Narrative:

Flight from cvg to bna. The forecast for bna indicated no landing alternate was needed for bna at the time of our departure at cvg. Our dispatch released our flight with a fuel load to include our en route fuel, approximately 250 pounds of hold fuel, and our standard 45 min reserve. As we approached the bna area, we arrived from the northeast arrival gate deviating around thunderstorms in the bna area. At this point, we had approximately 850 pounds total fuel. After we had contacted bna approach, they told us to maintain our present heading (210 degrees) and expect the ILS to runway 2R. We acknowledged and set up our NAVAID frequencys (our position was approximately 25 mi to the south of bna). A few mins later, bna approach advised everyone on that particular frequency that no one was getting into bna due to the thunderstorm activity on the airport. The controller also advised that the area of WX was moving rapidly over the airport and hopefully in 15 mins approach would be able to accommodate arrs. At this point we had approximately 800 pounds of fuel (50 mins flight time). I told approach that we had 'minimum fuel' and could only accept a short delay. I also inquired about the ILS to runway 2L (hoping the WX would be moved off the west side of the airport). The controller replied, 'the localizer approach course seems to be clearing, but we just had a lightning strike on the 2L localizer and it's not operational -- contact bna approach on 133.0.' I contacted the other approach controller, and he advised that the localizer for runway 2L was operational. I asked about the field conditions, and he said that the tower visibility was 1/2 mi and it was raining hard on the airport. I told him that we would like to go out to the west of the airport and hold for a few mins, but that we did have a fuel situation. He understood. I also told him that as soon as the conditions improved, we needed to make the approach and land. (By the way, we were as close as 10 mi to the airport and had intermittent contact with the airport -- WX was great behind, west of the storms.) after approximately 10 mins, we were getting low on fuel and I told the controller that we needed the approach to runway 2L. He then began to give us vectors for the approach. Once on the approach, the controller instructed us to plan on circling to runway 20R because of the surface winds (causing us to land with a tailwind which would exceed our maximum tailwind component of 10 KTS). Approximately 5 mi on final approach to runway 2L, the controller said that it was now hailing on the airport. At that point, we discontinued the approach and he advised us to turn left to a westerly heading. I told the controller we wanted vectors back to the final for runway 2L (just prior to this, he gave us holding instructions and I told him that we planned on going to paducah, ky, to land, but after speaking with FSS, the WX briefer advised us not to go there because of a line of thunderstorms moving toward the airport). At this point, we had approximately 650 pounds of fuel (35 mins). As we were being vectored to the runway 2L localizer, the right low fuel warning light illuminated (indicating we had a maximum of 200-300 pounds of fuel in the right fuel tank). The fuel quantity gauge for the right tank indicated we had 350 pounds of fuel and 300 pounds of fuel in the left tank. We were #1 for the approach to runway 2L with a clearance to circle to runway 20R. While on final approach, the approach controller stated that the visibility was going down rapidly to the north of the airport and it would be difficult to land on runway 20R. The winds were reported at 230 degrees at 15 KTS approximately 5 mi when we were on final to runway 2L. I instructed the first officer to declare an emergency because we had to land on runway 2L due to the low visibility on the north side of the airport regardless of our tailwind component landing on runway 2L. We landed on runway 2L without any incident and it was only raining on the field. There were 2 reasons why we declared an emergency: 1) because of our low fuel status, and 2) because we exceeded our maximum tailwind component of 10 KTS (company flight operations manual) for landing. Before we landed, while on final approach to runway 2L, we had visual contact with the runway 5 mi out. No wind shear on turbulence on short final. We landed with approximately 450-500 pounds total indicated fuel.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER DECLARED WHEN FLC REALIZED FUEL REMAINING IS INSUFFICIENT FOR TERMINAL AREA WX. LNDG PROC DOWNWIND LNDG.

