Narrative:

I was captain and PNF on a commuter flight from lax to pmd. We had been cleared for a visual approach to runway 22 by the joshua approach controller. When we were switched to the palmdale tower, he cleared us to land runway 22 (left hand traffic) with a short approach west of the VOR and a long landing. The VOR is about 1000 ft down runway 22 which is approximately 12000 ft. We acknowledged the clearance, but I knew that this would make it a very tight approach as we were still very high (approximately 9000 ft MSL). We also noted that the tower had an MTR in right closed traffic for runway 25 and that this must be the reason for the request for the base turn west of the VOR. We normally request the short approach and long landing left traffic anyway, as the terminal is at the end of runway 22. As the first officer started the base turn just inside the VOR at approximately 4500 ft MSL. I started having strong doubts that we could make the landing. We were configured with full flaps gear down, which can really bring the airplane down fast. As we continued I knew it was not looking good. The last distance marker I saw was the 4000 ft marker. I was worried about an attempted go around at this point with this confign and the airspeed bleeding off quickly. I told the first officer to get it on the runway. I estimate we touched down at just less than 3000 ft remaining. We had to use full reverse and full brakes to stop on the remaining runway. We stopped with about 25 ft of runway left. Too damn scary! In retrospect, there is no question it was an extremely poor decision on my part to continue the approach. I thought about a go around several times during the approach, but never had the first officer initialize it or call it out. I was uneasy with the approach from the time we got the clearance, but still accepted it. We were trying to help the controller, but that is no reason to be put in a bad position. Contributing factors -- but not excuses for my weak decision: 1) we were on the last day of a 4 day trip on a reduced rest of 8 hours the night before. The day before we had flown 8.2 hours with 10 legs and 7 approachs. There is no question we were both tired, but of course this is all legal -- and becoming more common for cost-cutting measures by the airlines. 2) mind set in the commuters to stay on tight schedules and don't get late. As much as I feel I don't have a problem being late, I still feel the pressure from me as well as the airline. From me, being late means getting home late. After 4 days, one wants to get home. Arriving late means later flow times back to lax and it can snowball easily from there. It's the old get homeitis thing. Stupid, but still there. Also, shorter turnaround times in schedules to save money by airlines. 3) manhood versus safety issue. The concept that doing a go around makes one feel they have erred or could not fly the airplane well enough. They were not good enough to pull off the approach. As easy as it is to say, I would not be like this (macho, egotistical), it is hard to ignore it. It is in the pilot psyche, I feel, and hard to overcome sometimes. I feel that this always comes into play in a situation like this. I feel these are all contributing factors, but none is close to a reason for such a poor decision and unassertive action on my part.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: STABILIZED APCH CONCEPT VIOLATED AND LNDG PROC OVERSHOOT OCCURS.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT AND PNF ON A COMMUTER FLT FROM LAX TO PMD. WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 22 BY THE JOSHUA APCH CTLR. WHEN WE WERE SWITCHED TO THE PALMDALE TWR, HE CLRED US TO LAND RWY 22 (L HAND TFC) WITH A SHORT APCH W OF THE VOR AND A LONG LNDG. THE VOR IS ABOUT 1000 FT DOWN RWY 22 WHICH IS APPROX 12000 FT. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC, BUT I KNEW THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IT A VERY TIGHT APCH AS WE WERE STILL VERY HIGH (APPROX 9000 FT MSL). WE ALSO NOTED THAT THE TWR HAD AN MTR IN R CLOSED TFC FOR RWY 25 AND THAT THIS MUST BE THE REASON FOR THE REQUEST FOR THE BASE TURN W OF THE VOR. WE NORMALLY REQUEST THE SHORT APCH AND LONG LNDG L TFC ANYWAY, AS THE TERMINAL IS AT THE END OF RWY 22. AS THE FO STARTED THE BASE TURN JUST INSIDE THE VOR AT APPROX 4500 FT MSL. I STARTED HAVING STRONG DOUBTS THAT WE COULD MAKE THE LNDG. WE WERE CONFIGURED WITH FULL FLAPS GEAR DOWN, WHICH CAN REALLY BRING THE AIRPLANE DOWN FAST. AS WE CONTINUED I KNEW IT WAS NOT LOOKING GOOD. THE LAST DISTANCE MARKER I SAW WAS THE 4000 FT MARKER. I WAS WORRIED ABOUT AN ATTEMPTED GAR AT THIS POINT WITH THIS CONFIGN AND THE AIRSPD BLEEDING OFF QUICKLY. I TOLD THE FO TO GET IT ON THE RWY. I ESTIMATE WE TOUCHED DOWN AT JUST LESS THAN 3000 FT REMAINING. WE HAD TO USE FULL REVERSE AND FULL BRAKES TO STOP ON THE REMAINING RWY. WE STOPPED WITH ABOUT 25 FT OF RWY LEFT. TOO DAMN SCARY! IN RETROSPECT, THERE IS NO QUESTION IT WAS AN EXTREMELY POOR DECISION ON MY PART TO CONTINUE THE APCH. I THOUGHT ABOUT A GAR SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE APCH, BUT NEVER HAD THE FO INITIALIZE IT OR CALL IT OUT. I WAS UNEASY WITH THE APCH FROM THE TIME WE GOT THE CLRNC, BUT STILL ACCEPTED IT. WE WERE TRYING TO HELP THE CTLR, BUT THAT IS NO REASON TO BE PUT IN A BAD POS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- BUT NOT EXCUSES FOR MY WEAK DECISION: 1) WE WERE ON THE LAST DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP ON A REDUCED REST OF 8 HRS THE NIGHT BEFORE. THE DAY BEFORE WE HAD FLOWN 8.2 HRS WITH 10 LEGS AND 7 APCHS. THERE IS NO QUESTION WE WERE BOTH TIRED, BUT OF COURSE THIS IS ALL LEGAL -- AND BECOMING MORE COMMON FOR COST-CUTTING MEASURES BY THE AIRLINES. 2) MIND SET IN THE COMMUTERS TO STAY ON TIGHT SCHEDULES AND DON'T GET LATE. AS MUCH AS I FEEL I DON'T HAVE A PROB BEING LATE, I STILL FEEL THE PRESSURE FROM ME AS WELL AS THE AIRLINE. FROM ME, BEING LATE MEANS GETTING HOME LATE. AFTER 4 DAYS, ONE WANTS TO GET HOME. ARRIVING LATE MEANS LATER FLOW TIMES BACK TO LAX AND IT CAN SNOWBALL EASILY FROM THERE. IT'S THE OLD GET HOMEITIS THING. STUPID, BUT STILL THERE. ALSO, SHORTER TURNAROUND TIMES IN SCHEDULES TO SAVE MONEY BY AIRLINES. 3) MANHOOD VERSUS SAFETY ISSUE. THE CONCEPT THAT DOING A GAR MAKES ONE FEEL THEY HAVE ERRED OR COULD NOT FLY THE AIRPLANE WELL ENOUGH. THEY WERE NOT GOOD ENOUGH TO PULL OFF THE APCH. AS EASY AS IT IS TO SAY, I WOULD NOT BE LIKE THIS (MACHO, EGOTISTICAL), IT IS HARD TO IGNORE IT. IT IS IN THE PLT PSYCHE, I FEEL, AND HARD TO OVERCOME SOMETIMES. I FEEL THAT THIS ALWAYS COMES INTO PLAY IN A SIT LIKE THIS. I FEEL THESE ARE ALL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, BUT NONE IS CLOSE TO A REASON FOR SUCH A POOR DECISION AND UNASSERTIVE ACTION ON MY PART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.