Narrative:

We indicated that we wanted to fly back to hillsboro and shoot an ILS to minimums and land on runway 12. Portland approach told us to call them back after we had ATIS information. When we left hillsboro, ATIS information was in effect so our reply to portland was that we had ATIS information. Next ATIS information stated that visual lndgs and departing on runway 30, the opposite runway from runway 12. Runway 12 is the only runway that supports an ILS. Also, hillsboro does not have radar, so they are dependent on portland. Portland cannot see us once we drop below 3000 ft typically. Portland cleared us to 4000 ft and asked if this would be to a full stop. Our reply was yes. Portland later asked us to descend again to 4000 ft and we stated that we were at 4000 ft, our previous assigned altitude. The controller apologized and assigned us 3000 ft. Portland vectored us towards the final approach course. We monitored the ADF and we were completely set up for the approach inclusive of setting the tower frequency of 119.3. We passed abeam abate, and our localizer needle was already swinging in towards center. X commented that portland must have dropped us and I agreed. I was just about to contact portland when a new voice said turn right to 090 degrees, cleared for ILS runway 12, maintain at or above 3000 ft until established, maintain VFR, squawk VFR, contact tower 119.3. Portland had turned us onto the final approach quite late and by the time that we reach 090 degrees we had passed the localizer and had to continue to turn right beyond 120 degrees to reintercept the localizer. As we intercepted the localizer our OM was going off. We contacted the tower immediately after the handoff and said hillsboro tower 'with you on the ILS runway 12.' the reply that we thought we heard was cleared to land. There was a great deal of static on the radio so there was an immediate question of clarity. This also seemed to us as an inappropriate response and we discussed this issue. I decided that the tower may not have received our first transmission and was about to contact the tower again when we saw another aircraft climbing out of hillsboro heading 300 degrees. A potential collision course. I immediately contacted the tower again and stated our position as being on the ILS runway for runway 12 inbound just about to intercept the middle marker. The tower asked if we were at the OM yet and as our middle marker was going off, I again stated that we were now at the middle marker at 460 ft. The controller then asked if this was our first call up, and my reply was a stern no. The radio went totally silent. I started to turn right but turned back to the original course. We never heard the other aircraft cleared for takeoff and did not know the other aircraft's intentions (the other aircraft may have asked for a left hand departure and at that time left hand traffic was in operation for runway 30. I did not want to lose sight of the other aircraft since it was in a nose high pitch from climb out. He did not know we were there and the tower never said anything to the other aircraft). We maintained VFR and underflew the other aircraft. Our altitude was 460 ft and we underflew the other aircraft with at least a 500 ft vertical clearance. At the threshold end of runway 30 the tower controller asked if we wanted to make a 360 degree turn and land on runway 30. My reply was 'right, a 360 to land on runway 30.' the controller came back on and said correction, a 180 for landing on runway 30. I said that would be fine, a 180 for landing on runway 30. After turning off the