Wrong runway takeoff. Unauthorized takeoff. Takeoff on closed runway.

Attributes
ACN	244878
Time
Date	199306
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : iag
State Reference	NY
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	general aviation : personal
Make Model Name	Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : takeoff ground : holding ground other : taxi
Flight Plan	None
Person 1
Affiliation	Other
Function	flight crew : single pilot
Qualification	pilot : commercial pilot : instrument
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 48 flight time total : 1304 flight time type : 244
ASRS Report	244878
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : ground
Qualification	controller : non radar
Events
Anomaly	incursion : runway non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

The day of the event, crews were working at the departure end of runway 24 on taxiway K. Runway 24 was not 'X-ed off,' nor was it barricaded to deter traffic. ATIS information at the time of the event stated that wind direction was 240 degrees at 7 and runways 28L/10R 24/6 were closed. Upon initial callup for taxi for takeoff the ground controller instructions were 'taxi runway 24.' this established in our understanding that we were going to depart using runway 24 and no other departure runway instructions or corrections were ever received from the controller. During initial taxi out, the controller instructed us to taxi via taxiway I, 28L, runway 24 to 28R. This made no sense since 28L/10R was closed and barricaded. Apparently, the work crew was blocking our normal taxi route to runway 24. The crew, however, was finishing up and were moving off the runway which allowed us to pass using the perimeter taxiway. Following normal pre-takeoff checks, we called tower and informed them we were holding and ready for departure runway 24. The tower cleared us to depart runway 28R and did not offer any correction to our originally assigned departure runway. We apparently had a mindset to depart runway 24 especially since we knew the work crews had moved off the runway to let us pass earlier during taxi. We taxied into position on runway 24 and there were no vehicles or crews on the runway. After departure the controller informed us that we were supposed to depart runway 28R. During the time of the event, there was confusion and conflicting instructions given by the controller, such as: why were we assigned to takeoff runway 24 if it was closed. Why were we instructed to taxi on closed runways. Our call 'ready for departure runway 24' still allowed the controller time to revise our departure runway, which he did not. Communication errors appear to be causes for the event, however, an overworked and stressed controller who was working ground and tower frequencys at the same time could possibly be a primary cause for safety shortcomings. The use of 2 separate controllers, 1 for ground/clearance delivery and 1 for tower would significantly improve safety at iag.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG RWY TKOF. UNAUTH TKOF. TKOF ON CLOSED RWY.

Narrative: THE DAY OF THE EVENT, CREWS WERE WORKING AT THE DEP END OF RWY 24 ON TXWY K. RWY 24 WAS NOT 'X-ED OFF,' NOR WAS IT BARRICADED TO DETER TFC. ATIS INFO AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT STATED THAT WIND DIRECTION WAS 240 DEGS AT 7 AND RWYS 28L/10R 24/6 WERE CLOSED. UPON INITIAL CALLUP FOR TAXI FOR TKOF THE GND CTLR INSTRUCTIONS WERE 'TAXI RWY 24.' THIS ESTABLISHED IN OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE GOING TO DEPART USING RWY 24 AND NO OTHER DEP RWY INSTRUCTIONS OR CORRECTIONS WERE EVER RECEIVED FROM THE CTLR. DURING INITIAL TAXI OUT, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI VIA TXWY I, 28L, RWY 24 TO 28R. THIS MADE NO SENSE SINCE 28L/10R WAS CLOSED AND BARRICADED. APPARENTLY, THE WORK CREW WAS BLOCKING OUR NORMAL TAXI RTE TO RWY 24. THE CREW, HOWEVER, WAS FINISHING UP AND WERE MOVING OFF THE RWY WHICH ALLOWED US TO PASS USING THE PERIMETER TXWY. FOLLOWING NORMAL PRE-TKOF CHKS, WE CALLED TWR AND INFORMED THEM WE WERE HOLDING AND READY FOR DEP RWY 24. THE TWR CLRED US TO DEPART RWY 28R AND DID NOT OFFER ANY CORRECTION TO OUR ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED DEP RWY. WE APPARENTLY HAD A MINDSET TO DEPART RWY 24 ESPECIALLY SINCE WE KNEW THE WORK CREWS HAD MOVED OFF THE RWY TO LET US PASS EARLIER DURING TAXI. WE TAXIED INTO POS ON RWY 24 AND THERE WERE NO VEHICLES OR CREWS ON THE RWY. AFTER DEP THE CTLR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO DEPART RWY 28R. DURING THE TIME OF THE EVENT, THERE WAS CONFUSION AND CONFLICTING INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE CTLR, SUCH AS: WHY WERE WE ASSIGNED TO TKOF RWY 24 IF IT WAS CLOSED. WHY WERE WE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI ON CLOSED RWYS. OUR CALL 'READY FOR DEP RWY 24' STILL ALLOWED THE CTLR TIME TO REVISE OUR DEP RWY, WHICH HE DID NOT. COM ERRORS APPEAR TO BE CAUSES FOR THE EVENT, HOWEVER, AN OVERWORKED AND STRESSED CTLR WHO WAS WORKING GND AND TWR FREQS AT THE SAME TIME COULD POSSIBLY BE A PRIMARY CAUSE FOR SAFETY SHORTCOMINGS. THE USE OF 2 SEPARATE CTLRS, 1 FOR GND/CLRNC DELIVERY AND 1 FOR TWR WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE SAFETY AT IAG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.