37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 250957 |
Time | |
Date | 199309 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mht |
State Reference | NH |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Small Transport |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other |
Qualification | other other : other |
ASRS Report | 250957 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | observation : air carrier inspector |
Qualification | other other : other |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified cockpit |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
During an audit process of past files at air carrier, a paper work problem was discovered involving the air carrier's operations specifications and the limits published for the fuselage and wing structural life limits. At manufacture of the aircraft, a structural life limit was set at 22500 cycles for the wing and fuselage. When a new limit of 37000 cycles was set by the manufacturer a letter was sent to the air carrier FAA principle maintenance inspector requesting an operations specification change reflecting the revised figures. At this point the principle maintenance inspector requested more information to support the change. Due to lack of follow-up the operation specifications were never updated. As a result, 6 small transport aircraft series aircraft have overflown the fuselage and wing structural limits as published in the air carrier's operations specifications. We believe this problem to be an administrative problem and not an airworthiness safety problem as we have factual documentation from the manufacturer of the aircraft authorizing the higher cycle limits which all 6 aircraft fall under at this time. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he was a newly appointed chief inspector for the operator and therefore had taken over this matter when he came 'aboard.' he stated that the FAA had not been given sufficient information on which to base an approval upon the original operations specification application requested amendment, therefore, the previous chief of maintenance had delayed in obtaining the necessary documentation from the manufacturer for the FAA. However, this matter has been cleared up by the FAA closing out this matter with no further action.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR OPERATED SEVERAL SMT ACFT OVER THE ACFT STRUCTURAL TIME LIMITS.
Narrative: DURING AN AUDIT PROCESS OF PAST FILES AT ACR, A PAPER WORK PROB WAS DISCOVERED INVOLVING THE ACR'S OPS SPECS AND THE LIMITS PUBLISHED FOR THE FUSELAGE AND WING STRUCTURAL LIFE LIMITS. AT MANUFACTURE OF THE ACFT, A STRUCTURAL LIFE LIMIT WAS SET AT 22500 CYCLES FOR THE WING AND FUSELAGE. WHEN A NEW LIMIT OF 37000 CYCLES WAS SET BY THE MANUFACTURER A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE ACR FAA PRINCIPLE MAINT INSPECTOR REQUESTING AN OPS SPEC CHANGE REFLECTING THE REVISED FIGURES. AT THIS POINT THE PRINCIPLE MAINT INSPECTOR REQUESTED MORE INFO TO SUPPORT THE CHANGE. DUE TO LACK OF FOLLOW-UP THE OP SPECS WERE NEVER UPDATED. AS A RESULT, 6 SMT ACFT SERIES ACFT HAVE OVERFLOWN THE FUSELAGE AND WING STRUCTURAL LIMITS AS PUBLISHED IN THE ACR'S OPS SPECS. WE BELIEVE THIS PROB TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROB AND NOT AN AIRWORTHINESS SAFETY PROB AS WE HAVE FACTUAL DOCUMENTATION FROM THE MANUFACTURER OF THE ACFT AUTHORIZING THE HIGHER CYCLE LIMITS WHICH ALL 6 ACFT FALL UNDER AT THIS TIME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE WAS A NEWLY APPOINTED CHIEF INSPECTOR FOR THE OPERATOR AND THEREFORE HAD TAKEN OVER THIS MATTER WHEN HE CAME 'ABOARD.' HE STATED THAT THE FAA HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN SUFFICIENT INFO ON WHICH TO BASE AN APPROVAL UPON THE ORIGINAL OPS SPEC APPLICATION REQUESTED AMENDMENT, THEREFORE, THE PREVIOUS CHIEF OF MAINT HAD DELAYED IN OBTAINING THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION FROM THE MANUFACTURER FOR THE FAA. HOWEVER, THIS MATTER HAS BEEN CLRED UP BY THE FAA CLOSING OUT THIS MATTER WITH NO FURTHER ACTION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.