Narrative:

We were cleared for runway 22L VOR/DME approach with minimums 1440 ft MSL. The missed approach is to climb to 3000 ft while outbound on a radial (I do not have the approach plate with me). At minimums, with nothing in sight, a go around was initiated, climbing to 3000 ft. A go around with a light widebody transport is very busy, 'especially' when one has just flown 6300 NM and executed a nonprecision approach. The incredible performance of our aircraft precluded our advising the tower that we were going around until we were passing through 1500 ft. We were then issued a revised climb to 2000 ft and turn left to 180 degrees, which I set and read back. Noting that the first officer was still climbing the aircraft at full go around performance, I called his attention to the 2000 ft altitude limit. He pushed over, reaching 2400 ft. Seeing the situation, the tower reclred us to 3000 ft and we continued climb. The first officer was so busy flying that he never heard the 2000 ft altitude reclrnc. It was the first go around that he'd ever done on the line on the widebody transport, although he has considerable time on the airplane. Incidentally, we had reviewed in detail step- by-step the go around procedure during the brief at 16000 ft. He knew the procedure to the letter and performed it 'to the letter.' now, another interesting point: the flight director continued to call for the climb to 3000 ft even after I had set 2000 ft and pressed the selector knob. We were then cleared for an ILS to runway 22L. We had the approach lights at 360 ft AGL. The first officer flew a textbook approach and landing. What I see here is a classic overload for the pilots, the aircraft, and the system. In retrospect, I would have suggested to the first officer that he use the automatic throttles to ease the workload. I would have (should have) asked the controller, when I heard the widebody transport in front of us go around, if we should plan on the standard missed approach. I would not have accepted the 2000 ft reclrnc when climbing at several thousand FPM for 3000 ft when we were already out of about 1500 ft. I rather slid 1 of my cardinal rules there. In fact, I had advised, when requested to maintain 190 KIAS as long as possible, that we must be at the FAF at 145 KIAS. Momentum is enormous. I am not herein so much second- guessing myself, but more that I am seeing it as an opportunity for different planning in the future. It was clear to us (and to the off duty crew in the cockpit with us) that there will be no issue made by the FAA. I wish to share this experience with you as I feel that the factors represented here are of significance from the human, the cockpit resource management, flight guidance and large (and light weight) aircraft performance perspective.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VERY LIGHT WDB EXCEEDS ASSIGNED ALT ON MISSED APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR RWY 22L VOR/DME APCH WITH MINIMUMS 1440 FT MSL. THE MISSED APCH IS TO CLB TO 3000 FT WHILE OUTBOUND ON A RADIAL (I DO NOT HAVE THE APCH PLATE WITH ME). AT MINIMUMS, WITH NOTHING IN SIGHT, A GAR WAS INITIATED, CLBING TO 3000 FT. A GAR WITH A LIGHT WDB IS VERY BUSY, 'ESPECIALLY' WHEN ONE HAS JUST FLOWN 6300 NM AND EXECUTED A NONPRECISION APCH. THE INCREDIBLE PERFORMANCE OF OUR ACFT PRECLUDED OUR ADVISING THE TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND UNTIL WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 1500 FT. WE WERE THEN ISSUED A REVISED CLB TO 2000 FT AND TURN L TO 180 DEGS, WHICH I SET AND READ BACK. NOTING THAT THE FO WAS STILL CLBING THE ACFT AT FULL GAR PERFORMANCE, I CALLED HIS ATTN TO THE 2000 FT ALT LIMIT. HE PUSHED OVER, REACHING 2400 FT. SEEING THE SIT, THE TWR RECLRED US TO 3000 FT AND WE CONTINUED CLB. THE FO WAS SO BUSY FLYING THAT HE NEVER HEARD THE 2000 FT ALT RECLRNC. IT WAS THE FIRST GAR THAT HE'D EVER DONE ON THE LINE ON THE WDB, ALTHOUGH HE HAS CONSIDERABLE TIME ON THE AIRPLANE. INCIDENTALLY, WE HAD REVIEWED IN DETAIL STEP- BY-STEP THE GAR PROC DURING THE BRIEF AT 16000 FT. HE KNEW THE PROC TO THE LETTER AND PERFORMED IT 'TO THE LETTER.' NOW, ANOTHER INTERESTING POINT: THE FLT DIRECTOR CONTINUED TO CALL FOR THE CLB TO 3000 FT EVEN AFTER I HAD SET 2000 FT AND PRESSED THE SELECTOR KNOB. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR AN ILS TO RWY 22L. WE HAD THE APCH LIGHTS AT 360 FT AGL. THE FO FLEW A TEXTBOOK APCH AND LNDG. WHAT I SEE HERE IS A CLASSIC OVERLOAD FOR THE PLTS, THE ACFT, AND THE SYS. IN RETROSPECT, I WOULD HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE FO THAT HE USE THE AUTO THROTTLES TO EASE THE WORKLOAD. I WOULD HAVE (SHOULD HAVE) ASKED THE CTLR, WHEN I HEARD THE WDB IN FRONT OF US GAR, IF WE SHOULD PLAN ON THE STANDARD MISSED APCH. I WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE 2000 FT RECLRNC WHEN CLBING AT SEVERAL THOUSAND FPM FOR 3000 FT WHEN WE WERE ALREADY OUT OF ABOUT 1500 FT. I RATHER SLID 1 OF MY CARDINAL RULES THERE. IN FACT, I HAD ADVISED, WHEN REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN 190 KIAS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, THAT WE MUST BE AT THE FAF AT 145 KIAS. MOMENTUM IS ENORMOUS. I AM NOT HEREIN SO MUCH SECOND- GUESSING MYSELF, BUT MORE THAT I AM SEEING IT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIFFERENT PLANNING IN THE FUTURE. IT WAS CLR TO US (AND TO THE OFF DUTY CREW IN THE COCKPIT WITH US) THAT THERE WILL BE NO ISSUE MADE BY THE FAA. I WISH TO SHARE THIS EXPERIENCE WITH YOU AS I FEEL THAT THE FACTORS REPRESENTED HERE ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE HUMAN, THE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT, FLT GUIDANCE AND LARGE (AND LIGHT WT) ACFT PERFORMANCE PERSPECTIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.