runway we contacted ground (121.7) and ground asked if we would contact the tower by phone. I said no problem. I contacted the tower by phone and they asked what happened. I explained what happened and they indicated that they never heard our first call up at the OM. They did tell me that the tower controller which had been handed our flight by portland was in process of briefing another controller during a shift change. It was quite clear to me that the tower was oblivious that we were on the ILS for runway 12. I believe that we were still talking to portland when the tower cleared the other aircraft for a touch-and-go on the downwind leg. Comments: first, let me say that I should have been more expeditious about contacting the tower the second time. However, my workload increased quite a bit just as we were being handed off due to the late turn onto final approach. The following suggestions may alleviate this sort of problem in the future. 1) that in a non radar environment when in a control zone, no traffic is allowed in opposition. I see this as a poor suggestion because in good VFR WX, pilots would be handicapped to maintain IFR currency. 2) that 3-5 mins prior to handoff, center makes an advisory communication with the final authority/authorized that a handoff will be forthwith in coming. This will at least alert the tower so better flow management may occur and perhaps avoid this type of happening. 3) that even though I defined what my intentions were with a controller at center, these intentions do not get passed on, either to another controller at the center or when a handoff between ctrs or the tower occurs. For that reason alone, I think that intentions or remarks must be passed along.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA TWIN ON PRACTICE ILS APCH HAS NMAC WITH SMA OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

Narrative: WE INDICATED THAT WE WANTED TO FLY BACK TO HILLSBORO AND SHOOT AN ILS TO MINIMUMS AND LAND ON RWY 12. PORTLAND APCH TOLD US TO CALL THEM BACK AFTER WE HAD ATIS INFO. WHEN WE LEFT HILLSBORO, ATIS INFO WAS IN EFFECT SO OUR REPLY TO PORTLAND WAS THAT WE HAD ATIS INFO. NEXT ATIS INFO STATED THAT VISUAL LNDGS AND DEPARTING ON RWY 30, THE OPPOSITE RWY FROM RWY 12. RWY 12 IS THE ONLY RWY THAT SUPPORTS AN ILS. ALSO, HILLSBORO DOES NOT HAVE RADAR, SO THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON PORTLAND. PORTLAND CANNOT SEE US ONCE WE DROP BELOW 3000 FT TYPICALLY. PORTLAND CLRED US TO 4000 FT AND ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE TO A FULL STOP. OUR REPLY WAS YES. PORTLAND LATER ASKED US TO DSND AGAIN TO 4000 FT AND WE STATED THAT WE WERE AT 4000 FT, OUR PREVIOUS ASSIGNED ALT. THE CTLR APOLOGIZED AND ASSIGNED US 3000 FT. PORTLAND VECTORED US TOWARDS THE FINAL APCH COURSE. WE MONITORED THE ADF AND WE WERE COMPLETELY SET UP FOR THE APCH INCLUSIVE OF SETTING THE TWR FREQ OF 119.3. WE PASSED ABEAM ABATE, AND OUR LOC NEEDLE WAS ALREADY SWINGING IN TOWARDS CTR. X COMMENTED THAT PORTLAND MUST HAVE DROPPED US AND I AGREED. I WAS JUST ABOUT TO CONTACT PORTLAND WHEN A NEW VOICE SAID TURN R TO 090 DEGS, CLRED FOR ILS RWY 12, MAINTAIN AT OR ABOVE 3000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, MAINTAIN VFR, SQUAWK VFR, CONTACT TWR 119.3. PORTLAND HAD TURNED US ONTO THE FINAL APCH QUITE LATE AND BY THE TIME THAT WE REACH 090 DEGS WE HAD PASSED THE LOC AND HAD TO CONTINUE TO TURN R BEYOND 120 DEGS TO REINTERCEPT THE LOC. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC OUR OM WAS GOING OFF. WE CONTACTED THE TWR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HDOF AND SAID HILLSBORO TWR 'WITH YOU ON THE ILS RWY 12.' THE REPLY THAT WE THOUGHT WE HEARD WAS CLRED TO LAND. