Narrative:

I arrived on rdu airspace, was handed off to rdu approach control and told to expect runway 32. I was vectored to a right base and cleared to land on runway 32. The winds were reported calm but a left crosswind was present until 100 ft AGL. First touchdown was long (approximately 1000 ft down the runway) and my airspeed was 10 KTS above nominal landing speed. The aircraft bounced fairly lightly but became airborne again. The second touchdown was slightly nose low and the possibility of extended low amplitude porpoising was noted. A decision to execute a go around was made. I immediately notified the tower of my intention and was told to fly runway heading by the tower. Rdu has 2 main runways, 5L/right and 23L/right and the non-intersecting runway 32 which I was using. My initial concern was the possibility of aircraft traffic on runway 23L just beyond the end of runway 32 and I gained 50 ft of altitude before reaching runway 23L. This was at the expense of 10-20 KTS of my airspeed and I was flying at only 5 KTS above stall speed when the tower ordered me to 'climb immediately.' there was a few seconds of delay before I could manage any significant rate of climb. It soon became clear what was worrying the controller (and now me) was a large jet aircraft lifting off runway 23R which I was about to cross over. Although I lost sight of the aircraft (to the right and below my aircraft) my passenger became very frightened and stated the aircraft was climbing towards us and led me to believe a collision was imminent. I turned 10- 30 degrees left as an evasive maneuver almost by reflex before the controller strongly advised me to 'fly runway heading.' I complied immediately. The aircraft passed behind and below my aircraft. I'm not sure how close our aircraft came from each other. The crisis was over, but I now realize I was shaken by the incident and should have left the pattern for a few mins. Instead, I accepted an immediate clearance to land again on runway 32. This landing was rough, but successful. I believe this incident had several contributing factors: 1) a low sun angle and a westward heading significantly reduced the visibility while I approached the airport. By the time I had the runway in sight, I was close enough that my approach was slightly rushed and a steeper than normal descent was required. 2) the airspeed on my final approach was 10 KTS too fast. The aircraft I fly is an small aircraft and is known to have a tendency to float if the landing speed is much above 70 KTS. I have landed on this runway over 100 times without incident, but I believe the higher airspeed combined with other unfavorable factors led to the aborted landing and go around. 3) my reluctance to initially accept that a go around was needed caused me to delay long enough that I could not cleanly gain airspeed and climb quickly over the runways ahead. 4) being a relatively low time pilot and flying only 16 hours in the previous 3 months was a contributing factor. 5) the controller at rdu would seem to have some responsibility for this incident. However, from my experience it is common practice at rdu to clear traffic for takeoff and lndgs while aircraft are using runway 32. This has always been a concern to me and probably contributed to my attempt to set the aircraft down too quickly after the first bounce.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA MAKES GAR AND HAS NMAC WITH ACR.

Narrative: I ARRIVED ON RDU AIRSPACE, WAS HANDED OFF TO RDU APCH CTL AND TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 32. I WAS VECTORED TO A R BASE AND CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 32. THE WINDS WERE RPTED CALM BUT A L XWIND WAS PRESENT UNTIL 100 FT AGL. FIRST TOUCHDOWN WAS LONG (APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY) AND MY AIRSPD WAS 10 KTS ABOVE NOMINAL LNDG SPD. THE ACFT BOUNCED FAIRLY LIGHTLY BUT BECAME AIRBORNE AGAIN. THE SECOND TOUCHDOWN WAS SLIGHTLY NOSE LOW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDED LOW AMPLITUDE PORPOISING WAS NOTED. A DECISION TO EXECUTE A GAR WAS MADE. I IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE TWR OF MY INTENTION AND WAS TOLD TO FLY RWY HDG BY THE TWR. RDU HAS 2 MAIN RWYS, 5L/R AND 23L/R AND THE NON-INTERSECTING RWY 32 WHICH I WAS USING. MY INITIAL CONCERN WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF ACFT TFC ON RWY 23L JUST BEYOND THE END OF RWY 32 AND I GAINED 50 FT OF ALT BEFORE REACHING RWY 23L. THIS WAS AT THE EXPENSE OF 10-20 KTS OF MY AIRSPD AND I WAS FLYING AT ONLY 5 KTS ABOVE STALL SPD WHEN THE TWR ORDERED ME TO 'CLB IMMEDIATELY.' THERE WAS A FEW SECONDS OF DELAY BEFORE I COULD MANAGE ANY SIGNIFICANT RATE OF CLB. IT SOON BECAME CLR WHAT WAS WORRYING THE CTLR (AND NOW ME) WAS A LARGE JET ACFT LIFTING OFF RWY 23R WHICH I WAS ABOUT TO CROSS OVER. ALTHOUGH I LOST SIGHT OF THE ACFT (TO THE R AND BELOW MY ACFT) MY PAX BECAME VERY FRIGHTENED AND STATED THE ACFT WAS CLBING TOWARDS US AND LED ME TO BELIEVE A COLLISION WAS IMMINENT. I TURNED 10- 30 DEGS L AS AN EVASIVE MANEUVER ALMOST BY REFLEX BEFORE THE CTLR STRONGLY ADVISED ME TO 'FLY RWY HDG.' I COMPLIED IMMEDIATELY. THE ACFT PASSED BEHIND AND BELOW MY ACFT. I'M NOT SURE HOW CLOSE OUR ACFT CAME FROM EACH OTHER. THE CRISIS WAS OVER, BUT I NOW REALIZE I WAS SHAKEN BY THE INCIDENT AND SHOULD HAVE LEFT THE PATTERN FOR A FEW MINS. INSTEAD, I ACCEPTED AN IMMEDIATE CLRNC TO LAND AGAIN ON RWY 32. THIS LNDG WAS ROUGH, BUT SUCCESSFUL. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT HAD SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) A LOW SUN ANGLE AND A WESTWARD HDG SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE VISIBILITY WHILE I APCHED THE ARPT. BY THE TIME I HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT, I WAS CLOSE ENOUGH THAT MY APCH WAS SLIGHTLY RUSHED AND A STEEPER THAN NORMAL DSCNT WAS REQUIRED. 2) THE AIRSPD ON MY FINAL APCH WAS 10 KTS TOO FAST. THE ACFT I FLY IS AN SMA AND IS KNOWN TO HAVE A TENDENCY TO FLOAT IF THE LNDG SPD IS MUCH ABOVE 70 KTS. I HAVE LANDED ON THIS RWY OVER 100 TIMES WITHOUT INCIDENT, BUT I BELIEVE THE HIGHER AIRSPD COMBINED WITH OTHER UNFAVORABLE FACTORS LED TO THE ABORTED LNDG AND GAR. 3) MY RELUCTANCE TO INITIALLY ACCEPT THAT A GAR WAS NEEDED CAUSED ME TO DELAY LONG ENOUGH THAT I COULD NOT CLEANLY GAIN AIRSPD AND CLB QUICKLY OVER THE RWYS AHEAD. 4) BEING A RELATIVELY LOW TIME PLT AND FLYING ONLY 16 HRS IN THE PREVIOUS 3 MONTHS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. 5) THE CTLR AT RDU WOULD SEEM TO HAVE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT. HOWEVER, FROM MY EXPERIENCE IT IS COMMON PRACTICE AT RDU TO CLR TFC FOR TKOF AND LNDGS WHILE ACFT ARE USING RWY 32. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CONCERN TO ME AND PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO MY ATTEMPT TO SET THE ACFT DOWN TOO QUICKLY AFTER THE FIRST BOUNCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.