Narrative:

On jun/xx/93 at approximately XY30 am, after an instrument training flight with a student, an unintentional gear up landing was made at sparta airport. The cause of this incident was not a result of any mechanical failure and the student nor myself were not hurt. The training flight was uneventful until our approach to sparta airport at which time we began our approach to landing. Our descent to the airport was faster than normal and the student was forced to wait until he had achieved safe gear operating range. Upon entering the pattern I casually mentioned, 'I hope I don't get a call today.' my student replied, 'what do you mean?' I said, 'a friend of mine was dying of muscular dystrophy.' he replied with, 'I had a cousin that died of the disease when 15 yrs old,' and the conversation continued from there. As a result, our attention was diverted from running the checklist and flying the airplane. On final, the student pushed the propeller full forward and the approach was continued along with the conversation, without realizing the gear was not down and locked. The student was practicing a soft field landing and as we began the flare just prior to touchdown I heard the stall horn (so I thought) which was normal and did not suspect a problem. When I finally realized there was a problem it was too late. I feel contributing factors leading up to this indecent were: 1) flying when I was emotionally unfit due to the illness of a close friend. 2) failure to properly run checklist. 3) causing a distraction to the student in the pattern when it should have been sterile environment. 4) failure to properly supervise my student and to do an instructor check of the gear down indication on final approach. 5) and my over-confidence in the student's ability to fly the aircraft. Other factors I feel contributed were the small aircraft's gear warning horn. Neither the student nor myself recall hearing the warning horn at all. After a ground test of the horn we found that the horn was not very loud. With our head sets on and the noise of the engine the horn was hard, if at all possible, to hear. Also the horn did not go off until the throttle was below 11 inches manifold pressure which was not achieved until just prior to touchdown. Also, the close resemblance of the noise the stall horn and gear horn make made it possible to confuse the noise we heard on short final which we assumed was the stall horn may have been the gear horn. What I have learned over this is never let your guard down, always insure the checklist is being completed, provide a sterile cockpit and never assume anything -- make sure the gear is down and locked and there is a green light, then check it again!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: ON JUN/XX/93 AT APPROX XY30 AM, AFTER AN INST TRAINING FLT WITH A STUDENT, AN UNINTENTIONAL GEAR UP LNDG WAS MADE AT SPARTA ARPT. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT A RESULT OF ANY MECHANICAL FAILURE AND THE STUDENT NOR MYSELF WERE NOT HURT. THE TRAINING FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL OUR APCH TO SPARTA ARPT AT WHICH TIME WE BEGAN OUR APCH TO LNDG. OUR DSCNT TO THE ARPT WAS FASTER THAN NORMAL AND THE STUDENT WAS FORCED TO WAIT UNTIL HE HAD ACHIEVED SAFE GEAR OPERATING RANGE. UPON ENTERING THE PATTERN I CASUALLY MENTIONED, 'I HOPE I DON'T GET A CALL TODAY.' MY STUDENT REPLIED, 'WHAT DO YOU MEAN?' I SAID, 'A FRIEND OF MINE WAS DYING OF MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY.' HE REPLIED WITH, 'I HAD A COUSIN THAT DIED OF THE DISEASE WHEN 15 YRS OLD,' AND THE CONVERSATION CONTINUED FROM THERE. AS A RESULT, OUR ATTN WAS DIVERTED FROM RUNNING THE CHKLIST AND FLYING THE AIRPLANE. ON FINAL, THE STUDENT PUSHED THE PROP FULL FORWARD AND THE APCH WAS CONTINUED ALONG WITH THE CONVERSATION, WITHOUT REALIZING THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN AND LOCKED. THE STUDENT WAS PRACTICING A SOFT FIELD LNDG AND AS WE BEGAN THE FLARE JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN I HEARD THE STALL HORN (SO I THOUGHT) WHICH WAS NORMAL AND DID NOT SUSPECT A PROB. WHEN I FINALLY REALIZED THERE WAS A PROB IT WAS TOO LATE. I FEEL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS LEADING UP TO THIS INDECENT WERE: 1) FLYING WHEN I WAS EMOTIONALLY UNFIT DUE TO THE ILLNESS OF A CLOSE FRIEND. 2) FAILURE TO PROPERLY RUN CHKLIST. 3) CAUSING A DISTR TO THE STUDENT IN THE PATTERN WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN STERILE ENVIRONMENT. 4) FAILURE TO PROPERLY SUPERVISE MY STUDENT AND TO DO AN INSTRUCTOR CHK OF THE GEAR DOWN INDICATION ON FINAL APCH. 5) AND MY OVER-CONFIDENCE IN THE STUDENT'S ABILITY TO FLY THE ACFT. OTHER FACTORS I FEEL CONTRIBUTED WERE THE SMA'S GEAR WARNING HORN. NEITHER THE STUDENT NOR MYSELF RECALL HEARING THE WARNING HORN AT ALL. AFTER A GND TEST OF THE HORN WE FOUND THAT THE HORN WAS NOT VERY LOUD. WITH OUR HEAD SETS ON AND THE NOISE OF THE ENG THE HORN WAS HARD, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO HEAR. ALSO THE HORN DID NOT GO OFF UNTIL THE THROTTLE WAS BELOW 11 INCHES MANIFOLD PRESSURE WHICH WAS NOT ACHIEVED UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. ALSO, THE CLOSE RESEMBLANCE OF THE NOISE THE STALL HORN AND GEAR HORN MAKE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO CONFUSE THE NOISE WE HEARD ON SHORT FINAL WHICH WE ASSUMED WAS THE STALL HORN MAY HAVE BEEN THE GEAR HORN. WHAT I HAVE LEARNED OVER THIS IS NEVER LET YOUR GUARD DOWN, ALWAYS INSURE THE CHKLIST IS BEING COMPLETED, PROVIDE A STERILE COCKPIT AND NEVER ASSUME ANYTHING -- MAKE SURE THE GEAR IS DOWN AND LOCKED AND THERE IS A GREEN LIGHT, THEN CHK IT AGAIN!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.