Narrative:

#3 fuel gauge inoperative. Fuel tank quantity was measured by mechanics by stick method, then was confirmed by maintenance control in msp. Stick reading by mechanic showed tank #3 was 9500 pounds while quantity in tanks #1 and #2 were about 14000 pounds. With a 5000 pound difference than in tank #1, we should have felt improper weight distribution upon arrival into dtw (same inbound aircraft), but controls were normal. We questioned this stick reading and quantity 3 times with mechanics, and they in turn verified quantity saying this reading was correct. A known quantity was pumped into tank #3 to equalize all fuel tanks for departure. Immediately after takeoff, I noticed a right wing heavy control situation, not threatening or dangerous, just extra left aileron was required to maintain straight and level flight. We transferred approximately 2000 pounds of fuel from tank #3 to tank #1 to equalize weight distribution. Flight proceeded normally to destination. We feel we had approximately 2000-4000 pounds more fuel in tank #3 than tanks #1 and #2, so again that much above the dispatched fuel. Either mechanic misread stick reading, mechanic and maintenance control misinterpreted stick reading, or aircraft stick measuring system was inaccurate. Maybe flcs should be trained in procedures for using stick measuring method in determining fuel quantity in a tank with an inoperative fuel gauge. When you are assured by the people trained to perform this function, you are still responsible as pilots, if these very people are not correct. Since the final responsibility lies on the pilot's shoulders, maybe we should be the ones performing these duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MISFUELING, FUEL IMBAL.

Narrative: #3 FUEL GAUGE INOP. FUEL TANK QUANTITY WAS MEASURED BY MECHS BY STICK METHOD, THEN WAS CONFIRMED BY MAINT CTL IN MSP. STICK READING BY MECH SHOWED TANK #3 WAS 9500 LBS WHILE QUANTITY IN TANKS #1 AND #2 WERE ABOUT 14000 LBS. WITH A 5000 LB DIFFERENCE THAN IN TANK #1, WE SHOULD HAVE FELT IMPROPER WT DISTRIBUTION UPON ARR INTO DTW (SAME INBOUND ACFT), BUT CTLS WERE NORMAL. WE QUESTIONED THIS STICK READING AND QUANTITY 3 TIMES WITH MECHS, AND THEY IN TURN VERIFIED QUANTITY SAYING THIS READING WAS CORRECT. A KNOWN QUANTITY WAS PUMPED INTO TANK #3 TO EQUALIZE ALL FUEL TANKS FOR DEP. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, I NOTICED A R WING HVY CTL SIT, NOT THREATENING OR DANGEROUS, JUST EXTRA L AILERON WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLT. WE TRANSFERRED APPROX 2000 LBS OF FUEL FROM TANK #3 TO TANK #1 TO EQUALIZE WT DISTRIBUTION. FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY TO DEST. WE FEEL WE HAD APPROX 2000-4000 LBS MORE FUEL IN TANK #3 THAN TANKS #1 AND #2, SO AGAIN THAT MUCH ABOVE THE DISPATCHED FUEL. EITHER MECH MISREAD STICK READING, MECH AND MAINT CTL MISINTERPRETED STICK READING, OR ACFT STICK MEASURING SYS WAS INACCURATE. MAYBE FLCS SHOULD BE TRAINED IN PROCS FOR USING STICK MEASURING METHOD IN DETERMINING FUEL QUANTITY IN A TANK WITH AN INOP FUEL GAUGE. WHEN YOU ARE ASSURED BY THE PEOPLE TRAINED TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION, YOU ARE STILL RESPONSIBLE AS PLTS, IF THESE VERY PEOPLE ARE NOT CORRECT. SINCE THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY LIES ON THE PLT'S SHOULDERS, MAYBE WE SHOULD BE THE ONES PERFORMING THESE DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.