Narrative:

Myself and 3 other mechanics were doing and learning the job card (test servo valve sticking switch). Being the fact we had never performed such test on the medium large transport before, we asked other mechanics who had. They all said to install the rig pin in until you hear a snap. That we did and the mechanic in the cockpit on 2-WAY radio told us on the ground that the check functioned correctly according to the job card procedures. It was I who inserted the rig pin into the right side while another mechanic did the left side. I feel that the job card and urgency of formal, on the job training is lacking and this caused the questions of mechanics doing the functional check. At a later date I was informed that the aircraft returned with aileron problems. Pilots discrepancy is listed below. Item: upon releasing the control lock the ailerons went to full right aileron. Using a great amount of force you can bring the ailerons to neutral but not put in any left aileron. Returned to gate after taxi out. Supplemental information from acn 240116: I feel very strongly that our check card is very vague in telling how to insert the pin. It only says to simply 'insert rig pin.' the pin used is a threaded bolt? How far? How tight? It makes no mention of this at all. I am told that many of our work cards are being revised so we can get accurate information from them. Supplemental information from acn 239757: the representatives were looking into finding the correct rigging pins for this test. Supplemental information from acn 239465: during the check the aileron position was full left (would not neutralize at center). Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter said the FAA was already on the case. He said that the rig pin he was given was the proper one, etched with the correct part number. He said that the improper insertion of the pin rendered the servo inoperative. He inferred that training provided by the air carrier was practically non-existent and should be improved. He said that the job cards, which describe maintenance procedures are woefully inadequate. He thinks the fault is in the translation from the manufacturer's language to english.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAULTY MAINT PROCS CAUSE THE AILERON SYS OF AN MLG TO BECOME INOP.

Narrative: MYSELF AND 3 OTHER MECHS WERE DOING AND LEARNING THE JOB CARD (TEST SERVO VALVE STICKING SWITCH). BEING THE FACT WE HAD NEVER PERFORMED SUCH TEST ON THE MLG BEFORE, WE ASKED OTHER MECHS WHO HAD. THEY ALL SAID TO INSTALL THE RIG PIN IN UNTIL YOU HEAR A SNAP. THAT WE DID AND THE MECH IN THE COCKPIT ON 2-WAY RADIO TOLD US ON THE GND THAT THE CHK FUNCTIONED CORRECTLY ACCORDING TO THE JOB CARD PROCS. IT WAS I WHO INSERTED THE RIG PIN INTO THE R SIDE WHILE ANOTHER MECH DID THE L SIDE. I FEEL THAT THE JOB CARD AND URGENCY OF FORMAL, ON THE JOB TRAINING IS LACKING AND THIS CAUSED THE QUESTIONS OF MECHS DOING THE FUNCTIONAL CHK. AT A LATER DATE I WAS INFORMED THAT THE ACFT RETURNED WITH AILERON PROBS. PLTS DISCREPANCY IS LISTED BELOW. ITEM: UPON RELEASING THE CTL LOCK THE AILERONS WENT TO FULL R AILERON. USING A GREAT AMOUNT OF FORCE YOU CAN BRING THE AILERONS TO NEUTRAL BUT NOT PUT IN ANY L AILERON. RETURNED TO GATE AFTER TAXI OUT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 240116: I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT OUR CHK CARD IS VERY VAGUE IN TELLING HOW TO INSERT THE PIN. IT ONLY SAYS TO SIMPLY 'INSERT RIG PIN.' THE PIN USED IS A THREADED BOLT? HOW FAR? HOW TIGHT? IT MAKES NO MENTION OF THIS AT ALL. I AM TOLD THAT MANY OF OUR WORK CARDS ARE BEING REVISED SO WE CAN GET ACCURATE INFO FROM THEM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 239757: THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE LOOKING INTO FINDING THE CORRECT RIGGING PINS FOR THIS TEST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 239465: DURING THE CHK THE AILERON POS WAS FULL L (WOULD NOT NEUTRALIZE AT CTR). CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR SAID THE FAA WAS ALREADY ON THE CASE. HE SAID THAT THE RIG PIN HE WAS GIVEN WAS THE PROPER ONE, ETCHED WITH THE CORRECT PART NUMBER. HE SAID THAT THE IMPROPER INSERTION OF THE PIN RENDERED THE SERVO INOP. HE INFERRED THAT TRAINING PROVIDED BY THE ACR WAS PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTENT AND SHOULD BE IMPROVED. HE SAID THAT THE JOB CARDS, WHICH DESCRIBE MAINT PROCS ARE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE. HE THINKS THE FAULT IS IN THE TRANSLATION FROM THE MANUFACTURER'S LANGUAGE TO ENGLISH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.