Narrative:

Taking off from ord in an large transport with a light load and maximum takeoff power (engine anti-ice on). The first officer, just out of training, was flying the leg while I handled communications. Each of us had only done previous leg in an large transport (I have several hundred hours in widebody transport). The combination of cold WX, maximum power, and a nearly empty aircraft caused the airspeed to increase extremely rapidly after liftoff. The first officer was reluctant to raise the nose to the extreme angle required to maintain 250 (in this case, probably better than 25 degrees). When I saw the airspeed zipping through 270, I warned him to slow down and he disconnected the autothrottles, manually retarding power and raising the nose just as the flight director went to altitude capture (between 3500-4000'). Attempting to level at 5000', we overshot by 200-300' (still fast), when we were cleared to 14000'. (I don't really know whether we actually broke 5300' before being cleared up.) I punched flight level change, but the autothrottles refused to engage initially. In the confusion over exactly what was wrong, we both were slow to respond to several heading changes, which understandably annoyed the controller. Nothing really serious here, except the same old story. Both of us were engrossed in trying to figure out why this computerized marvel was doing what it was, rather than turning everything off and manually flying (which we finally did) until we could sort things out. This is a common tendency in this type cockpit, but our unfamiliarity with the super high performance of the large transport was a contributing factor. It really is a handful to takeoff and level at a low altitude and seems to require an almost immediate power reduction to maintain a reasonable nose attitude at low weights. Supplemental information from acn 134177: contributing factors were my inexperience in the type aircraft (my first leg west/O a check airman in widebody transport-widebody transport 2) and the extraordinary performance of the widebody transport 1 along with the fact that we were at maximum power due to engine anti-ice on. Also I think the captain was caught by surprise since it was only his second leg in a widebody transport 1, even though he has a lot of experience in the widebody transport 2. I think the ultimate corrective action would be a separate rating for the widebody transport 1 and widebody transport 2 since the performance characteristics are so different.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB EXCEEDS AIRSPEED AND ALT ON INITIAL CLIMBOUT.

Narrative: TAKING OFF FROM ORD IN AN LGT WITH A LIGHT LOAD AND MAX TKOF PWR (ENG ANTI-ICE ON). THE F/O, JUST OUT OF TRNING, WAS FLYING THE LEG WHILE I HANDLED COMS. EACH OF US HAD ONLY DONE PREVIOUS LEG IN AN LGT (I HAVE SEVERAL HUNDRED HRS IN WDB). THE COMBINATION OF COLD WX, MAX PWR, AND A NEARLY EMPTY ACFT CAUSED THE AIRSPD TO INCREASE EXTREMELY RAPIDLY AFTER LIFTOFF. THE F/O WAS RELUCTANT TO RAISE THE NOSE TO THE EXTREME ANGLE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN 250 (IN THIS CASE, PROBABLY BETTER THAN 25 DEGS). WHEN I SAW THE AIRSPD ZIPPING THROUGH 270, I WARNED HIM TO SLOW DOWN AND HE DISCONNECTED THE AUTOTHROTTLES, MANUALLY RETARDING PWR AND RAISING THE NOSE JUST AS THE FLT DIRECTOR WENT TO ALT CAPTURE (BTWN 3500-4000'). ATTEMPTING TO LEVEL AT 5000', WE OVERSHOT BY 200-300' (STILL FAST), WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO 14000'. (I DON'T REALLY KNOW WHETHER WE ACTUALLY BROKE 5300' BEFORE BEING CLRED UP.) I PUNCHED FLT LEVEL CHANGE, BUT THE AUTOTHROTTLES REFUSED TO ENGAGE INITIALLY. IN THE CONFUSION OVER EXACTLY WHAT WAS WRONG, WE BOTH WERE SLOW TO RESPOND TO SEVERAL HDG CHANGES, WHICH UNDERSTANDABLY ANNOYED THE CTLR. NOTHING REALLY SERIOUS HERE, EXCEPT THE SAME OLD STORY. BOTH OF US WERE ENGROSSED IN TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY THIS COMPUTERIZED MARVEL WAS DOING WHAT IT WAS, RATHER THAN TURNING EVERYTHING OFF AND MANUALLY FLYING (WHICH WE FINALLY DID) UNTIL WE COULD SORT THINGS OUT. THIS IS A COMMON TENDENCY IN THIS TYPE COCKPIT, BUT OUR UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE SUPER HIGH PERFORMANCE OF THE LGT WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. IT REALLY IS A HANDFUL TO TKOF AND LEVEL AT A LOW ALT AND SEEMS TO REQUIRE AN ALMOST IMMEDIATE PWR REDUCTION TO MAINTAIN A REASONABLE NOSE ATTITUDE AT LOW WTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 134177: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE MY INEXPERIENCE IN THE TYPE ACFT (MY FIRST LEG W/O A CHK AIRMAN IN WDB-WDB 2) AND THE EXTRAORDINARY PERFORMANCE OF THE WDB 1 ALONG WITH THE FACT THAT WE WERE AT MAX PWR DUE TO ENG ANTI-ICE ON. ALSO I THINK THE CAPT WAS CAUGHT BY SURPRISE SINCE IT WAS ONLY HIS SECOND LEG IN A WDB 1, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS A LOT OF EXPERIENCE IN THE WDB 2. I THINK THE ULTIMATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD BE A SEPARATE RATING FOR THE WDB 1 AND WDB 2 SINCE THE PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS ARE SO DIFFERENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.