Narrative:

I wasn't scheduled to fly on this particular day. I had been in the ZZZ airport since that morning; though; working on another project. The chief pilot asked me if I could fly a bos turn; due to lack of coverage; and I agreed to help out. The flight was scheduled to depart at XA30; but due to thunderstorms in the area; was delayed until XC09. The captain flew this first leg; and I would fly the return leg from boston. Boston's WX was 200 ft ceiling and 1/2 mi visibility with thunderstorms in the vicinity. We briefed for a CAT ii ILS approach to runway 4R in boston. We xferred control of the aircraft to me; in accordance with company procedures (the first officer flies the approach and go around if necessary -- the captain takes control of the aircraft for landing if the runway is sighted). We conducted this xfer at 16000 ft; approximately 35 mi from the airport. Approach already had kept us too high for this straight-in approach and I started to slow and configure. At 1000 ft above touchdown zone elevation; although fully configured; we were still well above the glide path. At this point; we should have gone around. A prior PIREP had indicated that the ceiling was 150 ft; but the pilot landing immediately before us stated that the ceiling was 400 ft. I continued the approach; forgetting that we were conducting a CAT ii approach; thinking that I was flying a CAT I ILS. At the captain's 500 ft call; I didn't respond with the requisite; 'flare armed' callout; since I thought I was doing a CAT I. We were still above the glide path; but capturing it; if I had looked for the 'flare armed' annunciation; I would have realized that it wasn't present; since we were above the GS. This; too; would have required a go around. At the captain's 400 ft call; the GS captured; I saw the runway lights; the autoplt came off; and I landed uneventfully. I made the call; 'I have the lights; I have the landing;' because at this point I remembered that this was supposed to have been a CAT ii landing; and I didn't want there to be any further confusion about xferring controls of the aircraft when we weren't properly set up to do the CAT ii approach (the autoplt was off). My conduct during this approach went against all my training and all that I have practiced in my aviation career. It was disturbing to me that I allowed myself to fail to comply with my procedures. I had been distraction by our position well above the glide path long before beginning the approach. The captain stated that he; too; had been fixated on the glide path indicator during the approach. I will; in the future; not allow approach to dictate a bad setup for an approach. Although this approach resulted in an uneventful landing; I will; in the future; never hesitate to initiate a go around when it is warranted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-500 FO RPTS A CAT II APCH AND LNDG PROC FOLLOWING AN ABOVE GS NON STABILIZED APCH THAT SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A GAR.

Narrative: I WASN'T SCHEDULED TO FLY ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY. I HAD BEEN IN THE ZZZ ARPT SINCE THAT MORNING; THOUGH; WORKING ON ANOTHER PROJECT. THE CHIEF PLT ASKED ME IF I COULD FLY A BOS TURN; DUE TO LACK OF COVERAGE; AND I AGREED TO HELP OUT. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XA30; BUT DUE TO TSTMS IN THE AREA; WAS DELAYED UNTIL XC09. THE CAPT FLEW THIS FIRST LEG; AND I WOULD FLY THE RETURN LEG FROM BOSTON. BOSTON'S WX WAS 200 FT CEILING AND 1/2 MI VISIBILITY WITH TSTMS IN THE VICINITY. WE BRIEFED FOR A CAT II ILS APCH TO RWY 4R IN BOSTON. WE XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT TO ME; IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY PROCS (THE FO FLIES THE APCH AND GAR IF NECESSARY -- THE CAPT TAKES CTL OF THE ACFT FOR LNDG IF THE RWY IS SIGHTED). WE CONDUCTED THIS XFER AT 16000 FT; APPROX 35 MI FROM THE ARPT. APCH ALREADY HAD KEPT US TOO HIGH FOR THIS STRAIGHT-IN APCH AND I STARTED TO SLOW AND CONFIGURE. AT 1000 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN ZONE ELEVATION; ALTHOUGH FULLY CONFIGURED; WE WERE STILL WELL ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH. AT THIS POINT; WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. A PRIOR PIREP HAD INDICATED THAT THE CEILING WAS 150 FT; BUT THE PLT LNDG IMMEDIATELY BEFORE US STATED THAT THE CEILING WAS 400 FT. I CONTINUED THE APCH; FORGETTING THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING A CAT II APCH; THINKING THAT I WAS FLYING A CAT I ILS. AT THE CAPT'S 500 FT CALL; I DIDN'T RESPOND WITH THE REQUISITE; 'FLARE ARMED' CALLOUT; SINCE I THOUGHT I WAS DOING A CAT I. WE WERE STILL ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH; BUT CAPTURING IT; IF I HAD LOOKED FOR THE 'FLARE ARMED' ANNUNCIATION; I WOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT IT WASN'T PRESENT; SINCE WE WERE ABOVE THE GS. THIS; TOO; WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A GAR. AT THE CAPT'S 400 FT CALL; THE GS CAPTURED; I SAW THE RWY LIGHTS; THE AUTOPLT CAME OFF; AND I LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. I MADE THE CALL; 'I HAVE THE LIGHTS; I HAVE THE LNDG;' BECAUSE AT THIS POINT I REMEMBERED THAT THIS WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN A CAT II LNDG; AND I DIDN'T WANT THERE TO BE ANY FURTHER CONFUSION ABOUT XFERRING CTLS OF THE ACFT WHEN WE WEREN'T PROPERLY SET UP TO DO THE CAT II APCH (THE AUTOPLT WAS OFF). MY CONDUCT DURING THIS APCH WENT AGAINST ALL MY TRAINING AND ALL THAT I HAVE PRACTICED IN MY AVIATION CAREER. IT WAS DISTURBING TO ME THAT I ALLOWED MYSELF TO FAIL TO COMPLY WITH MY PROCS. I HAD BEEN DISTR BY OUR POS WELL ABOVE THE GLIDE PATH LONG BEFORE BEGINNING THE APCH. THE CAPT STATED THAT HE; TOO; HAD BEEN FIXATED ON THE GLIDE PATH INDICATOR DURING THE APCH. I WILL; IN THE FUTURE; NOT ALLOW APCH TO DICTATE A BAD SETUP FOR AN APCH. ALTHOUGH THIS APCH RESULTED IN AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG; I WILL; IN THE FUTURE; NEVER HESITATE TO INITIATE A GAR WHEN IT IS WARRANTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.