Narrative:

The captain and I reported for duty early at XA30 am for the 4TH day in a trip series all with show times of XX00 am and before. The captain and I completed our preflight and cockpit set up and then the captain went to operations to call our dispatch to inquire as to the whereabouts of our release and WX since it had yet to arrive. I monitored ATIS and heard nothing. I then initiated 2 calls, each to ground and tower, with no response. I then called ZSE and was advised that eug tower was closed from XB00 to XC00 local and to contact them 2 mins prior to departure for our clearance. Since our paperwork had yet to arrive, I contacted the local unicom frequency to get local WX and field advisories. There was no response. The release and WX arrived 10 mins prior to departure. We pushed at XX30 local and announced that we were taxiing to runway 34 for departure on tower and unicom frequency. We then called ZSE for our clearance to pdx. They acknowledged and told us to anticipate a 2 min delay. An light transport was departing on runway 34 ahead of us and an small transport was waiting to depart behind us. We subsequently received our clearance and announced our departure on tower frequency and departed for a routine flight to pdx. On arrival at pdx we were advised that air operations had been contacted by the operations of the light transport that departed ahead of us stating they had just realized that runway 34/16 had been notamed OTS from XB00 to XC00 for the next 7 days and to be advised. We were subsequently informed that a tower controller who was in the tower early for his shift had observed our departure and filed a report with the FAA, yet made no attempt to contact any of the departing aircraft. The captain and I reexamined our paperwork and found the NOTAM which due to the early morning hours and our rushed state from the late arrival of the paperwork, we had both failed to notice. Inadvertently operating on a closed runway represents a potentially serious safety hazard and as a consequence, the FAA and airport management generally expend extraordinary means to prevent it. These generally include the following: 1) written notification to scheduled operations who will be using the airport during the affected hours. 2) utilization of ATIS lwas frequencys associated with the airport. 3) briefing all ATC personnel responsible for the facility during the affected hours and having local FBO operations on unicom frequency, contractors on tower frequency and airport fire departments monitoring all frequencys as a requirement for 121 operations be prepared to warn any aircraft announcing his intentions to use a closed runway. 4) appropriate markings including X's on runway ends, and cones to prevent ingress as well as define the area to be worked on. 5) finally, the off duty controller should have communicated the hazard to the departing aircraft rather than allowing the situation to occur. In determining the culpability of the parties involved, it should be clear that none of the traditional safeguards were in place.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG DEPARTS EARLY MORNING FROM RWY NOTAMED CLOSED.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I RPTED FOR DUTY EARLY AT XA30 AM FOR THE 4TH DAY IN A TRIP SERIES ALL WITH SHOW TIMES OF XX00 AM AND BEFORE. THE CAPT AND I COMPLETED OUR PREFLT AND COCKPIT SET UP AND THEN THE CAPT WENT TO OPS TO CALL OUR DISPATCH TO INQUIRE AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF OUR RELEASE AND WX SINCE IT HAD YET TO ARRIVE. I MONITORED ATIS AND HEARD NOTHING. I THEN INITIATED 2 CALLS, EACH TO GND AND TWR, WITH NO RESPONSE. I THEN CALLED ZSE AND WAS ADVISED THAT EUG TWR WAS CLOSED FROM XB00 TO XC00 LCL AND TO CONTACT THEM 2 MINS PRIOR TO DEP FOR OUR CLRNC. SINCE OUR PAPERWORK HAD YET TO ARRIVE, I CONTACTED THE LCL UNICOM FREQ TO GET LCL WX AND FIELD ADVISORIES. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. THE RELEASE AND WX ARRIVED 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP. WE PUSHED AT XX30 LCL AND ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE TAXIING TO RWY 34 FOR DEP ON TWR AND UNICOM FREQ. WE THEN CALLED ZSE FOR OUR CLRNC TO PDX. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED AND TOLD US TO ANTICIPATE A 2 MIN DELAY. AN LTT WAS DEPARTING ON RWY 34 AHEAD OF US AND AN SMT WAS WAITING TO DEPART BEHIND US. WE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED OUR CLRNC AND ANNOUNCED OUR DEP ON TWR FREQ AND DEPARTED FOR A ROUTINE FLT TO PDX. ON ARR AT PDX WE WERE ADVISED THAT AIR OPS HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE OPS OF THE LTT THAT DEPARTED AHEAD OF US STATING THEY HAD JUST REALIZED THAT RWY 34/16 HAD BEEN NOTAMED OTS FROM XB00 TO XC00 FOR THE NEXT 7 DAYS AND TO BE ADVISED. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAT A TWR CTLR WHO WAS IN THE TWR EARLY FOR HIS SHIFT HAD OBSERVED OUR DEP AND FILED A RPT WITH THE FAA, YET MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT ANY OF THE DEPARTING ACFT. THE CAPT AND I REEXAMINED OUR PAPERWORK AND FOUND THE NOTAM WHICH DUE TO THE EARLY MORNING HRS AND OUR RUSHED STATE FROM THE LATE ARR OF THE PAPERWORK, WE HAD BOTH FAILED TO NOTICE. INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ON A CLOSED RWY REPRESENTS A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS SAFETY HAZARD AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE FAA AND ARPT MGMNT GENERALLY EXPEND EXTRAORDINARY MEANS TO PREVENT IT. THESE GENERALLY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 1) WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO SCHEDULED OPS WHO WILL BE USING THE ARPT DURING THE AFFECTED HRS. 2) UTILIZATION OF ATIS LWAS FREQS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARPT. 3) BRIEFING ALL ATC PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FACILITY DURING THE AFFECTED HRS AND HAVING LCL FBO OPS ON UNICOM FREQ, CONTRACTORS ON TWR FREQ AND ARPT FIRE DEPTS MONITORING ALL FREQS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR 121 OPS BE PREPARED TO WARN ANY ACFT ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTIONS TO USE A CLOSED RWY. 4) APPROPRIATE MARKINGS INCLUDING X'S ON RWY ENDS, AND CONES TO PREVENT INGRESS AS WELL AS DEFINE THE AREA TO BE WORKED ON. 5) FINALLY, THE OFF DUTY CTLR SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED THE HAZARD TO THE DEPARTING ACFT RATHER THAN ALLOWING THE SIT TO OCCUR. IN DETERMINING THE CULPABILITY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT NONE OF THE TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS WERE IN PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.