Narrative:

Assigned aircraft X to conduct flight. Discovered previous crew had written up #1 engine oil temperature gauge for going well into the red (hot) while in cruise flight. Maintenance opened cowling where melted wiring harness wrap was melted on wires leading to 450 degree sensors for engine fire detection. I turned on batteries to compute fuel order and noted temperature gauge now read expected value. Maintenance cleaned temperature sending unit and signed off aircraft good to go. I refused aircraft since maintenance did not address melted wire wrap and since engine was not run to verify problem was solved. Chief pilot attempted to get me to accept aircraft. He said I have no right to question a maintenance sign off. He also said whenever there is a conflict with a maintenance, he can bet it would be me or another pilot who he named (the other pilot was recently suspended for refusing an aircraft with damaged flaps, maintenance had signed off flap as 'does not affect safety of flight'). I conducted flight in another aircraft. Later, at the hangar, I observed problem aircraft leaving hangar. In discussion with maintenance supervisor on duty, I learned that the problem aircraft had a bleed air leak on #1 engine. In my opinion, this could easily have led to an engine shutdown in-flight with revenue passenger on board (had I accepted aircraft). I have noticed numerous circumstances where line maintenance closes write-up, by doing some action and then signs aircraft off. I feel the pressure applied by management causes maintenance personnel to take short cuts. Our management has staffed mechanics at a level where they never seem to catch up. They always just get the planes out in time. It seems obvious that schedule and profits are very important to our management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT REFUSED ACFT BECAUSE OF SUSPECTED MECHANICAL PROBS.

Narrative: ASSIGNED ACFT X TO CONDUCT FLT. DISCOVERED PREVIOUS CREW HAD WRITTEN UP #1 ENG OIL TEMP GAUGE FOR GOING WELL INTO THE RED (HOT) WHILE IN CRUISE FLT. MAINT OPENED COWLING WHERE MELTED WIRING HARNESS WRAP WAS MELTED ON WIRES LEADING TO 450 DEG SENSORS FOR ENG FIRE DETECTION. I TURNED ON BATTERIES TO COMPUTE FUEL ORDER AND NOTED TEMP GAUGE NOW READ EXPECTED VALUE. MAINT CLEANED TEMP SENDING UNIT AND SIGNED OFF ACFT GOOD TO GO. I REFUSED ACFT SINCE MAINT DID NOT ADDRESS MELTED WIRE WRAP AND SINCE ENG WAS NOT RUN TO VERIFY PROB WAS SOLVED. CHIEF PLT ATTEMPTED TO GET ME TO ACCEPT ACFT. HE SAID I HAVE NO RIGHT TO QUESTION A MAINT SIGN OFF. HE ALSO SAID WHENEVER THERE IS A CONFLICT WITH A MAINT, HE CAN BET IT WOULD BE ME OR ANOTHER PLT WHO HE NAMED (THE OTHER PLT WAS RECENTLY SUSPENDED FOR REFUSING AN ACFT WITH DAMAGED FLAPS, MAINT HAD SIGNED OFF FLAP AS 'DOES NOT AFFECT SAFETY OF FLT'). I CONDUCTED FLT IN ANOTHER ACFT. LATER, AT THE HANGAR, I OBSERVED PROB ACFT LEAVING HANGAR. IN DISCUSSION WITH MAINT SUPVR ON DUTY, I LEARNED THAT THE PROB ACFT HAD A BLEED AIR LEAK ON #1 ENG. IN MY OPINION, THIS COULD EASILY HAVE LED TO AN ENG SHUTDOWN INFLT WITH REVENUE PAX ON BOARD (HAD I ACCEPTED ACFT). I HAVE NOTICED NUMEROUS CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE LINE MAINT CLOSES WRITE-UP, BY DOING SOME ACTION AND THEN SIGNS ACFT OFF. I FEEL THE PRESSURE APPLIED BY MGMNT CAUSES MAINT PERSONNEL TO TAKE SHORT CUTS. OUR MGMNT HAS STAFFED MECHS AT A LEVEL WHERE THEY NEVER SEEM TO CATCH UP. THEY ALWAYS JUST GET THE PLANES OUT IN TIME. IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT SCHEDULE AND PROFITS ARE VERY IMPORTANT TO OUR MGMNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.