Narrative: FLT FROM CVG TO BNA. THE FORECAST FOR BNA INDICATED NO LNDG ALTERNATE WAS NEEDED FOR BNA AT THE TIME OF OUR DEP AT CVG. OUR DISPATCH RELEASED OUR FLT WITH A FUEL LOAD TO INCLUDE OUR ENRTE FUEL, APPROX 250 LBS OF HOLD FUEL, AND OUR STANDARD 45 MIN RESERVE. AS WE APCHED THE BNA AREA, WE ARRIVED FROM THE NE ARR GATE DEVIATING AROUND TSTMS IN THE BNA AREA. AT THIS POINT, WE HAD APPROX 850 LBS TOTAL FUEL. AFTER WE HAD CONTACTED BNA APCH, THEY TOLD US TO MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT HDG (210 DEGS) AND EXPECT THE ILS TO RWY 2R. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND SET UP OUR NAVAID FREQS (OUR POS WAS APPROX 25 MI TO THE S OF BNA). A FEW MINS LATER, BNA APCH ADVISED EVERYONE ON THAT PARTICULAR FREQ THAT NO ONE WAS GETTING INTO BNA DUE TO THE TSTM ACTIVITY ON THE ARPT. THE CTLR ALSO ADVISED THAT THE AREA OF WX WAS MOVING RAPIDLY OVER THE ARPT AND HOPEFULLY IN 15 MINS APCH WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE ARRS. AT THIS POINT WE HAD APPROX 800 LBS OF FUEL (50 MINS FLT TIME). I TOLD APCH THAT WE HAD 'MINIMUM FUEL' AND COULD ONLY ACCEPT A SHORT DELAY. I ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE ILS TO RWY 2L (HOPING THE WX WOULD BE MOVED OFF THE W SIDE OF THE ARPT). THE CTLR REPLIED, 'THE LOC APCH COURSE SEEMS TO BE CLRING, BUT WE JUST HAD A LIGHTNING STRIKE ON THE 2L LOC AND IT'S NOT OPERATIONAL -- CONTACT BNA APCH ON 133.0.' I CONTACTED THE OTHER APCH CTLR, AND HE ADVISED THAT THE LOC FOR RWY 2L WAS OPERATIONAL. I ASKED ABOUT THE FIELD CONDITIONS, AND HE SAID THAT THE TWR VISIBILITY WAS 1/2 MI AND IT WAS RAINING HARD ON THE ARPT. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO GO OUT TO THE W OF THE ARPT AND HOLD FOR A FEW MINS, BUT THAT WE DID HAVE A FUEL SIT. HE UNDERSTOOD. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT AS SOON AS THE CONDITIONS IMPROVED, WE NEEDED TO MAKE THE APCH AND LAND. (BY THE WAY, WE WERE AS CLOSE AS 10 MI TO THE ARPT AND HAD INTERMITTENT CONTACT WITH THE ARPT -- WX WAS GREAT BEHIND, W OF THE STORMS.) AFTER APPROX 10 MINS, WE WERE GETTING LOW ON FUEL AND I TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE NEEDED THE APCH TO RWY 2L. HE THEN BEGAN TO GIVE US VECTORS FOR THE APCH. ONCE ON THE APCH, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO PLAN ON CIRCLING TO RWY 20R BECAUSE OF THE SURFACE WINDS (CAUSING US TO LAND WITH A TAILWIND WHICH WOULD EXCEED OUR MAX TAILWIND COMPONENT OF 10 KTS). APPROX 5 MI ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 2L, THE CTLR SAID THAT IT WAS NOW HAILING ON THE ARPT. AT THAT POINT, WE DISCONTINUED THE APCH AND HE ADVISED US TO TURN L TO A WESTERLY HDG. I TOLD THE CTLR WE WANTED VECTORS BACK TO THE FINAL FOR RWY 2L (JUST PRIOR TO THIS, HE GAVE US HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE PLANNED ON GOING TO PADUCAH, KY, TO LAND, BUT AFTER SPEAKING WITH FSS, THE WX BRIEFER ADVISED US NOT TO GO THERE BECAUSE OF A LINE OF TSTMS MOVING TOWARD THE ARPT). AT THIS POINT, WE HAD APPROX 650 LBS OF FUEL (35 MINS). AS WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO THE RWY 2L LOC, THE R LOW FUEL WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED (INDICATING WE HAD A MAX OF 200-300 LBS OF FUEL IN THE R FUEL TANK). THE FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE FOR THE R TANK INDICATED WE HAD 350 LBS OF FUEL AND 300 LBS OF FUEL IN THE L TANK. WE WERE #1 FOR THE APCH TO RWY 2L WITH A CLRNC TO CIRCLE TO RWY 20R. WHILE ON FINAL APCH, THE APCH CTLR STATED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS GOING DOWN RAPIDLY TO THE N OF THE ARPT AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO LAND ON RWY 20R. THE WINDS WERE RPTED AT 230 DEGS AT 15 KTS APPROX 5 MI WHEN WE WERE ON FINAL TO RWY 2L. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE WE HAD TO LAND ON RWY 2L DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY ON THE N SIDE OF THE ARPT REGARDLESS OF OUR TAILWIND COMPONENT LNDG ON RWY 2L. WE LANDED ON RWY 2L WITHOUT ANY INCIDENT AND IT WAS ONLY RAINING ON THE FIELD. THERE WERE 2 REASONS WHY WE DECLARED AN EMER: 1) BECAUSE OF OUR LOW FUEL STATUS, AND 2) BECAUSE WE EXCEEDED OUR MAX TAILWIND COMPONENT OF 10 KTS (COMPANY FLT OPS MANUAL) FOR LNDG. BEFORE WE LANDED, WHILE ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 2L, WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY 5 MI OUT. NO WIND SHEAR ON TURB ON SHORT FINAL. WE LANDED WITH APPROX 450-500 LBS TOTAL INDICATED FUEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.