Narrative:

Gjt tower is a non radar approach control facility. Our current transfer of communication procedure for IFR departing aircraft is to instruct pilots to either contact ZDV leaving a designated altitude (i.e., 9000 ft, 10000 ft, etc) or to remain on tower frequency until further advised. The latter instruction is issued to pilots when it is necessary for the departure controller to issue additional instructions to departing IFR aircraft. Unfortunately this situation creates 3 problems. 1) it creates unnecessary coordination between the approach/departure controller and the local controller, increasing the probability of a misunderstanding which in turn increases the probability of an incident, as has occurred in the past. 2) instructing a pilot to contact ZDV leaving an altitude does not insure the pilot is on his/her course (proper course) prior to communications transfer. I.e., an small aircraft departed runway 29 with a right turn to intercept V134 nebound (jnc 060 degree radial), the pilot was instructed to contact ZDV established on V134, but never reported established. An small transport departed runway 29, 1 min later with a left turn to intercept J130 nebound (jnc 075 degree radial) and instructed to contact ZDV established on J130, but the pilot never reported established. The small aircraft, according to ZDV, flew across V134 and came within 4 mi of the small transport on J130. If the pilot had been instructed to contact departure on 119.7 and instructed to report on V134 prior to releasing the small transport this incident would not have occurred. 3) the instructions issued to the local controller by the approach controller for relay to pilots are not recorded. There is nothing to prevent the approach controller from denying issuing incorrect instructions, or vice versa. A situation occurred where the local controller was concentrating on departing and arriving IFR aircraft and forgot about an aircraft on a practice VOR approach to runway 11 and in direct conflict with a departing IFR aircraft on runway 29. These 2 aircraft came within 200 ft of each other at the departure end of runway 29. When the local controller became aware of this situation his immediate response was 'that's because I was working your traffic.' if the local controller had not been preoccupied with IFR traffic he could have been concentrating on his own traffic. This procedure has exited in this facility for numerous yrs. I can say that it has nothing to do with operational necessity or efficiency. The facility manager is well aware of this situation and it was mentioned in our last full facility evaluation. The manager refuses to implement corrective action and insists our current procedure is acceptable. This procedure should be changed immediately to comply with paragraph 3-102(1)B in the ATC manual 7110.65. I do not want to be responsible for someone else's mistake, nor should the local controller be forced to do the approach controller's job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR COMPLAINS ABOUT CTR NOT TAKING A HDOF ON THE ACFT UNTIL SEPARATION WITH OTHER ACFT ARE RESOLVED.

Narrative: GJT TWR IS A NON RADAR APCH CTL FACILITY. OUR CURRENT TRANSFER OF COM PROC FOR IFR DEPARTING ACFT IS TO INSTRUCT PLTS TO EITHER CONTACT ZDV LEAVING A DESIGNATED ALT (I.E., 9000 FT, 10000 FT, ETC) OR TO REMAIN ON TWR FREQ UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. THE LATTER INSTRUCTION IS ISSUED TO PLTS WHEN IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE DEP CTLR TO ISSUE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO DEPARTING IFR ACFT. UNFORTUNATELY THIS SIT CREATES 3 PROBS. 1) IT CREATES UNNECESSARY COORD BTWN THE APCH/DEP CTLR AND THE LCL CTLR, INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF A MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH IN TURN INCREASES THE PROBABILITY OF AN INCIDENT, AS HAS OCCURRED IN THE PAST. 2) INSTRUCTING A PLT TO CONTACT ZDV LEAVING AN ALT DOES NOT INSURE THE PLT IS ON HIS/HER COURSE (PROPER COURSE) PRIOR TO COMS TRANSFER. I.E., AN SMA DEPARTED RWY 29 WITH A R TURN TO INTERCEPT V134 NEBOUND (JNC 060 DEG RADIAL), THE PLT WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT ZDV ESTABLISHED ON V134, BUT NEVER RPTED ESTABLISHED. AN SMT DEPARTED RWY 29, 1 MIN LATER WITH A L TURN TO INTERCEPT J130 NEBOUND (JNC 075 DEG RADIAL) AND INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT ZDV ESTABLISHED ON J130, BUT THE PLT NEVER RPTED ESTABLISHED. THE SMA, ACCORDING TO ZDV, FLEW ACROSS V134 AND CAME WITHIN 4 MI OF THE SMT ON J130. IF THE PLT HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT DEP ON 119.7 AND INSTRUCTED TO RPT ON V134 PRIOR TO RELEASING THE SMT THIS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. 3) THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO THE LCL CTLR BY THE APCH CTLR FOR RELAY TO PLTS ARE NOT RECORDED. THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT THE APCH CTLR FROM DENYING ISSUING INCORRECT INSTRUCTIONS, OR VICE VERSA. A SIT OCCURRED WHERE THE LCL CTLR WAS CONCENTRATING ON DEPARTING AND ARRIVING IFR ACFT AND FORGOT ABOUT AN ACFT ON A PRACTICE VOR APCH TO RWY 11 AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH A DEPARTING IFR ACFT ON RWY 29. THESE 2 ACFT CAME WITHIN 200 FT OF EACH OTHER AT THE DEP END OF RWY 29. WHEN THE LCL CTLR BECAME AWARE OF THIS SIT HIS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WAS 'THAT'S BECAUSE I WAS WORKING YOUR TFC.' IF THE LCL CTLR HAD NOT BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH IFR TFC HE COULD HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATING ON HIS OWN TFC. THIS PROC HAS EXITED IN THIS FACILITY FOR NUMEROUS YRS. I CAN SAY THAT IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH OPERATIONAL NECESSITY OR EFFICIENCY. THE FACILITY MGR IS WELL AWARE OF THIS SIT AND IT WAS MENTIONED IN OUR LAST FULL FACILITY EVALUATION. THE MGR REFUSES TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION AND INSISTS OUR CURRENT PROC IS ACCEPTABLE. THIS PROC SHOULD BE CHANGED IMMEDIATELY TO COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH 3-102(1)B IN THE ATC MANUAL 7110.65. I DO NOT WANT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOMEONE ELSE'S MISTAKE, NOR SHOULD THE LCL CTLR BE FORCED TO DO THE APCH CTLR'S JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.