleed air to ensure all system off/closed. Again, on power application, #2 engine overtemped. Taxied back to gate where dispatch (part 121 carrier) cancelled flight. A mechanic was sent from dfw to sjt on the next flight. Upon the mechanic's arrival, he uncowled the nacelle and inspected all fittings on the p- 3 line. He also inspected the anti-ice/start bleed valve. I also visually inspected P-3 line and saw a split in the line covering about 30 percent of the diameter. The mechanic agreed with me that that was in all probability the problem. The mechanic called maintenance control and was advised that the part was already on its way. The aircraft had spent the previous night at a maintenance hub with a large split in the 'dt' (difference in temperature between #1 and #2 engines). The split was there before maintenance and after, therefore, it can be concluded that the problem existed pre and post maintenance. The ruptured duct was plainly visible, if the engine was uncowled. A bleed leak of that magnitude would, in all probability, have caused an engine fire indication and necessitated an engine shutdown, subjecting all to unnecessary safety hazards. In conclusion, maintenance should have investigated a high 'dt' further and swapped the part out the previous night. The other obvious conclusion is plain to see.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED DUE TO ACFT EQUIP PROB.

Narrative: ON TKOF FROM SJT, #2 ENG OVERTEMPED. THE TKOF PROC AT THIS ARPT IS PWR SET AT BRAKE RELEASE. ABORTED TKOF SEQUENCE AND RECHKED DATA AND CYCLED ICE PROTECTION AND BLEED AIR TO ENSURE ALL SYS OFF/CLOSED. AGAIN, ON PWR APPLICATION, #2 ENG OVERTEMPED. TAXIED BACK TO GATE WHERE DISPATCH (PART 121 CARRIER) CANCELLED FLT. A MECH WAS SENT FROM DFW TO SJT ON THE NEXT FLT. UPON THE MECH'S ARR, HE UNCOWLED THE NACELLE AND INSPECTED ALL FITTINGS ON THE P- 3 LINE. HE ALSO INSPECTED THE ANTI-ICE/START BLEED VALVE. I ALSO VISUALLY INSPECTED P-3 LINE AND SAW A SPLIT IN THE LINE COVERING ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE DIAMETER. THE MECH AGREED WITH ME THAT THAT WAS IN ALL PROBABILITY THE PROB. THE MECH CALLED MAINT CTL AND WAS ADVISED THAT THE PART WAS ALREADY ON ITS WAY. THE ACFT HAD SPENT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT AT A MAINT HUB WITH A LARGE SPLIT IN THE 'DT' (DIFFERENCE IN TEMP BTWN #1 AND #2 ENGS). THE SPLIT WAS THERE BEFORE MAINT AND AFTER, THEREFORE, IT CAN BE CONCLUDED THAT THE PROB EXISTED PRE AND POST MAINT. THE RUPTURED DUCT WAS PLAINLY VISIBLE, IF THE ENG WAS UNCOWLED. A BLEED LEAK OF THAT MAGNITUDE WOULD, IN ALL PROBABILITY, HAVE CAUSED AN ENG FIRE INDICATION AND NECESSITATED AN ENG SHUTDOWN, SUBJECTING ALL TO UNNECESSARY SAFETY HAZARDS. IN CONCLUSION, MAINT SHOULD HAVE INVESTIGATED A HIGH 'DT' FURTHER AND SWAPPED THE PART OUT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. THE OTHER OBVIOUS CONCLUSION IS PLAIN TO SEE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.