Narrative:

On the last leg of the day we departed buf en route to bos without required release fuel. About 15-20 mins into the flight the captain became aware of and alerted me of the fact that the fuel gauges were not showing enough quantity to make it to bos with reserve and alternate fuel still on board. Actions taken: the captain tested the fuel gauges and found them indicating correctly. The captain slowed for better endurance until we found and used the long range cruise power setting. Using fuel flow at that power setting, ground speed, and fuel on board, we determined we could continue to landing at bos with well above reserve fuel as long as there were no major arrival delays into bos. At about that time, we received a message from dispatch asking if we had received fuel at buf. The captain responded that we had not and advised of our fuel computations to boston. The dispatcher then sent a message stating the landing alternate had been removed from our release. Soon after, we accepted holding instructions and made it clear to ATC that we could only accept 1 turn in the holding pattern (20 mi legs) and then we would have to proceed to bdl for landing. As we entered holding, bdl was in sight off the right side of the aircraft. Soon after entering holding, about 45 mi from bos, we were issued a heading and told to expect vectors to bos. After being vectored toward bos we again computed fuel for landing bos and determined we could make the field with well over reserve fuel. We continued on for an otherwise uneventful approach and landing. We arrived at the gate with fuel above reserve requirements. At no time was evasive action taken or special handling requested or required. Contributing factors: fatigue associated with the last leg of a 9 hour, 57 min duty day. After the first leg of the day we had to absorb a 1 hour, 40 min ATC delay and were trying to 'catch up' for the rest of the day. The final 4 hours, 35 mins of duty consisted of 4 hours, 6 mins hard time, 3 flight legs. The engines were only shut down for 29 total mins during 17 and 12 min turns in bos and buf respectively. My workload during the ground time in buf was high. I had little spare time to reflect on the tasks at hand much less monitor the duties of others responsible for our safe departure. The ground time was a whirl of activity. The gate agent is no longer required to confirm fuel on board with the captain as had been the case in the past. The situation occurred because the captain and I were so 'schedule conscious' and determined to get back 'on time' that, when the agent shut the door and the ground crew signaled for engine start, we assumed we had been fueled. Then, as we ran the checklist we were 'hearing but not listening, looking but not seeing,' the captain must have looked at the fuel gauges and seen the correct amount of fuel, and I must have heard him announce the correct amount, but neither one of us double-checked. Suggestions: require an agent to confirm 'fuel on board' with the captain before shutting the door. Emphasize again and again not to let the pressure of 'on-time performance' effect the performance of your duties. Take the extra time necessary to do things methodically, slowly, and correctly. Think about what you are seeing and hearing and saying.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG DEPARTS WITHOUT REFUELING.

Narrative: ON THE LAST LEG OF THE DAY WE DEPARTED BUF ENRTE TO BOS WITHOUT REQUIRED RELEASE FUEL. ABOUT 15-20 MINS INTO THE FLT THE CAPT BECAME AWARE OF AND ALERTED ME OF THE FACT THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE NOT SHOWING ENOUGH QUANTITY TO MAKE IT TO BOS WITH RESERVE AND ALTERNATE FUEL STILL ON BOARD. ACTIONS TAKEN: THE CAPT TESTED THE FUEL GAUGES AND FOUND THEM INDICATING CORRECTLY. THE CAPT SLOWED FOR BETTER ENDURANCE UNTIL WE FOUND AND USED THE LONG RANGE CRUISE PWR SETTING. USING FUEL FLOW AT THAT PWR SETTING, GND SPD, AND FUEL ON BOARD, WE DETERMINED WE COULD CONTINUE TO LNDG AT BOS WITH WELL ABOVE RESERVE FUEL AS LONG AS THERE WERE NO MAJOR ARR DELAYS INTO BOS. AT ABOUT THAT TIME, WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DISPATCH ASKING IF WE HAD RECEIVED FUEL AT BUF. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT WE HAD NOT AND ADVISED OF OUR FUEL COMPUTATIONS TO BOSTON. THE DISPATCHER THEN SENT A MESSAGE STATING THE LNDG ALTERNATE HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM OUR RELEASE. SOON AFTER, WE ACCEPTED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND MADE IT CLR TO ATC THAT WE COULD ONLY ACCEPT 1 TURN IN THE HOLDING PATTERN (20 MI LEGS) AND THEN WE WOULD HAVE TO PROCEED TO BDL FOR LNDG. AS WE ENTERED HOLDING, BDL WAS IN SIGHT OFF THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. SOON AFTER ENTERING HOLDING, ABOUT 45 MI FROM BOS, WE WERE ISSUED A HDG AND TOLD TO EXPECT VECTORS TO BOS. AFTER BEING VECTORED TOWARD BOS WE AGAIN COMPUTED FUEL FOR LNDG BOS AND DETERMINED WE COULD MAKE THE FIELD WITH WELL OVER RESERVE FUEL. WE CONTINUED ON FOR AN OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL APCH AND LNDG. WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE WITH FUEL ABOVE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS. AT NO TIME WAS EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN OR SPECIAL HANDLING REQUESTED OR REQUIRED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE ASSOCIATED WITH THE LAST LEG OF A 9 HR, 57 MIN DUTY DAY. AFTER THE FIRST LEG OF THE DAY WE HAD TO ABSORB A 1 HR, 40 MIN ATC DELAY AND WERE TRYING TO 'CATCH UP' FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. THE FINAL 4 HRS, 35 MINS OF DUTY CONSISTED OF 4 HRS, 6 MINS HARD TIME, 3 FLT LEGS. THE ENGS WERE ONLY SHUT DOWN FOR 29 TOTAL MINS DURING 17 AND 12 MIN TURNS IN BOS AND BUF RESPECTIVELY. MY WORKLOAD DURING THE GND TIME IN BUF WAS HIGH. I HAD LITTLE SPARE TIME TO REFLECT ON THE TASKS AT HAND MUCH LESS MONITOR THE DUTIES OF OTHERS RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR SAFE DEP. THE GND TIME WAS A WHIRL OF ACTIVITY. THE GATE AGENT IS NO LONGER REQUIRED TO CONFIRM FUEL ON BOARD WITH THE CAPT AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN THE PAST. THE SIT OCCURRED BECAUSE THE CAPT AND I WERE SO 'SCHEDULE CONSCIOUS' AND DETERMINED TO GET BACK 'ON TIME' THAT, WHEN THE AGENT SHUT THE DOOR AND THE GND CREW SIGNALED FOR ENG START, WE ASSUMED WE HAD BEEN FUELED. THEN, AS WE RAN THE CHKLIST WE WERE 'HEARING BUT NOT LISTENING, LOOKING BUT NOT SEEING,' THE CAPT MUST HAVE LOOKED AT THE FUEL GAUGES AND SEEN THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FUEL, AND I MUST HAVE HEARD HIM ANNOUNCE THE CORRECT AMOUNT, BUT NEITHER ONE OF US DOUBLE-CHKED. SUGGESTIONS: REQUIRE AN AGENT TO CONFIRM 'FUEL ON BOARD' WITH THE CAPT BEFORE SHUTTING THE DOOR. EMPHASIZE AGAIN AND AGAIN NOT TO LET THE PRESSURE OF 'ON-TIME PERFORMANCE' EFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR DUTIES. TAKE THE EXTRA TIME NECESSARY TO DO THINGS METHODICALLY, SLOWLY, AND CORRECTLY. THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE SEEING AND HEARING AND SAYING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.