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF STATIC ON THE RADIO SO THERE WAS AN IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF CLARITY. THIS ALSO SEEMED TO US AS AN INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSE AND WE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE. I DECIDED THAT THE TWR MAY NOT HAVE RECEIVED OUR FIRST XMISSION AND WAS ABOUT TO CONTACT THE TWR AGAIN WHEN WE SAW ANOTHER ACFT CLBING OUT OF HILLSBORO HDG 300 DEGS. A POTENTIAL COLLISION COURSE. I IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE TWR AGAIN AND STATED OUR POS AS BEING ON THE ILS RWY FOR RWY 12 INBOUND JUST ABOUT TO INTERCEPT THE MIDDLE MARKER. THE TWR ASKED IF WE WERE AT THE OM YET AND AS OUR MIDDLE MARKER WAS GOING OFF, I AGAIN STATED THAT WE WERE NOW AT THE MIDDLE MARKER AT 460 FT. THE CTLR THEN ASKED IF THIS WAS OUR FIRST CALL UP, AND MY REPLY WAS A STERN NO. THE RADIO WENT TOTALLY SILENT. I STARTED TO TURN R BUT TURNED BACK TO THE ORIGINAL COURSE. WE NEVER HEARD THE OTHER ACFT CLRED FOR TKOF AND DID NOT KNOW THE OTHER ACFT'S INTENTIONS (THE OTHER ACFT MAY HAVE ASKED FOR A L HAND DEP AND AT THAT TIME L HAND TFC WAS IN OP FOR RWY 30. I DID NOT WANT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE OTHER ACFT SINCE IT WAS IN A NOSE HIGH PITCH FROM CLBOUT. HE DID NOT KNOW WE WERE THERE AND THE TWR NEVER SAID ANYTHING TO THE OTHER ACFT). WE MAINTAINED VFR AND UNDERFLEW THE OTHER ACFT. OUR ALT WAS 460 FT AND WE UNDERFLEW THE OTHER ACFT WITH AT LEAST A 500 FT VERT CLRNC. AT THE THRESHOLD END OF RWY 30 THE TWR CTLR ASKED IF WE WANTED TO MAKE A 360 DEG TURN AND LAND ON RWY 30. MY REPLY WAS 'R, A 360 TO LAND ON RWY 30.' THE CTLR CAME BACK ON AND SAID CORRECTION, A 180 FOR LNDG ON RWY 30. I SAID THAT WOULD BE FINE, A 180 FOR LNDG ON RWY 30. AFTER TURNING OFF THE RWY WE CONTACTED GND (121.7) AND GND ASKED IF WE WOULD CONTACT THE TWR BY PHONE. I SAID NO PROB. I CONTACTED THE TWR BY PHONE AND THEY ASKED WHAT HAPPENED. I EXPLAINED WHAT HAPPENED AND THEY INDICATED THAT THEY NEVER HEARD OUR FIRST CALL UP AT THE OM. THEY DID TELL ME THAT THE TWR CTLR WHICH HAD BEEN HANDED OUR FLT BY PORTLAND WAS IN PROCESS OF BRIEFING ANOTHER CTLR DURING A SHIFT CHANGE. IT WAS QUITE CLR TO ME THAT THE TWR WAS OBLIVIOUS THAT WE WERE ON THE ILS FOR RWY 12. I BELIEVE THAT WE WERE STILL TALKING TO PORTLAND WHEN THE TWR CLRED THE OTHER ACFT FOR A TOUCH-AND-GO ON THE DOWNWIND LEG. COMMENTS: FIRST, LET ME SAY THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE EXPEDITIOUS ABOUT CONTACTING THE TWR THE SECOND TIME. HOWEVER, MY WORKLOAD INCREASED QUITE A BIT JUST AS WE WERE BEING HANDED OFF DUE TO THE LATE TURN ONTO FINAL APCH. THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS MAY ALLEVIATE THIS SORT OF PROB IN THE FUTURE. 1) THAT IN A NON RADAR ENVIRONMENT WHEN IN A CTL ZONE, NO TFC IS ALLOWED IN OPPOSITION. I SEE THIS AS A POOR SUGGESTION BECAUSE IN GOOD VFR WX, PLTS WOULD BE HANDICAPPED TO MAINTAIN IFR CURRENCY. 2) THAT 3-5 MINS PRIOR TO HDOF, CTR MAKES AN ADVISORY COM WITH THE FINAL AUTH THAT A HDOF WILL BE FORTHWITH IN COMING. THIS WILL AT LEAST ALERT THE TWR SO BETTER FLOW MGMNT MAY OCCUR AND PERHAPS AVOID THIS TYPE OF HAPPENING. 3) THAT EVEN THOUGH I DEFINED WHAT MY INTENTIONS WERE WITH A CTLR AT CTR, THESE INTENTIONS DO NOT GET PASSED ON, EITHER TO ANOTHER CTLR AT THE CTR OR WHEN A HDOF BTWN CTRS OR THE TWR OCCURS. FOR THAT REASON ALONE, I THINK THAT INTENTIONS OR REMARKS MUST BE PASSED ALONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.